

MODERN KOREA

*The Socialist North, Revolutionary
Perspectives in the South, and
Unification*

by KIM ^PBYONG SIK

International Publishers



New York

*Translated from the Japanese by Takeshi Haga
and edited by Victor Perlo*

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PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

It is indeed a great pleasure for the author to see his book translated into English and presented to the American reader.

As stated in the Preface to the Japanese Edition, this work endeavors to explain the basic problems of present-day Korea in the light of Premier Kim Il Sung's theory and policy, which for over forty years guided the victorious struggles of the Korean people. Here the reader will also learn what forces were responsible for blocking the full independence and self-determination of Korea, bringing such great distress and unhappiness to its people.

For the American people, it is important to understand correctly the present situation in both the North and the South of Korea, for this is inseparable from their own destiny as a people. As we learn from history, a nation that oppresses another cannot itself be free. In the author's opinion, if there be any people in the world today who should feel this truth most acutely, it is the American people.

The Koreans are a homogeneous people. Throughout their history they have fought heroically against invaders. But also they have always been a peace-loving people; never in their history have they threatened or invaded any other country.

It is important to note that during the past hundred years of modern Korea, imperialist invasion began, at the end of the feudal era, with an American armed ship, the *General Sherman*, in 1866. Since then the only imperialist invaders have been either the Japanese or American.

These two powers—at times conspiring with each other, and at other times in conflict—have occupied either the entire country or part of it, practicing their colonial policies. Should one seek to discern the difference in their policies, it will be found that Japanese imperialism once occupied the whole of

Korea and imposed a Japanese governor-general over it, while today U.S. imperialism occupies the southern half of the country and rules through a Korean puppet regime.

In July 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, Premier Katsura of Japan made a secret agreement with U.S. Secretary of War Taft, in which Japan recognized American imperialist occupation of the Philippines in return for U.S. recognition of Japanese imperialist designs upon Korea. It was then that Japan began to plunder Korea, leading to annexation in 1910. In the process, her imperialist ambitions grew rapidly until, using Korea as a stepping stone, she occupied Manchuria, the northeastern region of China, in 1932. From there, moving South into China, her aim was to occupy the whole of that country and eventually the whole of Asia under the slogan of the "Great East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." Having launched full-scale war in China, in 1937, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, plunging the entire Pacific into war.

After the Second World War, under American aegis, the ground was laid for the revival of Japanese militarism. Furthermore, great fortunes were amassed by Japanese monopoly in the supply of materials for the U.S. armed forces during the Korean and Vietnam wars. This fed the rapid recovery of the Japanese economy, leading to substantial rearmament and to the revival of militarism.

As is now well established, the secret Johnson-Sato agreement of January 1965—a modern version of the Katsura-Taft secret agreement of 1905—provided for the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the pact between the puppet regime in Seoul and Japan. Through the ROK-Japan treaty, Japan gained the right of joint exploitation of South Korea alongside American imperialism, as compensation for her support of the U.S. aggressive policy in Asia. From this resulted the U.S.-Japan-ROK triple military alliance and the

perpendicular joint strategical system, with the United States at the head.

In November 1969, after the Nixon-Sato talks in Washington, a joint communique announced that South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam, as well as "other countries" in the Far East, were of serious concern to the security of Japan. This is merely an indirect way of indicating Japan's participation in American aggression in Asia, and at the same time reviving the erstwhile dream of the "Great East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."

Thus, in the past century the historical development of modern Korea was determined largely by the intrigues and intervention of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms, and the Korean people were compelled to fight them. One cannot understand the problems of modern Korea without knowing this historical background.

At the same time, it is equally important to know that the long anti-imperialist struggles of the Korean people, including the socialist victory in the North, were carried out under the revolutionary leadership of Kim Il Sung, now Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Inspired by his revolutionary theory, the *Juche* idea, during the past four decades the Korean people progressed from the national liberation struggle, to the people's democratic revolution and to the socialist revolution. Through various stages of revolution, final victory has been won, despite the extreme devastation of the Korean War, in the foundation of the socialist fatherland in the North and in socialist construction.

In South Korea, where fascistic oppression goes from bad to worse, revolutionaries and patriots recently organized the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, and in a proclamation set forth their program. It is hoped that the world, and particularly the American people, will understand the significance of this new development.

The author did his best to explain the problems of modern Korea, basing himself upon Premier Kim Il Sung's theory. He can only hope that this will satisfy the reader's expectations. If the work serves to clarify some aspect of the situation, the author will be well satisfied.

In conclusion, the author wishes to express his appreciation to James S. Allen, president of International Publishers, for his invaluable advice; to the translator, Takeshi Haga, and to the English editor, Victor Perlo.

—THE AUTHOR

*June 25, 1970, on the
20th anniversary of the
outbreak of the Korean War*

PREFACE TO THE JAPANESE EDITION

This book deals with essential questions concerning present-day Korea on the basis of the ideas and theories, the strategy and tactics, developed by Premier Kim Il Sung. A most important source document is Kim Il Sung's report delivered at the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Delegates to the celebration from abroad regarded this report as a valuable contribution to the theory of socialism, pertinent to the international communist movement generally.

In the report, Kim Il Sung:

(1) Analyzed and summed up the Korean people's struggles for the conquest of power, and the successive stages of the national liberation revolution, democratic revolution, socialist revolution and socialist construction.

(2) Scientifically clarified theoretical questions of the transitional period and the proletarian dictatorship, and of the complete and final victory of socialism. His solutions represented a major, original contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory.

(3) Elaborated the strategy of anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle at the present stage, and the basic policy of completing the revolution in South Korea and of unifying North and South Korea.

This important report provides a programmatic guide to the complete victory of the Korean revolution and contributes to ensuring the victory of the international communist movement and the world revolution. It enriches the treasure-house of Marxism-Leninism.

The present volume is in three parts. The first deals with socialist construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the second with the revolution in South Korea and the unification of the entire country, and the third with the relationship between the Korean revolution and the world revolutionary struggle.

The period of 20 years since the founding of the DPRK is but a short moment in the 5,000-years' history of our Korean people. But in these 20 years the Koreans have carried out tremendous social, economic and cultural transformations that our forefathers were unable to achieve in thousands of years. Formerly a colonial, semi-feudal society, with a backward agricultural economy, the northern half of our Republic has developed into a socialist industrial-agrarian country. This was accomplished through difficult socialist construction after the Korean War (1950-53). Now it is being developed further into an advanced socialist industrial country through implementation of the Seven-Year Plan.

Foreign visitors praise North Korea as an example of a socialist country useful for all countries and peoples. We Korean people take boundless pride in having such a splendid socialist country as our fatherland.

This victory would have been unthinkable without the correct guidance of Kim Il Sung, extending over a period of 40 years. Revolution is a complex and difficult undertaking—to destroy the old and create the new. This requires excellent leadership, great leadership.

Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma, but a science. Naturally, it is not necessarily developed only in a big country. Failure to develop the science in small countries also, subservience to developments in big countries, inevitably leads to dogmatism.

Kim Il Sung's revolutionary ideas are based on the concept of *Juche** which rejects subservience and dogmatism. This

*Pronounced chewché.

concept embraces the principle of self-reliance in ideology and in politics, in the economy and in military affairs. It means to think creatively about all problems ourselves, to solve them in accord with actual conditions in our own country, independently with our own strength, and in accord with our own revolutionary interests.

Through the *Juche* principle we can apply to Korea the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism, the experience of other countries, while opposing subservience and dogmatism. No people can carry through revolutionary construction successfully without giving full play to the spirit of self-reliance, in this way.

The masters of the Korean revolution are the Workers Party of Korea and the Korean people. The Korean people themselves are the decisive factor. Nobody else can carry it out for us. No revolution can be exported or imported.

If a nation becomes subservient, it will lose independence. If an individual becomes subservient, he becomes incapable of making an independent judgment and becomes a useless person. Historical experience in Korea shows that all those who were subservient became traitors to the nation. A typical example of this is the Pak Chung Hi* clique, which has turned South Korea over to plunder and military occupation by U.S. imperialism.

While upholding the line of self-reliance based on the idea of *Juche* of Kim Il Sung, we consider that this idea must strengthen proletarian internationalism. For the line of self-reliance is inseparable from proletarian internationalism. The two must not be counterposed under any circumstances or for any reason whatsoever.

Recently, the U.S. imperialists and the Pak Chung Hi clique have been intensifying new war provocation maneuvers more and more openly, while the Japanese militarists have been

*Referred to in the U.S. press as President Park of South Korea.

making serious efforts to reinvade South Korea. We cannot overlook the fact, under these circumstances, that slanderous attacks are being made on the foreign policy and the independent and principled policy of unifying Korea followed by the Democratic People's Republic. Thus it is necessary to strengthen further real friendship between the Korean and Japanese people.

Already many representatives of various circles of Japan have visited the DPRK, and economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries are developing. At the same time, studies are being made of the politics, economy and culture of the DPRK and articles dealing with these questions are frequently published. However, these studies and articles plainly are not sufficient to meet the actual need.

One cannot understand present-day Korea without knowing the ideas and theories, strategy and tactics, of Premier Kim Il Sung, which are related to the basic questions of Marxism-Leninism in our era.

The author wishes to draw special attention to Chapter 4 of Part I, which outlines Kim Il Sung's important recent contribution, "On Some Theoretical Problems of Socialist Economy."

The author hopes this book will help readers to understand the problems of present-day Korea.

April 10, 1969

—THE AUTHOR

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PART ONE

Theory and Practice
of Socialist Construction
in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea

In the past 50 years, the Korean people have fulfilled successfully the tasks of anti-imperialist, national liberation, the people's democratic and socialist revolution in the DPRK, and other tasks under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, and they are continuing to forge ahead toward the unification of their fatherland and to complete victory of the socialist revolution throughout Korea.

CHAPTER I

Founding and Development of the DPRK

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the real fatherland of all the Korean people; the standard bearer of their freedom, independence and happiness; the most powerful weapon for the construction of socialism and communism, which the Korean people have gained through lengthy, fierce, revolutionary struggles. Premier Kim Il Sung said:

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the real fatherland of all the Korean people, and it has their unreserved support and love. Our state is completely democratic and stable. It was established by the people and relies on the united, solid forces of all the people, based on a worker-peasant alliance which is led by the working class and which involves broad masses of people in state affairs. Our Republic is a genuine people's state which ensures all strata of the people, including the workers and peasants, not only political freedom and rights but also material and cultural well-being.¹

In 1950 U.S. imperialism launched its armed aggression against our young Republic. Our people were victorious in this bitter and most difficult struggle. Our country dealt a disastrous blow to U.S. imperialism, shattering the myth of its invincibility and starting it on the long downhill road to its ultimate demise.

Immediately after the 1953 armistice ending the Korean War, the U.S. imperialists arrogantly declared that Korea would not be able to rise again, even in 100 years. However, the Korean people smashed this prediction by forging ahead

toward socialism and communism, successfully carrying out historic transformations.

The power of the Republic has eliminated completely all forms of exploitation and oppression in urban and rural areas, a centuries-old aspiration of mankind; has developed the great Chollima* movement, the general line of socialist construction, and has laid firm foundations for an independent, national economy.

Today, the DPRK has become a really independent nation with an advanced socialist system, an independent national economy and a flowering national culture.

Indeed, these years have been a glorious 20 years of struggle and victory, of creativity and advance.

1. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DPRK

The question of power is the fundamental question in the revolution and the vital question on which depend the victory of the revolution and the success of constructive work [writes Kim Il Sung]. The working class can achieve complete class and national liberation and win in the cause of socialism and communism only when it takes power firmly into its hands, constantly enhances its functions and role, and steadily strengthens the dictatorship of the proletariat.²

As the historical experience of all the revolutionary struggles of the working class of the entire world shows, the proletariat cannot liberate the masses of people from exploitation and oppression without overthrowing the state power of the old bourgeoisie and without establishing its own revolutionary power. Only when it has achieved political power can the working class sweep away all the political, economic and social foundations of the exploiting classes and build socialism and communism.

*The "flying-horse" movement, explained in Part I, Chapter 3, Section 5.

In all exploiting societies, political power has been the most powerful means and instrument of domination and oppression by the exploiting classes against the exploited classes. In capitalist society, the last exploiting society that mankind experiences, bourgeois state power is thus used by the capitalists to oppress and suppress the revolutionary struggles of the working class. Consequently, the question of power is the fundamental question of revolution and is the life-and-death question that determines the success or failure of revolution and the achievement of socialist construction.

That is precisely why all revolutionary struggles of the working class should be concentrated ultimately on the question of power and why the political struggle of the working class, including armed struggle, is the highest form of class struggle. Because the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, too, is a question of power, it is the sharpest question of principle, on which a Marxist-Leninist can make no concessions whatsoever.

Korean Communists, headed by Kim Il Sung, consistently have paid close attention to the question of power during the entire period in which they led the revolution, and they have fought firmly for its correct solution. To begin with there is the problem of how to conquer power; then the question of the appropriate form of exercising power during each stage of the revolution. The problem also arises of how to prepare revolutionary cadres to maintain and exercise power. And, finally, there is the question of how to expand and strengthen the political, economic and social foundations of people's power.

The DPRK is the great achievement of the Korean Communists and people, through bloody and difficult struggles, for the correct solution of the question of power. The entire 20-year history of the Republic may be said to have been the victorious road of struggle for the most correct solutions.

As early as the 1930's, Kim Il Sung defined scientifically the question of power, indicated the Marxist-Leninist line for its

solution in our country, and personally led the struggles for its realization. He regarded revolutionary violence as a necessary ingredient of that struggle. He advanced the line of developing organized armed struggles with a powerful standing armed force based on the broad masses of people under the banner of Marxism-Leninism. Kim Il Sung said: "Without revolutionary violence the working class cannot triumph in the struggle to overthrow the power machine of the exploiting classes and establish political rule."³

When the fascist terror of barbarous, heavily armed Japanese imperialism raged, there was not even the slightest possibility of legal political activity. Thus the method of revolutionary violence, of anti-Japanese armed struggle, was the only correct line for smashing the terror machine, for wresting power from Japanese imperialism by the Korean people. As experience has shown, organized violence, that is, armed struggle in a national liberation war, is the most decisive form of political struggle for national liberation. This is inevitable in view of the aggressive nature of imperialism.

Counter-revolutionary violence is the essential method of domination used by the exploiting classes. Human history teaches us that no ruling class has yet surrendered its power of its own accord, and that no reactionary class has retired gracefully from power without resorting to counter-revolutionary violence. In fact, imperialists cling more and more desperately to violent means in order to maintain their rule as their doomsday approaches. The imperialists not only oppress their own people but also launch aggression against other peoples, mobilize military forces for the purpose of invading and plundering other countries, and take repressive actions against any revolutionary advances of oppressed peoples. Under these conditions, the liberation struggles of an oppressed people can never triumph without recourse to revolutionary violence aimed at overthrowing the reactionary dictatorial machine of imperialists and their collaborators.

The line of anti-Japanese armed struggle presented by Kim Il Sung followed the *Juche* principle, in which Marxism-Leninism was applied creatively to the concrete realities of our country.

The 15 years of armed struggle by the anti-Japanese guerrillas, organized by progressive workers, peasants and patriotic youth under the direct leadership of Kim Il Sung, developed to its highest plane the national liberation struggle of the Korean people for independence of the fatherland and laid a firm foundation for the establishment of people's power.

In the course of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, Kim Il Sung clearly defined the character and form of the power to be established in the future. On the basis of a scientific analysis of national and class contradictions and of social and economic conditions, he defined the character of the revolution as an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution. As for the form of power to be established, he presented the view that it should be a people's revolutionary government based on a united front of broad anti-Japanese forces spearheaded by the peasant-worker alliance led by the working class.

This perspective for a people's revolutionary government was clearly laid down in the 10-point program of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland, formed on May 5, 1936, as the first Marxist-Leninist national united front in the history of our country. For instance, Article 1 of the 10-point program states: "To mobilize the Korean nation generally and realize a broad-based anti-Japanese united front and thereby to overthrow predatory Japanese imperialist rule and establish a genuine people's government of Korea." The program also stressed the need to organize a revolutionary army and defined the political, economic and social tasks to be carried out by the people's power.

It specified policies for realizing freedom of speech, press, assembly and association, equality of the sexes, and other democratic freedoms and rights.

The program called for confiscation of land, enterprises, railways, banks, ships, farms, irrigation and other facilities in the hands of the Japanese imperialists, and of lands and properties owned by traitorous, pro-Japanese elements. These fully reflected the basic demands for land reform and nationalization of key industries to be fulfilled in the stage of the people's democratic revolution.

Further, the program called for an eight-hour working day, implementation of a democratic system of labor safeguards, development of national industry, agriculture and commerce — that is, the construction of an independent national economy — development of a democratic educational system and national culture, and various other tasks.

In this way, the 10-point program integrated the task of national liberation and that of social revolution, thereby embracing the basic demands of the working class in the stage of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution. During that period there was a view prevalent that revolutionary power everywhere had to take the same form as in the USSR, namely to be exercised through Soviets of workers and peasants deputies. Advocates of this line ignored the character of the immediate revolution and wrongly demanded that socialism be realized at once, starting with liberated guerrilla bases. They also advocated elimination of all private ownership of land, including that of working peasants as well as landlords, and the forced establishment of collective cultivation.

This view confused stages of revolutionary struggle and did serious damage to the revolutionary movement in Korea. However, Kim Il Sung led those who considered it necessary to strive for establishment of a people's revolutionary government based on a broad united front of anti-Japanese forces. These were spearheaded by the worker-peasant alliance, in turn led by the working class. The line of a people's revolutionary government was of great significance. It corresponded

to similar tendencies in the world Communist movement, in the formation of broad anti-imperialist and anti-fascist united fronts, and the struggle to create people's democratic revolutionary governments by the national liberation forces.

Kim Il Sung consciously prepared revolutionary cadres for establishing people's power in the future, while undergoing fierce anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. Thus, the guerrillas were tempered by the study of Marxism-Leninism and by practical struggles, and they won the wholehearted confidence of the people by fighting devotedly for the interests of the masses. Many revolutionary leaders were trained in Kim Il Sung's *Juche* ideas, which were fostered in various revolutionary organizations, including the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland. Successful preparation of these core leaders enabled them to become effective government and Party leaders after liberation, and quickly to expand and strengthen the people's power.

During the anti-Japanese armed struggle valuable experience was gained for the establishment of people's power. The practical struggle proved that people's power could be established only through revolutionary violence and that only people's power can represent the interests of the broad masses of people in all walks of life under the leadership of the working class.

Experience in the course of the rigorous anti-Japanese conflict showed that the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance should be given full play in all areas of people's power; the revolutionary line of independence, self-reliance and self-defense should be the guide to action so that the people's power may be strengthened and developed, and its tasks sufficiently fulfilled; the leadership should carry out thoroughly the mass line, constantly improve its capacity and methods of action so that people's power may surely maintain firm ties with the masses.

In this way, the form of power to be established was clearly

defined. Revolutionary cadres for establishing people's power were trained and tempered in the course of the bitter anti-Japanese armed struggle, organized and developed for the conquest of power. Rich experience for the operation of people's power was gained through management of the people's revolutionary government established in the guerrilla bases and liberated areas.

As Kim Il Sung wrote: "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a political power which inherited the brilliant revolutionary traditions of the glorious anti-Japanese armed struggle waged by the Korean Communists and patriotic people and is a great revolutionary achievement won by our people through an arduous struggle against the internal and external enemies under the leadership of our Party."⁴

2. HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DPRK

The Marxist-Leninist line of people's power, presented by Kim Il Sung during the anti-Japanese armed struggle, was realized fully and thoroughly after liberation in the northern half of the Republic.

The foundation for the establishment of people's power laid during the anti-Japanese armed struggle had a decisive effect on its implementation after liberation in our country and on strengthening and developing it. It was on this foundation that the question of power, the most fundamental and difficult question in a revolution, was correctly solved after liberation from Japanese imperialism. And people's power quickly was strengthened and developed on the basis of that firm foundation.

Under conditions in which the U.S. imperialists were occupying South Korea and foreign and domestic reactionaries were herded together there, opposing the founding of a unified independent state for the Korean people and schem-

ing to split the nation, the policy of constructing a powerful democratic base in the northern half was the correct Marxist-Leninist political line. Kim Il Sung explained it as follows:

Under existing circumstances, the tasks confronting the Communists in North Korea were to carry through a democratic revolution against the remnant forces of imperialism and the feudal forces and to build a unified, democratic independent state, by uniting their ranks promptly and rallying the broad masses of the people around themselves. Without energetically furthering the revolution in North Korea, already liberated, and creating a powerful revolutionary base there to meet the aggressive policy of the U.S. imperialists, we could not plan successfully for the country's unification and the all-Korea victory of the revolution.⁵

From the moment the U.S. imperialists landed in South Korea after World War II, Premier Kim Il Sung understood their aggressive nature and foresaw the complexities and difficulties ahead for the Korean revolution. He started to construct a powerful base for its victory.

The formation of a broad united front to rally the masses of people in all walks of life was the first question to be solved after the Liberation. It was on this basis that a really potent people's power could be established.*

*In those days, the right opportunists, welcoming the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces as if they were a liberation army and disregarding the interests of the overwhelming majority of the people, but representing the interests of landlords and capitalists, asserted that a bourgeois republic should be founded. On the other hand, the left opportunists, ignoring the objective law of the social development of the country, demanded that the power of proletarian dictatorship should be established immediately after the Liberation by skipping over the stage of democratic revolution.

Subsequent developments show clearly that these assertions reflected a counter-revolutionary desire to divorce workers and broad sections of the people, beginning with workers and peasants, from the revolution and thereby to destroy the revolution. These developments also show that the Marxist-Leninist line of establishing people's power, presented by Kim Il Sung, was the only correct line.

Thus, early in 1946, a united front was formed of different parties and groupings, democratic forces of various social strata. The old machinery of Japanese colonial rule was smashed thoroughly by mobilizing broad sections of the masses in the struggle. People's committees were organized in all corners of the country, on the basis of which the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea, a political power of a new type, was founded. This was by nature a people's power, relying on the democratic national united front of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic forces, based on the worker-peasant alliance led by the working class. In function, it was a people's democratic dictatorship.

Its basic task was to carry out the 10-point program of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland and the 20-point program presented in March 1946, and to build a strong democratic revolutionary base in North Korea. The provisional regime enabled the Korean people completely to wipe out the old machinery of colonial domination of Japanese imperialism. It operated as a dictatorship against subservient capitalists, traitors to the nation, pro-Japanese elements and other reactionaries. At the same time it guaranteed complete democracy for the broad masses of people, including national capitalists. Premier Kim Il Sung wrote:

The Party formed a united front with all the political parties, all groups and democratic forces of all strata, and organized and mobilized the broad masses of people to wipe out, first of all, the old ruling machinery of Japanese imperialism thoroughly and set up state power of a new type. Thus it solved the question of power, which is the key issue in revolution. The state power we have set up is genuine people's power, based on the worker-peasant alliance led by the working class and representing the interests of the people of all strata, and it has become a powerful weapon for revolution and construction.⁶

A series of democratic reforms—beginning with land reform, nationalization of key industries, rights of labor, equal rights

for women—which the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea carried out successfully, not only eliminated the economic foundations of landlords, comprador capitalists and all other reactionary classes and opened up a broad road of social progress, but also consolidated the social and economic basis of the people's power. They were decisive in turning the northern half of the Republic into a powerful democratic base of the revolution.

Land reform is an urgent question that should be solved in the stage of democratic revolution. It was of special importance for Korea, then a backward colonial agricultural country where the peasantry formed the overwhelming majority of the population. Only if the land question is solved correctly can the peasantry be liberated from feudal landlord exploitation, can the economic base of the reactionary forces, deeply rooted in the countryside for several centuries, be done away with. Thus the broad peasant masses can be won to the side of the revolution, raising their political enthusiasm, and the bases for democratizing the political, economic and cultural life of a country can be strengthened. The winning of the masses is the vital question that determines the success or failure of the revolution, and to win the broad masses of peasants to the side of the revolution was of decisive significance at the time.

Above all, the correct solution of the land question makes it possible to expedite the development of agricultural productive forces, which have been stagnant, by freeing them from feudal fetters and promoting the rehabilitation and development of the national industry and economy in general.

The Provisional People's Committee defined clearly the kind of lands to be confiscated, taking fully into consideration the relations of class forces in the countryside, the relations of landownership and the centuries-old aspirations of peasants for land. Land reform was carried out by confiscation and distribution without compensation.

First, as a result of land reform, feudal landownership, the social and economic base of the undemocratic reactionary

forces, was done away with once and for all in the rural villages of the northern half of the Republic. Peasants, liberated from bondage, faced a bright future, free to develop agriculture rapidly and improve their living standards.

Second, the land reform changed the countryside in the northern half of the Republic from a stronghold of reaction into a stronghold of democracy. The freed peasants became masters of their lands, a basic force for constructing a prosperous, powerful, united, democratic independent state, together with the working class, the most progressive class of the country.

Third, the reform was the first complete land reform ever carried out in the Far East, and has encouraged the liberation struggles of the oppressed peoples of the East who are fighting against imperialism and domestic feudal forces.

The nationalization of key industries was decisive in wiping out the political and economic bases of the imperialists and domestic reactionaries and in promoting the general rehabilitation and development of the national economy. While the imperialists and subservient capitalists control the main arteries of the economy, they will continue to plunder and exploit, and a country cannot attain sovereignty and independence or economic development. Only when the state has a firm hold on the basic means of production and has socialized them can the political and economic bases of the imperialists and domestic reactionaries be wiped out. Then the country can develop its national economy, increase the welfare of the entire people, and lay the foundation for a socialist economy.

The Provisional People's Committee implemented the Law on the Nationalization of Important Industries in August 1946. Under it, all large factories, mines, power stations, railway transport, telecommunication facilities, banks and commercial and cultural establishments were made the property of the Korean people, the only legitimate owners of these facilities. Further, factories and other enterprises owned by pro-

Japanese elements and traitors who had fled with the Japanese were confiscated without compensation and became the property of the people.

It was not for the good of the Korean people that the Japanese imperialists developed industry in Korea. It was to secure large colonial profits by plundering the rich resources of our country and by exploiting the Korean people. Moreover, the Japanese imperialists also utilized many Korean industrial enterprises for the purpose of supplying military goods for their aggressive war. The Korean people were forced to lead a difficult life of extreme hunger and poverty just before Liberation. However, this unjust and humiliating system was done away with once and for all, and the factories, mines, power plants, railways, banks and other enterprises became the property of the Korean people, to be used to develop a rich and powerful fatherland and increase public welfare.

As a result of the nationalization of key industries, the root causes of social ills basically were removed in the northern half of the Republic, and socialist relations of production were created for the first time in Korea. Democratic reforms, beginning with the Labor Law and the Law on the Equality of the Sexes, were enforced, putting an end to unlimited exploitation of the working class and liberating women from feudal subordination. Women acquired the same rights as men in all spheres of social life.

Moreover, the Provisional People's Committee successfully solved the question of national cadres, particularly important in the construction of a new society. Not only did it achieve encouraging results in the training of national cadres, but it also prepared a revolutionary armed force to defend the people's democratic system from enemy aggression in establishing the Korean People's Army on February 8, 1948.

In this way the line of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution presented by Kim Il Sung in the days of anti-Japanese armed struggle was carried out completely in

the northern half of the Republic, and the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea successfully carried out its historical mission.

Radical changes were effected in social, economic and class relations in the northern half of the Republic, a people's democratic system was established and a powerful revolutionary base for an all-Korea victory was founded. In other words, all colonial and semi-feudal components were removed, and socialist economic relations, based on state and cooperative economy, came to occupy a leading position in all areas of the people's economy, with capitalist relations confined to only small commodity production by private farms and handicraft enterprises in urban areas and to some commerce and small-scale industry. Concerning class relations, landlords, comprador capitalists, pro-Japanese elements and traitors were eliminated and working people became the masters of the country, the leading role of the working class increased and the worker-peasant alliance was consolidated. In this way, the balance of forces developed decisively in favor of the revolution.

These developments showed that transition to the socialist revolution was on the order of the day and that conditions for it had been created. With deep insight, Kim Il Sung programmed the further development of people's power for the successful carrying out of the tasks of the socialist revolution. On November 3, 1946, the first democratic election in the history of Korea was held in the northern half of the Republic. And the People's Committee of North Korea—no longer "Provisional"—the first proletarian dictatorship in the country, was created in February 1947 at the people's assemblies of provinces, cities and counties of North Korea.

The People's Committee of North Korea, functioning as the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat, carried out tasks for the transition to socialism and fought for development of the people's economic plan. It achieved successful results in

this struggle. The people's economic plan for the fiscal year of 1947 was the first economic plan in the history of our country. When it was made public, waverers and reactionaries placed obstructions in the way of its implementation. But the People's Committee of North Korea organized powerful workers' production emulation movements, headed by members of the Workers Party in factories, mines and rural communities. The plan was carried out successfully through an upsurge of labor enthusiasm, dealing a shattering blow to obstructionists.

This success established firmly the leading position of socialist economy. By 1947 state-controlled industry accounted for 80.2 per cent and private industry for only 19.8 per cent of industrial output. Mining was completely state-controlled. Industrial production jumped 70 per cent, and labor productivity 51 per cent, in fiscal 1947 in comparison with the previous year.

The following year's plan was also fulfilled successfully. These results, combined with democratic reforms, further expanded and consolidated the social and economic basis of people's power and provided the foundations for construction of a Republic. In addition, a large number of core revolutionary cadres were brought up in the course of the fulfillment of the people's democratic revolution, and broad sections of the people were politically awakened.

These positive factors created a firm foundation for a sovereign, democratic, united, independent state, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in 1948. Kim Il Sung wrote of this step:

On the basis of great socio-economic changes in the northern sector, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was founded in September 1948, according to the general will of the entire Korean people, amidst a nationwide struggle against U.S. imperialists and their stooges, who had become more pronounced in their colonial enslavement policy and maneuvers to split our nation.⁷

After liberation from Japanese imperialism, a situation entirely different from that which prevailed in North Korea was created in South Korea.

U.S. imperialism followed a complete colonial enslavement policy as soon as it occupied South Korea on September 8, 1945, and carried out two basic policies for this purpose. They suppressed politically all the initiatives of the South Korean people opposed to the colonial enslavement policy and all democratic forces. They mobilized and encouraged all the reactionary forces willing to help the aggressive policy of splitting the Korean nation and turning Korea into a colony again. Thus, people's committees that had been set up on the initiative of the people immediately after liberation were ordered disbanded. Reactionaries at home and abroad were gathered in South Korea, and former agents of Japan became the stooges of U.S. imperialism and began to oppose the people. Economically, the U.S. imperialists obstructed the development of Korea's industry and national economy and followed a policy of subordinating them to the U.S. economy. They disposed at will of factories and enterprises formerly owned by Japanese imperialism in the name of "enemy assets," selling them to pro-Japanese elements, traitors, greedy businessmen and American entrepreneurs. They even destroyed some outright. Instead of distributing land to farmers, they cooked up a plunderous organ called Shin Han Public Corporation,* which began to exploit the farming masses more ruthlessly than had the Japanese imperialists.

*The predecessor of Shin Han Public Corporation was the notorious Toyo Takushoku Co., Ltd., which ruthlessly exploited the rural communities of Korea as a colonial company during Japanese rule. U.S. occupation authorities simply renamed the company Shin Han Public Corporation. They also took over the land formerly owned by Toyo Takushoku Co., Ltd., as well as other land formerly owned by Japanese. These lands were later transferred to Shin Han Public Corporation, through which fabulous sums of money in the form of land rentals in kind were raked in.

In this way, South Korea was again plunged down the road to bankruptcy, misfortune, ruin and subordination. The policy of aggression and colonial enslavement followed by the United States necessarily aroused strong anger and anti-American, national salvation struggles among the South Korean people.

At the end of World War II Soviet troops, together with Korean and Chinese patriotic forces, smashed the Japanese armies on the continent of Asia. Soviet troops were temporarily in North Korea, while American troops seized control of South Korea. A Soviet-U.S. Joint Committee was set up to facilitate the unification of all Korea under a single democratic government. However, the U.S. imperialists sabotaged the meetings of the Joint Committee and moved to set up their own puppet regime in South Korea, thereby revealing their intention to perpetuate the division of the country.

This action stimulated and intensified the national salvation struggles of the masses in South Korea. It erupted in a sharp, violent struggle at the time of the "separate election" in May 1948, when more than 140 polling stations and a number of police stations were destroyed and burned.

To save Korea from this grave national crisis, Kim Il Sung submitted the draft Provisional Constitution of Korea for discussion by all the people North and South and he proposed the election of an all-Korea supreme legislative assembly through a general, direct, equal and secret ballot. At the same time he called on the political parties and social organizations of South Korea to hold a South-North joint conference to oppose the "separate election" and to discuss ways and means of saving the nation.

In response to this call, such a joint conference was held in Pyongyang on April 20, 1948. At the conference, Kim Il Sung reported on the political situation and the tasks for the unification of the fatherland. On the basis of his report, the conference adopted a resolution completely exposing the

fraudulent nature of the planned "separate election" and called on the people to boycott it. The conference, attended from right to left irrespective of political persuasions, gave full support to Kim Il Sung's report.

Defying the Korean people's opposition, the United States forcibly carried out the "separate election," resorting to fascist terror and suppression, and it cooked up a puppet regime consisting of a group of landlords, subservient capitalists and traitors.

On June 29, 1948, a conference of leaders of various political parties and social organizations of North and South Korea decided to hold an all-Korea general election on August 25 to organize a supreme legislative organ, in line with the proposal of Kim Il Sung. Participating in the general election, held according to this decision, were 99.97 per cent of the total eligible voters in North Korea and 77.52 per cent in South Korea, despite ruthless suppression by the United States and its stooges. As a result of the election, 572 deputies to the Supreme People's Assembly were elected from the North and South. The first session of the Supreme People's Assembly, held in Pyongyang in September 1948, named the country the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, adopted a constitution and established a government of the Republic headed by Premier Kim Il Sung.

The founding of the DPRK was in accord with the unanimous desire of all the Korean people to win freedom and independence for their fatherland. It was an event of historic significance in the revolutionary struggle of the Korean people. It was also a brilliant victory for the Korean people, united firmly around the Workers Party of Korea under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, in their tenacious struggle for a prosperous, sovereign, independent state.

As a result of the founding of the Republic, the Korean people achieved a homeland, becoming a powerful and dignified people no one would dare to insult, people of a sovereign,

independent state, people who were building their fatherland on their own, with sovereignty completely in their hands. The Korean people, under the banner of the Republic, made its debut anew on the stage of history, and the fatherland, which had been obliterated from the map of the world for a long time, took its place shoulder to shoulder with the world's countries, large and small, on an equal footing.

As a result of the founding of the Republic, the Korean people acquired a more powerful weapon with which to achieve socialism and communism. That weapon is the dictatorship of the proletariat, making it possible for them to assure the overwhelming superiority of the revolutionary forces over the counter-revolutionary forces on a nationwide scale, to smash all possible maneuvers of the imperialists and reactionaries and to accelerate the revolution and socialist construction.

Finally, the founding of the Republic gave boundless strength and encouragement to the entire Korean people who, with their destiny in their hands, had risen in revolutionary struggle to create a bright, new life for themselves and to unify the divided fatherland. At the same time, it increased decisively the national pride and confidence of the people, who had become masters of their own country. Today the South Korean people, encouraged by the victory achieved in revolution and construction in the northern half of the Republic, are developing tenacious struggles in defiance of fascist suppression and repression to realize national unification under the banner of the Republic.

Indeed, the DPRK is the banner of freedom and independence for the entire people, the symbol of their victory and glory, and a powerful weapon in the struggle to achieve the unification of the fatherland and the building of socialism and communism.

3. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE DPRK

In the 20 years since its founding, the Republic has traversed a glorious and victorious road under the leadership of Premier Kim Il Sung and fulfilled its role as a weapon for socialist revolution and construction. It has strengthened constantly the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and carried out revolutionary tasks in all domains, including political, economic, cultural and military affairs.

The political power of the Republic smashed revolts by the defeated exploiting classes and secured the leading position of the state sector in the economic field, while restricting capitalist development, fought for the planned development of the national economy and achieved great results.

On the basis of the plans of 1947 and 1948, the two-year economic plan for 1949 and 1950 was adopted. In those days, preparations for a socialist transformation of the relations of production were set into motion, and substantial results were achieved in eliminating the colonial distortions of the economy and laying the foundations for an independent national economy.

However, this preparatory work for the transition to socialism had to be suspended when U.S. imperialism launched its predatory armed aggression against the North on June 25, 1950. The hard-fought three-year war for defense of the fatherland was the most severe trial for the Republic and the entire Korean people.

The Workers Party of Korea and the government of the Republic put everything on a wartime footing, in response to Premier Kim Il Sung's call "All for Victory in the War," and organized and mobilized the people for a decisive struggle. The people fought heroically with patriotic devotion and self-

sacrifice. The Korean People's Army engaged in fierce counter-offensives to liberate areas in the southern half, then in strategic retreat and again in hard-fought battles for renewed advance and in defense of positions. In the midst of intensified enemy air-raids, workers, farmers, youths and students in the rear concentrated on wartime production, supported the front, and surmounted all obstacles and difficulties to insure victory.

The peoples of the socialist countries, beginning with the Soviet Union, actively extended material and moral assistance to the struggle of the Korean people. The Chinese sent volunteers, who shed their blood to help the Korean people in the war. Together with the socialist countries, all progressive countries and people of the world denounced the aggression of U.S. imperialism and supported the Korean people in their just struggle.

In the United States, American Communists and other anti-imperialists opposed the war, and were persecuted severely by the ruling class. Later, mass opposition to the war spread in the United States, and helped hasten its end.

U.S. imperialism mobilized tremendous quantities of the latest type of combat equipment and materials and resorted to barbarous methods and means of warfare unprecedented in military history.* But it suffered an irretrievable defeat for the first time in its history at the hands of the Korean people who fought heroically, following the strategy and tactics of Kim Il Sung.

*U.S. imperialism mobilized an armed force of two million men on the Korean front, including one-third of its army, a large part of its Pacific Fleet, and armies of 15 satellite countries. At the same time, it used all modern arms except the atomic bomb. In the three years of the Korean War, the United States suffered losses in personnel and military equipment 2.3 times larger than it had suffered in the four years of battles in the Pacific theater in World War II.

The Fatherland Liberation War was a hard-fought, anti-imperialist struggle against the allied forces of international reaction, headed by U.S. imperialism. It was at the same time a sharp class struggle against the enemies of the people. The great historic victory of the Korean people in the war was an epochal event of great historical significance for the development not only of the Korean revolution but also of the world revolution. The world anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle entered a new phase.

The victory of the Korean people in the Fatherland Liberation War was a victory for Kim Il Sung's revolutionary ideas and for his strategy and tactics. The victory demonstrated that free people who fight for the independence and progress of their fatherland, under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist Party, are invincible. It showed also that the decisive factor for victory in war is not the kind of weapons used or technical superiority but the power of the united people, who are firmly convinced of the justness of their cause.

The outcome of the war set back U.S. imperialism, which boastfully had declared itself the "mightiest" in the world, shattering the myth of its "world leadership" and signaled the beginning of its decline. Furthermore, it shattered the aggressive designs of U.S. imperialism toward the countries of the socialist camp, safeguarded the eastern outpost of the socialist camp and contributed to the defense of world peace and security.

The Fatherland Liberation War strengthened decisively the subjective revolutionary capacity of our country. As a result of severe trials during the war, the people were awakened more and tempered more, and the People's Army developed into an invincible revolutionary army, well trained politically, ideologically and in military technique, and equipped with rich combat experience. At the same time, several hundreds of thousands of revolutionary cadres were trained in the blazing flames of war. They were to be the precious foundation for the victory of the revolution.

After the war, the North Korean people were faced with the grave task of converting the armistice into a lasting peace, rebuilding the destroyed economy as soon as possible, improving the impoverished people's living conditions quickly, and thereby strengthening the northern half of the Republic, the base of the Korean revolution, politically, economically and militarily, and converting it into a powerful material force for the unification of the fatherland.

The sixth plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, called on August 5, 1953 to consider these pressing tasks of the revolution, decided to promote postwar rehabilitation and development of the people's economy in three basic stages, according to a proposal of Kim Il Sung.

The first was a preparatory stage for general rehabilitation and development of the people's economy, a period of six months to one year in which preparations and adjustments were to be made for general rehabilitation of the economy. In the second stage, it was decided to carry out a Three-Year Plan for the rehabilitation and development of the people's economy and to recover prewar levels in all economic branches. In the third stage, a Five-Year Plan would be worked out to complete the first stage of industrialization in North Korea and to lay the foundations for socialist industrialization.

The basic line of postwar economic construction was the Marxist-Leninist theory of expanded reproduction applied to suit the requirements and possibilities of economic development in the northern half of the Republic. It was a revolutionary line, reflecting the *Juche* principle of constructing an independent national economy as soon as possible, in the spirit of self-reliance.

An essential feature was the priority development of heavy industry while simultaneously developing light industry and agriculture. Without first developing heavy industry, it is impossible to develop light industry or agriculture, nor is it possible to secure expanded reproduction. Heavy industry

is the most important base of the economy and is a central factor in successfully solving all problems. It is only when heavy industry is developed that socialist industrialization can be realized and a firm foundation laid for a powerful, independent national economy. In other words, heavy industry is the material basis for a country's political and economic independence. Without it, the economy cannot be independent or national and the national defense capability cannot be built up.

The country had conditions favorable for the development of heavy industry, despite the limitations of the colonial economy. In particular, it has vast mineral resources. If these mineral resources were developed and utilized correctly, it would be possible to develop a decisive heavy industry.

The Party's program was for the country to create its own heavy industrial base, which would be equipped with new techniques, developed mainly on the basis of domestic natural resources, and would be able to provide domestic manufacture with materials, fuels, power, machinery and equipment necessary for the people's economy of the northern half of the Republic. It would also rely on its own technical cadres. This was precisely the program for creating an independent, modern heavy industry, on the *Juche* principle.

Further, most important was to develop heavy industry not for its own sake but in a manner that would serve directly and most effectively the development of light industry and agriculture. This would lay the foundation for socialist industrialization and would supply the clothing, food and shelter which the people required. When heavy industry of all types was developed, a powerful base for simultaneously developing light industry and agriculture would be created.

Moreover, without developing light industry and agriculture, it would be impossible to restore and improve the living standards of the people, impoverished by wartime destruc-

tion. Indeed, there was a pressing need to improve the people's living conditions as soon as possible.

Industry in North Korea, distorted to satisfy the specific requirements of Japanese colonialists, included hardly any light industry. It was difficult to decide under what conditions light industry was to be developed and to settle on its specific content.

Furthermore, our agriculture was extremely backward, as might be expected under colonial conditions and, to make matters worse, it was largely destroyed by the war. Without developing agriculture, it was impossible to supply raw materials to light industry, or to improve living conditions. Kim Il Sung wrote of this period:

We suffered from a shortage of able technicians, and we did not have equipment, either. We had to develop light industry at the same time as we were rehabilitating heavy industry, under conditions where the economy had been seriously damaged by war. There is no precedent for this in the annals of other countries.

If we study the history of the industrial development of other countries, we will see that in many, heavy industry was developed first, and later light industry was developed, while in other countries, light industry was developed first, to accumulate funds, and then later heavy industry was constructed.

However, in our country, if heavy industry only had been developed, when the people had only the clothes on their backs because of the war and when the towns and countryside had been devastated, it would have been impossible to provide the people with clothing, food and shelter.

Therefore, we had to develop heavy industry and, at the same time, light industry and agriculture as well.⁸

This was a completely untrodden path, one that had never been followed even by a socialist country, let alone by a capitalist country.

As might be expected, anti-Party elements in the Party, revisionists and dogmatists at home and abroad, made a frontal attack on this line, charging that undue importance

was being given to heavy industry when people are suffering; machinery does not produce food. They argued, in effect, that everything should be channeled into consumer goods, whatever the future might be, and they opposed the construction of a foundation for an independent national economy.

However, the Party and the government turned back these attacks and resolutely defended Kim Il Sung's program for postwar economic rehabilitation and development, mobilizing the people to fight for its fulfillment. In only nine months after the armistice the tasks set for the first stage—the preparatory stage of general rehabilitation and development of the economy—were carried out successfully.

In this short period, several scores of thousands of temporary houses were built in towns and countryside; rehabilitation and construction in the countryside were started. Prices were lowered and living conditions of the people were beginning to improve. Destroyed cities and factories rose from the debris and were restored and repaired. Large ceramic plants were constructed in all parts of the country and were preparing for production. A large number of industrial and agricultural enterprises, beginning with the Kangson Steel Works, Songjin Steel Works, Sunghori Cement Factory and Komusan Cement Factory, mines and other enterprises, were already either partially or wholly in production, while many enterprises in light industry, including Nampo Glass Factory and Pyongyang Spinning Mill, were being readied for full-scale operation.

On the basis of these successes, the Party proposed a Three-Year Plan for the rehabilitation and development of the people's economy for 1954-1956. This was the second stage. The basic task of the Three-Year Plan was to raise industrial and agricultural production to their prewar levels, to develop rapidly every sector of the people's economy, science, culture and arts and to provide a strong economic foundation for improving the living standards of the people.

The Three-Year Plan was intended not only to restore the war-torn people's economy. Its main task was to eradicate every vestige of distortion in the economy inherited from long colonial rule by Japanese imperialism, and ensure priority development of heavy industry for the purpose of laying the foundation for socialist industrialization of the northern half of the Republic. At the same time, the purpose was also to rehabilitate and develop light industry and agriculture in order to stabilize and improve the living conditions of the people, which had been lowered by the war.

For instance, the Three-Year Plan envisaged a 2.6-fold increase in total industrial production in fiscal 1956, the final year of the plan, as compared with 1953. A 1.3-fold advance was planned for the production of the means of production, and a two-fold increase for the production of consumer goods. These goals were far in excess of their respective prewar 1949 levels.

In the sphere of agriculture, it was planned during the three-year period to increase grain output to the level of 1949, when the highest grain production was recorded, to expand further the mechanization of agriculture, and to lay the foundation for its rapid development.

Concerning the life of the people, the plan proposed that production of foodstuff and daily necessities in 1956 was to be double that of 1949. A five-fold increase in the output of cotton fabrics and more than a three-fold gain in the manufacture of rubber shoes was envisaged for the same period.

The plan called for an increase in labor productivity of 76 per cent in industry and 74 per cent in construction.

The workers succeeded in fulfilling these important tasks in two years and four months, or ahead of schedule, by displaying initiative and good will and by fighting heroically for the fulfillment of the tasks set by the Party.

Total industrial production of state-run and cooperative enterprises in 1955 was 2.3 times greater than in 1953 and 56 per cent higher than the prewar level. The production of the

means of production rose 3.1-fold in 1955 over 1953, and consumer goods, 1.7-fold. In other words, by the end of January 1955, industrial production of state-run and cooperative enterprises exceeded the level set for 1956 in the Three-Year Plan.

In comparison with 1949, by 1955 output of means of production was up 51.7 per cent, while output of consumer goods was up 48.3 per cent. Thus the preferential development of heavy industry was carried out, along with the rapid rebuilding and development of light industry and agriculture.

Concerning heavy industry, production of the machine building and metal working industry climbed 2.3-fold; ore extraction, 107 per cent; the metallurgical industry, 109 per cent, and construction materials manufacturing, 2.8-fold. All these industries exceeded their prewar levels.

In light industry, output of the spinning and weaving industries jumped 2.2-fold; paper manufacturing, 106 per cent; leather and shoemaking, 196 per cent. Production of the food processing and pharmaceutical manufacturing industries rose 120 and 260 per cent, respectively, during the plan period.

In agriculture, encouraging results were also achieved. In the two years of 1954 and 1955, 37,700 *chongbo** of land were brought under cultivation for the first time, while irrigation work in South Pyongan province made progress—43 water reservoirs and 568 pumping stations were repaired or newly constructed. Construction work in this respect was expanded on a larger scale in 1956. As a result, between 1954 and April 1956, the area of irrigated land was increased by 90,000 *chongbo* through state capital investments, and river embankment construction work to prevent flooding of 100,000 or more *chongbo* of farmland was completed.

The number of farm machinery leasing stations rose three-

*A *chongbo* equals a hectare or 2.47 acres.

fold between 1953 and 1955, and the number of tractors (in terms of 15 hp units) climbed 3.9-fold. A large number of power-driven farm machines, including threshing machines, were turned out for agriculture.

On the basis of results accomplished during the experimental period 1953-1954, the trend toward agricultural cooperatives was phased into a mass movement in 1956. Thus, by the end of February 1956, 14,651 agricultural cooperatives were organized, comprising 65.2 per cent of total farm households and accounting for 62.1 per cent of the total land under cultivation.

The people's material and cultural levels were measurably improved during the plan period. Thus, national income in 1955 rose to 160 per cent of 1953 and to 111 per cent of the prewar year 1949. As a result of four postwar reductions in the prices of consumer goods, prices in state-run and cooperative stores fell as much as 40 per cent in 1955 as compared with 1953. Together with this, the wages of industrial and clerical workers rose 35 per cent on an average during 1955 alone.

Of special importance regarding the fulfillment of the Three-Year Plan was the fact that, during the plan period, socialist elements were especially developed in all branches of the economy and that these elements came to occupy a dominant position, providing a powerful material foundation for a socialist transformation of the people's economy.

Thus, in industry, production of state-run and cooperative industrial enterprises which was 90.7 per cent of total industrial production in fiscal 1949, rose to 98.3 per cent in 1955. Further, hitherto in agriculture, socialist sectors, including state farms, stock-breeding farms and agricultural farm machine leasing stations, accounted for only 3.2 per cent of total agricultural production. In 1955, however, these sectors, together with agricultural cooperatives, took a leading position in agriculture. In the distribution of commodities,

the proportion of state-run and cooperative commerce to total distribution of retail commodities rose from 56.5 to 84.6 per cent in the same period, with only 15.4 per cent left to private commerce.

As a result of successful fulfillment of the Three-Year Plan, the tasks set for the second stage of postwar economic rehabilitation and development—completely erasing the damage done by the war to all branches of the economy and raising industrial and agricultural production to their prewar levels—were fulfilled ahead of schedule. The Korean people became self-sustaining and able to promote socialist construction more vigorously. The most difficult postwar rehabilitation work was thus carried out successfully in a short period—only three to four years—after the war.

Thus the stage was set for Premier Kim Il Sung to propose a long-range Five-Year Plan, the first of its kind in Korean history, at the Third Congress of the Workers Party of Korea (April 1956). The basic task of the Five-Year Plan, started in 1957, was to lay the foundations for socialism in our country and to solve the basic problems of food, clothing and shelter.

The most important task in the construction of the basis of socialism, which was to be implemented during the Five-Year Plan period, was to complete the socialist transformation of the relations of production in the towns and countryside and to establish the socialist system generally. Only through the socialist transformation of the relations of production and overall establishment of the socialist system is it possible to eliminate all the socio-economic sources of exploitation and oppression, to give full play to the essential superiority of the socialist system, to develop rapidly the productive forces of the country and improve decisively the lives of the people.

In particular, the socialist transformation of agriculture was the most pressing revolutionary task. It had to be started immediately following the completion of land reform so the agrarian question finally could be solved by drawing broad

sections of the farming masses onto the road of socialism and leading them to participate in the construction of socialism and communism.

The political power of the Republic, relying on the basic program for the socialist transformation of agriculture, carried out this difficult and complex task successfully in a short period of only four to five years. Kim Il Sung wrote:

In carrying out the socialist transformation of agriculture, we determined properly the stages and tempo of the development of agricultural collectivization and the forms and sizes of the collectives by creatively applying the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism to suit the specific conditions of our country, and we strictly adhered to the Leninist voluntary principle and brought the peasants to realize the advantages of the cooperative economy through practical examples and, on this basis, promoted this movement efficiently.⁹

Earlier, as a result of the successful implementation of the land reform, landlord ownership of land was completely eliminated, and the land became the property of its tillers. Thus, agriculture developed at a rapid tempo and the living conditions of the peasantry improved markedly. Economic ties between town and countryside, industry and agriculture were also strengthened, further consolidating the worker-peasant alliance.

However, although land reform was a far-reaching, revolutionary transformation of great political and economic significance, it alone was not sufficient to solve the agrarian question finally or to develop agricultural production decisively.

As a result of the land reform, small-scale commodity production in the form of private farms became dominant in the countryside. As is well known, this situation breeds capitalism and a bourgeoisie. It goes without saying, however, that in our country where political power was in the hands of the

people, led by the working class, the basic means of production were concentrated in the state. Even though land reform had been completely carried out, such a process of class differentiation in the country necessarily was greatly restricted. Whatever the case may be, where private commodity economy prevailed, it was impossible to improve radically the living standards of farmers or to eliminate the sources of exploitation and poverty in the countryside.

Further, where there were small-scale, scattered private farms, it was impossible to develop agricultural production in a planned way, nor was it possible to achieve expanded reproduction. This situation necessarily came into conflict with the large-scale, greatly concentrated, socialist industry, which had been rebuilt and developed according to the state plans in the postwar period, and was achieving expanded reproduction.

It was possible to solve this contradiction only by transforming private farms into socialist cooperatives.

The solution to the agrarian and agricultural question in the stage of the socialist revolution was to eliminate all capitalist elements from the countryside, to liberate the peasantry from all forms of exploitation and oppression once and for all by transforming private farms into socialist collective farms and to liberate agricultural productive forces completely from the fetters of the old relations of production based on private ownership.

Particularly in the postwar situation, in which the economy and the lives of the people were seriously destroyed and impoverished, was such a solution most pressing. If the contradiction between socialist industry and private farms had been left as it was, not only would the development of agriculture have been hampered, but also the balance between industry and agriculture would have been destroyed, and the problem of foodstuffs would not have been solved.

Accordingly, the sixth plenum of the Central Committee

of the Workers Party of Korea (August 1953) presented the task of establishing agricultural cooperatives.

Preparations had already been made gradually, even before the war, for agricultural collectivization. Land reform eliminated landlords, and rich farmers received a shattering blow when they were forbidden to sell or purchase land, to use mortgages, or to have their land cultivated by tenant peasants. At the same time when key industries were nationalized, material conditions were provided for the socialist transformation of agriculture. Various forms of cooperative labor on the farm, including the organization of traditional draught-ox-joint-use teams and mutual-aid labor teams, which had been developed and spread during the war, increased the spirit of mutual assistance and the desire for cooperative management among the farmers.

After the armistice, the Party actively supported the policy of collectivization of agriculture. Relying on poor peasants who accepted the policy, and on Party activists, a number of agricultural cooperatives were organized in each county. These were experimental agricultural cooperatives. In this stage, the Party and the government extended positive guidance and aid in control and management of agricultural cooperatives. They supplied chemical fertilizers, agricultural machinery and building material; loaned foodstuffs and seed; advanced funds; cut the tax rate in kind, and offered labor assistance. As a result, agricultural cooperatives were able gradually to display their superiority, to demonstrate the advantages of cooperative management in practice.

By 1954 the per unit area yield of crops on cooperative farms increased by 10 to 50 per cent as compared with that on private farms, and cash income increased two to seven times as well. In addition, powerful organizational and political activities, developed by the Party among the peasants, led to the participation not only of poor peasants but also of middle peasants in the cooperative movement, thus making

it possible for the movement eventually to reach nationwide development.

A particularly important problem at this stage was to determine the correct form of cooperative management and integration of the means of production in keeping with the actual situation. This was of great significance for involving more middle peasants in the cooperative movement and in preventing mistakes.

On the basis of a scientific analysis of actual circumstances in the rural districts and of farmers in the country, Kim Il Sung set forth three forms of cooperative management and integration of the means of production:

1. Permanent mutual-aid labor units for collective farm work.
2. A semi-socialist form of distribution, according to labor and land, with farm management itself carried out jointly after land integration.
3. A completely socialist setup in which distribution is made solely according to labor, after land and other basic means of production are integrated.

The Republic conducted a campaign to enlist the farming masses in these three forms of cooperative management. In the course of this campaign, the principle of free choice always was strictly observed, although the movement was never allowed to develop spontaneously. In promoting the cooperative movement, the Republic constantly held fast to the correct class policy of relying firmly on the poor peasantry and strengthening its alliance with the middle peasants while, at the same time, placing restrictions on well-to-do farmers, instead of expropriating their land, so that they might gradually adapt themselves to actual conditions.

An important factor was to decide the proper size for agricultural cooperatives. At the outset, they were comparatively small, one cooperative covering about 40 to 100 farm house-

holds. Under existing circumstances, this size was most reasonable.

Numerical growth in cooperative farms proceeded parallel with their qualitative strengthening. Of great significance in this respect was an intensive course given as a guide by the Party to the agricultural cooperatives, once or twice a year, from the beginning of 1955. This concentrated program was given to several thousand leading members of both central and local organs at a time. It was of decisive significance in further consolidating agricultural cooperatives politically and economically.

State assistance by the working class to the agricultural cooperatives was also strengthened decisively, as is proven by the fact that state funds invested in agriculture after the war amounted to the huge sum of 12 billion *won*.^{*} This accorded with principles expressed by Lenin at a corresponding period of the development of socialism in the USSR: "A social system emerges only if it has the financial backing of a definite class. . . . At present we have to realize that the cooperative system is the social system to which we must now give more than ordinary assistance. . . ."¹⁰

By 1956 more than half of all farms were members of cooperatives, and their superiority was manifest. Thus the Workers Party of Korea at its Third Congress, April 1956, set the task of completing agricultural collectivization during the first Five-Year Plan. The task was accomplished, in fact, by August 1958.

This was a great revolutionary gain and was a brilliant victory for the agrarian policy of the Party. As a result, our farm villages were able to do away with the social and economic sources of all forms of exploitation and oppression, as well as of poverty. All the peasants became socialist worker-farmers and the farm villages in the northern half of the Republic

^{*}About \$5 billion at the rate of \$0.403 for the North Korean *won*.

became advanced socialist farm villages. Further, this victory completely freed the agricultural productive forces from all the fetters of the old relations of production, thus paving the way for unlimited development of agricultural productive forces. On the new socialist basis, the worker-peasant alliance was consolidated further, which contributed toward strengthening the political and economic foundations of the people's power.

Thus, North Korea's most important task in the stage of socialist revolution, the socialist transformation of the relations of production in the rural areas, was carried out successfully in the short period of four to five years after the war.

It is by no means an easy task to convert private agricultural farms, comprising several million peasants, into socialist farms, on the basis of their free choice, and in such a short span of time. It could only be achieved through fierce class struggle.

Vacillating elements opposed the program, pleading it was "premature." This was expressed in their questions: "What is the reason for collectivization now when North and South still remain divided?" and, "Is collectivization really possible when there are no farm machines available?" In the course of the program, also, some objectionable actions were observed, such as a tendency to concentrate efforts solely on increasing the number of cooperatives and on organizing cooperatives too high in level or too large in scale.

The Party maintained that, even where the material and technical foundations of farm villages are weak and where the agricultural productive forces have not yet reached a sufficiently high level of development, socialist transformation of production relations in rural districts is unavoidable when farmers demand it and when it accords with the objective laws of the development of the revolution, and that, in such a case, it must be pushed forward resolutely.

Moreover, the Party adhered strictly to the Leninist princi-

ple of voluntary cooperative formation so that the farmers should be convinced of the superiority of cooperative farms through actual examples, and the program should be promoted on the basis of their conviction. Particularly, the voluntary principle was applied not only to middle peasants, but also to all other classes in the farm villages, including even well-to-do farmers. In other words, the Party adopted the policy of gradually remolding well-to-do farmers in the process of the collectivization movement, though it placed strict restrictions on their acts of exploitation. Since the drive for agricultural cooperatives was accompanied by fierce class struggles, the Party was always faithful to the Marxist-Leninist class policy of depending on the poor peasants, of strengthening their alliance with middle peasants, and of restricting and gradually remolding big farmers.

Along with agricultural collectivization, the conversion of urban handicrafts and capitalist commerce and industry into socialist forms is an important component of the socialist revolution.

During the period of Japanese colonial rule, the important sectors of the economy were under the complete control of Japanese monopoly capital and the role of Korean national capital was insignificant, since very strict restrictions were placed upon its development.

Even after the liberation of Korea, capitalist commerce and industry, which were weak from the very outset, played an even less important part because of the successful nationalization of key industries, which assumed a leading position in the people's state-managed socialist sector. Further, owing to war damage, capitalist commerce and industry suffered so severe a decline that it was almost impossible to tell them from handicraft in scale of operations.

Under these circumstances, the conversion of capitalist commerce and industry to socialist forms became urgent in the postwar period. The Republic adopted a policy of enlisting

people engaged in capitalist commerce and industry in various forms of cooperative enterprises in conformity with their actual conditions and, by so doing, succeeded in gradually orienting them to socialism. In this way, they were able to make a clean break with their past, when they had not earned their livelihoods with their own labor but with others' labor, and to become socialist workers, producing material wealth through their own labor.

Thus, in the northern half of the Republic, the socialist transformation of the relations of production, in both the rural and urban communities, was completed by August 1958, and socialism was firmly established in cities and villages. This was an event of truly great historical significance in the development of the Korean revolution. As Kim Il Sung wrote:

As a result of the socialist transformation of private handicrafts and capitalist trade and industry, as well as the completion of agricultural collectivization, the socialist forms of economy came to hold undivided sway in our towns and countryside. This opened a wide avenue for the rapid development of the country's productive forces and made it possible to liquidate the sources of exploitation and poverty which had existed for thousands of years and to improve the material and cultural standards of the people markedly.¹¹

The basic task for socialist construction during the period of the Five-Year Plan was to lay the foundation for socialist industrialization and build a base for the development of an independent national economy. As a result of its successful fulfillment, North Korea advanced from the period of rehabilitation into a period of technical innovation.

The Five-Year Plan was devised as the first stage of this technical innovation. It aimed at further consolidating the foundations for an independent national economy by laying the bases for socialist industrialization during the plan period and by creating the facilities for equipping all sectors of the economy with up-to-date technology. The Plan also aimed at solving the food, clothing and housing problems, the basic

problems of the people's existence, during the five-year period and to this end concentrated on grain production, textile industries and housing construction. In short, the task of the Five-Year Plan in the realm of socialist construction was to achieve a rationally coordinated, balanced solution to the problems of economic construction and people's living conditions.

Building the foundations for socialist industrialization meant wiping out completely the colonial distortions of industry and constructing an independent and modern socialist industry. It meant converting the northern half of the Republic from a backward agricultural country into a socialist industrial-agricultural state by overcoming the backwardness of agriculture and building a self-reliant and independent economy. This was the main thrust of the Five-Year Plan looking toward future socialist construction.

Kim Il Sung said: "By the construction of a self-reliant and independent economy is meant the building of a country where we can meet all our needs ourselves and can live a decent life, that is, a country of self-sufficiency."¹²

In the course of implementing the Five-Year Plan, the Workers Party of Korea and the people were again confronted by new difficulties and trials.

During the period between 1956 and 1957, when the Five-Year Plan was in its initial stage, differences appeared within the international communist movement and, availing themselves of this opportunity, the world's imperialists and reactionaries evolved large-scale anti-communist campaigns. Keeping pace with these international movements, the U.S. imperialists occupying South Korea and their South Korean stooges greatly intensified their reactionary offensive against the northern half of the Republic. At the same time, within the Party itself, anti-party revisionist elements conspired with external forces, exploiting this complicated situation, and made a frontal challenge to the Party.

There were also many problems hampering economic construction, such as insufficient materials or funds to accomplish the gigantic Five-Year Plan. People's lives were hard. To cope with this complex and difficult situation at home and abroad, the Party urged all to work and fulfill successfully the Five-Year Plan. Premier Kim Il Sung wrote: "We could rely only on our Party members and our people. The Party decided to surmount the difficulties and trials by placing confidence in Party members and the masses of the people and by mobilizing their efforts."¹³

At the December 1956 plenum of the Party's Central Committee, the tasks to be accomplished during the first year of the Five-Year Plan and the methods of fulfilling them were discussed and decided. The Party adopted the line of advancing the revolution and construction, frustrating all attacks by enemies within and without, by relying upon the revolutionary zeal of the people and by inspiring them to bring about a great upsurge in socialist construction.

After the plenum, members of the Political Committee of the Party Central Committee, as well as other leaders, toured difficult factories and farm villages to acquaint the working people with the problems facing the Party and to inspire them to surmount all difficulties and trials.

In response to the Party appeal, the North Korean workers strongly supported the Party Central Committee and successfully introduced great innovations on all fronts of socialist construction. They found hidden resources to overcome shortages and smashed old records and norms. Thus industrial production recorded an annual growth rate of 40 to 50 per cent, and in agriculture a rich harvest was reaped. Both towns and rural communities changed in appearance for the better day by day and the people's living standard also improved rapidly.

It was during this great upsurge in socialist construction that the historic Chollima (Flying Horse) movement was initiated. This movement was adopted by the Workers Party

of Korea as its general line for socialist construction. And in this way, the tasks of the Five-Year Plan were overfulfilled ahead of schedule: the plan to increase total industrial production 2.6 times was fulfilled in only two and a half years, and that to raise production indices of important industrial products was fulfilled as a whole or overfulfilled in four years.

As a result, gross industrial production in the Republic rose 3.5 times during the four years from 1957 to 1960, inclusive, with the output of the means of production climbing 3.6 times and that of consumer goods 3.3 times. Thus, in spite of the serious war damage, industrial output of the Republic rose as much as 7.6 times over the prewar year of 1949.

In the industrial sector during this period, material and technical foundations were laid for developing the backward colonial industry, completely destroyed by the war, into an independent and modern industry in a short time and, by achieving this, for equipping all sectors of the people's economy with up-to-date technology and thereby further improving the people's living standards.

Good results were also obtained in agriculture. The fundamental task of the Five-Year Plan for agriculture was to strengthen the material and technical basis of agriculture and rapidly to increase agricultural production.

Following the completion of agricultural collectivization, the Party immediately got started on the technical innovation of agriculture—irrigation, electrification and mechanization.

By the end of 1960, the problem of irrigation, which was of primary importance, basically was solved. Further, during this period, electricity was supplied to 92.1 per cent of the *ri* (smallest administrative unit) in rural communities throughout the country, or to 62 per cent of the total number of farm households, and electric power came to be used extensively, not only for lighting but also as motive power for various operations, such as pumping water, threshing and feed processing. Mechanization, considered to be the most difficult

task in the technical innovation of agriculture, also made remarkable progress. Compared to 1956, the number of factories producing farm machinery approximately doubled in 1960. Also during this period, the total number of tractors in use increased 4.2 times (in terms of 15 h.p. units) and the area cultivated by them jumped 10 times. Thus, the level of mechanization in agriculture was raised substantially. As a result, grain output reached a high of 3.8 million tons, 32 per cent more than in 1956.

Agriculture in the Republic became socialist and made significant progress toward laying the material and technical foundations for an advanced socialist agriculture.

A marked improvement was also witnessed in the material and cultural aspects of the people's lives. The task of solving basically the food, clothing and housing problems was fulfilled successfully. In 1960, national income increased 2.1 times over 1956, and the wages of industrial and office workers showed a 2.1-fold advance during the same period. Kim Il Sung wrote on this:

Thanks to the successful fulfillment of the postwar Three-Year Plan, our country went over from the period of rehabilitation to the period of technical reconstruction. Our Party and the Government of the Republic defined the Five-Year Plan as the first stage in the technical reconstruction and set the task of laying the basis of socialist industrialization in this period to solidify more firmly the foundations of an independent national economy and create conditions for equipping all branches of our people's economy with modern technique in the future.¹⁴

At its Fourth Congress (September 1961), the Workers Party of Korea summed up the results achieved by the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan and adopted a long-range Seven-Year Plan for promoting socialist construction. The Seven-Year Plan called for equipping all branches of the people's economy with up-to-date technology by realizing socialist industrialization, for radically improving the people's living

conditions and culture and for achieving socialism. The fulfillment of all these tasks would convert Korea into a socialist state with modern industry and an advanced agriculture. This was the aim of the Seven-Year Plan.

Thus, it can be said that the Seven-Year Plan was a stage in the overall technical revolution.

Technical revolution [said Kim Il Sung] is a momentous evolutionary task which will relieve our people, now free from exploitation, of arduous labor, enable them to produce more material wealth while working with ease, and ensure them a more bountiful and cultured life. Accomplishment of the technical revolution will solve the most important problem for the ultimate victory of a new social system in our country, which inherited centuries-old backward productive forces.¹⁵

To accomplish an all-round technical revolution in the northern part of the Republic was of particularly great significance. Because of the long colonial rule by Japanese imperialism, Korea was unable to carry out an industrial revolution and to go through the stage of capitalist development in a normal way. Consequently, it had inherited backward productive forces from the old society.

If this were not the case, if Korea were an advanced capitalist country, the technical revolution would not have been so important for the building of socialism. In an advanced capitalist country, people produce a great deal of social wealth as a result of having achieved industrialization through an industrial revolution. Machinery and techniques have been developed considerably, and the question of technical revolution is comparatively simple to solve if the working class were to win state power and socialize the means of production.

However, in a backward agricultural country like Korea, which did not follow a normal course of capitalist development, the question of technical revolution is extremely important and very difficult to solve, even after the seizure of state

power by the working class and socialization of the means of production. Carrying out a technical revolution and training as many technicians as possible, after all, boils down to a single objective—completely wiping out the backwardness inherited from the old society and converting Korea in a short period of time into a rich, advanced and strong industrial state.

The successful completion of a technical revolution presupposes the achievement of a cultural revolution. In other words, unless the ranks of scientific and technical cadres are expanded greatly and unless all the working people are equipped with knowledge and skill sufficient for the effective operation of modern machinery, a technical revolution cannot be carried out successfully. Thus there is a close relationship between a technical revolution and a cultural revolution and therefore it was decreed in the Seven-Year Plan that these two revolutions be carried out simultaneously.

In order to fulfill the long-range tasks of the Seven-Year Plan successfully, the Party constantly reiterated the need to adhere to the basic line for postwar economic construction—the preferential development of heavy industry, while at the same time developing light industry and agriculture in order to achieve all-round scientific and cultural development.

The entire working people of the Republic struggled to accomplish the program put forward by the Party in the Seven-Year Plan. However, for several years following the Caribbean crisis in October 1962, U.S. imperialists' aggressive machinations became much more open and the internal and external situation of the Republic also became extremely tense.

In order to meet this situation, Premier Kim Il Sung, at the fifth plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee held at the end of 1962, proposed to push forward economic construction parallel with a defense buildup. On the basis of this line, the Party and the government hammered out a series of important measures aimed at reorganizing economic construc-

tion generally and at decisively strengthening defense capacity as well. Kim Il Sung pointed out:

What is most important for our revolutionary struggle and construction is to reorganize the work of socialist construction in general in keeping with the actual situation and to accelerate both economic construction and defense buildup, in parallel, so that our defense capabilities may be increased further to cope with the aggressive maneuvers of the enemy. This is the basic strategic line which our Party has already been implementing for several years in accordance with the change in the situation. It is necessary for us in the future, too, to adhere firmly to this policy of the Workers' Party and develop our work accordingly.¹⁶

The problem of how to combine economic construction with defense buildup is fundamental, having direct bearing upon success or failure in building socialism and communism in a country. The problem is based on the objective fact that, while imperialism still exists, the proletariat after gaining state power has to carry out the revolution and construction under conditions of encirclement by international capitalism.

Under these circumstances, it is inevitable that imperialism should resort to all forms of aggression, direct or indirect, as well as to various subversive activities. Therefore, after gaining state power, the proletariat must concentrate its efforts on building up powerful defense capabilities to defend its gains against imperialist aggression and subversive machinations, while energetically promoting economic construction to improve material and cultural standards.

It is important to guard against possible deviation either to economic construction or to defense buildup, correctly to combine the two. It is an ultra-leftist deviation to emphasize only defense buildup without economic construction on the grounds that should war break out, everything will be destroyed. And it is a right-wing revisionist deviation to over-emphasize economic construction, on the presumption of peace, without boosting defense capability to a sufficient

level. A correct combination of economic construction and defense buildup is a necessary requirement of Marxism-Leninism.

The parallel promotion of economic and defense construction required that the long-range tasks of the Seven-Year Plan be carried out completely and that the quality of production and construction be improved decisively in all fields through effective utilization of the existing economic foundations. The Plan called for strengthening the national defense capability to provide an impregnable fortress and for all necessary arrangements to cope with any surprise attack by the U.S. imperialists and their underlings. For this purpose, the line decreed that the military plan of the Party fully be carried out — the line of arming the People's Army and the entire people, politically and ideologically first of all, and turning the People's Army into a modernized cadre army, and also of converting the whole country into a fortress.

Subsequent developments proved the correctness of the line. Today, North Korea has been converted into an impregnable fortress fully capable of coping with any armed aggression by the U.S. imperialists and their underlings, and a powerful defense setup, encompassing all the people, has been completed.

In the field of socialist economic construction, too, the northern half of the Republic has again entered a period of a great upsurge. In fiscal 1967, for example, total industrial output recorded a growth rate of 17 per cent as against the target figure of 12.8 per cent. Further, the growth rate of industrial production was set at 24 per cent for fiscal 1968. However, even according to a preliminary survey, the growth rate of industrial production in 1968 far exceeded that of 1967 and is expected to overfulfill the target figure.

In the plan for 1968, the year of decisive significance for the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan, targets for a series of industries, such as coal, chemical fertilizer, nonferrous metals

and timber, were attained one after another, all ahead of schedule, and it is expected that all the production targets for industry will be fulfilled completely by the end of 1969. In the field of agriculture, grain production increased 16 per cent in fiscal 1967 over fiscal 1966, and in fiscal 1968 it rose 11 per cent over fiscal 1967.

It is obvious that when fulfilled, the Seven-Year Plan will be a significant event. Successful fulfillment of the plan will not only strengthen the socialist system of the Republic, but will also bring about a great advance in the struggle for the complete victory of socialism and create favorable conditions for the Korean people's struggle for the reunification of their country. Successful accomplishment of the Seven-Year Plan will convert Korea into a socialist industrial state.

Let us now review some of the indices showing the principal results achieved by the government and by the people in the northern half of the Republic during the 20-odd years of revolution and construction since the founding of the DPRK.

In the field of socialist economic construction, a strong foundation has been laid in the sectors of heavy and light industry, resulting in a big leap in industrial production. Total industrial production in 1967 increased 22 times over 1948. Specifically, total output in 1967 of the machine-tool industry, the core of heavy industry, increased 100 times, and the share of output of the machine industry in total industrial production rose from 7.4 per cent to 31.4 per cent. As a result, insofar as machinery and equipment are concerned, Korea has nearly attained self-sufficiency.

The rapid progress made in heavy industry, particularly in the machine-tool industry, means that there is a nucleus for a firm base of a powerful independent national economy. It is a great victory for the economic policy of the Workers Party of Korea, which constantly has given priority to the development of heavy industry.

A powerful light industrial base has also been established

and is being developed rapidly. Today in North Korea all the people's consumer goods are domestically made. For the development of light industry, the development of local industries is important. Today, in the northern half of the Republic, local industries are producing half of the total consumer goods, thus playing an important role in promoting the general development of the economy. Compared with the period right after the Liberation, when there was hardly any light industry and when Korea was still unable to produce even very simple light industrial products, this rapid development of light industry is of great significance.

In the sphere of agriculture, thanks to the completion of collectivization and subsequent technical improvements, the agricultural productive forces have made striking progress. In 1967, grain production registered a 2.7-fold increase over the period after the Liberation. As a result, today North Korea not only has become completely self-sufficient in food but also has a considerable amount of food in reserve. This means that even though North Korea's geographical and natural conditions are inferior to South Korea's for agricultural production, these handicaps have largely been overcome.

Thus, during these 20-odd years, the building of a socialist economy in the northern half of the Republic has made amazing progress.

In the sectors of education and culture, the nine-year compulsory technical education system took effect in 1967. Today, one-fourth of the entire population in North Korea, or 2,690,000 persons, are studying at schools of varying levels. Tuition is completely free. Further, at present the number of engineers, technicians and specialists working in all sectors of the people's economy has reached 425,700, representing a 19-fold increase over the period just after the armistice (July 1953). In this way, in the northern half of the Republic, powerful ranks of technical cadres have come into being and continuously are being expanded. This is a great victory for the Party's policy of concentration on the training of national cadres.

The rapid progress in economic construction has brought about a decisive improvement in the material and cultural standards of the people. For example, national income per capita in 1967 showed a nine-fold increase over 1946, a 4.4-fold advance over 1949. In 1968, the average amount of distribution per farm household increased 14 per cent in grain and 13 per cent in cash over the previous year. If the following facts are taken into consideration—complete abolition of tax payment in kind, establishment of a free medical treatment system, implementation of the nine-year universal compulsory technical education system, and so on—it is clear that there has been rapid improvement in the material and cultural standards of the people.

As for results in the field of national defense, these were shown to the entire world by our victory in the recent *Pueblo* incident.* Today, in the northern half of the Republic, an effective national defense setup has been completed and the whole country has been converted into a steel-walled fortress. As was demonstrated by the *Pueblo* incident, the heroic Korean People's Army has developed into a strong cadre army, with modern equipment and military technique.

Thanks to our achievements in all fields of socialist construction, in the field of national defense, in the consistent stand of the Republic against U.S. and world imperialism and in its upholding an independent and principled foreign policy, the embodiment of the *Juche* idea of Premier Kim Il Sung—thanks to all these factors the international prestige of the Republic has been heightened as never before. This fact is eloquently demonstrated by the statements made by many of the representatives from various foreign governments, foreign political parties and social organizations who attended the ceremony held to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Republic.

*The *Pueblo*, a U.S. spy ship which had intruded into North Korean waters, was captured with its crew by the armed forces of the DPRK in January 1968.

All this demonstrates, on the strength of the realities of the Republic, the correctness of the ideas and theories of Kim Il Sung on the direction of the revolution and construction, as well as the correctness of the line and policies of the Workers Party of Korea under his leadership. Historical experience in the development of Marxism-Leninism clearly teaches that the validity of a theory is always tested by the touchstone of revolutionary practice.

CHAPTER II

The Transitional Period and the Historical Mission of Dictatorship of the Proletariat

In his works, particularly in Section 2 of *On the Further Consolidation and Development of the Socialist System in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, his report at the 20th Anniversary of the DPRK, Premier Kim Il Sung made a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the progress of socialism in the northern half of the Republic, the present state of the revolution and construction in socialist countries and other questions, and on this basis he clarified the most pressing problems of the world revolution.

To achieve the complete victory of socialism, the working class must overthrow the bourgeoisie, seize power and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, making the transition from capitalism to socialism. The dictatorship of the proletariat will be converted into a world system through a series of socialist revolutions in various countries and through the expansion and development of the socialist camp on a world scale. In other words, this is a question of the relation between the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, fundamental to Marxism-Leninism. Such problems are not only very difficult and complex, but are the most pressing and practical ones confronting the socialist countries today in revolution and construction.

For countries such as Korea, where the working class has conquered power and established a dictatorship of the pro-

letariat, it is vital to the success of the revolution to work out correct theoretical propositions concerning the transitional period: How to understand the significance and nature of the transitional period, how to set the various tasks of the transitional period according to its different stages, and how to analyze inter-relationships between the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Despite the importance of these questions to the revolution, there has been insufficient clarification and various deviations have been committed, with the result that immeasurable damage has been done to the practical struggles for socialist and communist construction. This urgent problem—the task of solving correctly, theoretically, the question of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat—was accomplished by Kim Il Sung, in detail, on the basis of the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism.

His ideas and theory were developed in his work, *On Questions of the Transitional Period from Capitalism to Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. In this work he said:

As with all other scientific and theoretical questions, questions of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat should be solved on the basis of the *Juche* idea of our Party. We should never try to solve these questions dogmatically by becoming slaves to the classical propositions on this question, nor should we be influenced by subservient ideas and follow others in the solution of these questions.¹

In the interpretation of classical propositions, it is essential to understand the historical circumstances and the premise on which the classical works were based. Only on this basis is it possible to understand the content of classical propositions and to grasp their revolutionary meaning. If the historical circumstances are ignored, it will lead inevitably to a one-sided and dogmatic interpretation or to a revisionist interpretation that seriously distorts the revolutionary content.

Specifically, if a classical proposition is applied mechanically to a changed situation, without considering the historical circumstances and theoretical premises related to the proposition, not only will a fundamental error be committed in the theoretical solution of the question but a decisive error in practice will also result. Thus, to solve the problems of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is necessary to base ourselves firmly on the revolutionary propositions of Marxism-Leninism and, at the same time, to uphold the *Juche* idea of applying them creatively to suit the constantly changing and developing actual conditions of the revolution.

1. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

In the historical process of revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism or communism there is inevitably a certain period of time usually referred to as the transitional period.

There is no doubt of this, either theoretically or practically. There is no doubt that the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the working class and the seizure of power by the workers does not mean the immediate and complete realization of socialism or communism.

As Kim Il Sung explains: "The conquest of power by the working class is only the beginning of the socialist revolution, and in order to build a complete socialist society, it is necessary to work for the revolution continuously and to lay the firm material foundations for socialism."²

To assure the total victory of socialism, the working class must complete, within a certain historical period of time, a series of tasks defined by the concrete historical conditions of respective countries as well as by the general revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism.

What, then, is the most fundamental characteristic of this transitional period? Premier Kim Il Sung says: "The historical process of transition from capitalism to socialism is accompanied by sharp class struggles."³

It is clear that the transitional period from capitalism to socialism must combine characteristic features of the two socio-economic systems. Hence sharp struggles are inevitable between the newly born socialism and capitalism, which was defeated but not yet completely eliminated.

The capitalist class is stripped of its political power and means of exploitation by the first onslaught of the working class, and it suffers a decisive defeat. But this does not mean the elimination of the capitalist class as a class. Some of the socio-economic foundations of the capitalist class and its international base still remain, and resistance continues, much stronger than before. Small-scale commodity production, still widespread in towns and villages, continues to furnish a socio-economic foundation for capitalism, and vacillating peasants and lower middle class people provide an important potential political foothold that can be used for the revival of capitalism.

The socialist transformation of the relations of production in the town and countryside, or the complete victory of the socialist *revolution*, smashes this resistance of the capitalist class and completely does away with its economic base. This means complete elimination of the capitalist class as a class.

However, we cannot say even after this that capitalism has been eliminated completely or that socialism has triumphed completely. Even at this stage, remnants of capitalism and hostile elements of the exploiting class still remain, and they constantly conspire with foreign imperialism to revive capitalism. Further, as long as old ideas still deeply rooted in the consciousness of the working masses—individualism and egotism—remain, it cannot be said that capitalism has been eliminated completely, since these ideas are ideological survivals of capitalism.

Where there are still distinctions between the town and the countryside and class distinctions between the workers and peasants, we cannot say that vacillations among lower middle class people, including the peasantry, have been overcome completely. Therefore we cannot say that the proletariat has completely won over the petty bourgeoisie. Kim Il Sung says: "We cannot say that socialism has been strengthened, nor can we say that socialism has completely triumphed until the petty bourgeoisie ceases to waver and comes to support us completely. We can say we have realized socialism completely only when the petty bourgeoisie has come to support us positively."⁴

From the standpoint of productive forces, we cannot say that the establishment of the socialist system is followed immediately by complete socialist industrialization, apart from what may occur in some developed capitalist countries. A certain period of time is still needed to develop productive forces to the high level required for socialism.

In the final analysis, we cannot say that socialism has triumphed completely over capitalism even where the socialist revolution has completely triumphed and the socialist system has absolute power. Even in this stage, struggles between socialism and capitalism continue.

The entire historical period of transition from capitalism to socialism is one of sharp struggles between socialism and capitalism, a period of class struggle in its sharpest form. This is the fundamental characteristic and, consequently, the important content of the transitional period. As Kim Il Sung states: "Struggle between the new and the old, between progress and conservatism, between positive and negative, between collectivism and individualism, and, in general, between socialism and capitalism—these are the content of the revolutionary struggle we wage."⁵

Other questions, too, concerned with the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, can be solved correctly on the principles of Marxism-Leninism only when the essen-

tial content of the transitional period and its basic characteristics are understood from the standpoint of class struggle and uninterrupted revolution.

The focal question of where the transitional period ends naturally should be approached from this standpoint. If the basic characteristic of this period is sharp class struggle between emerging socialism and moribund capitalism, the most important task in the transitional period should be not merely the defeat of capitalism but its elimination, that is, the end of capitalism in all domains—politics, economy, culture and ideology—and the complete victory of socialism. It is clear that the period of transition ends when this task has been carried out successfully.

When we say “complete victory of socialism,” what do we mean? What will be the content of such a society? A complete socialist society should include all sectors: politics, economy, culture and ideology, as well as productive forces, relations of production, the base and the superstructure.

However, the decisive index encompassing all elements and the only index is “elimination of classes,” or the realization of a classless society. To achieve a classless society, it is necessary not only to defeat the exploiting classes, expropriate their property, and abolish them as a class, but also to abolish private ownership as a whole, eliminate distinctions between town and countryside, and erase class distinctions between workers and peasants.

The entire society will have become the working class and the proletariat will finally have won over all the petty bourgeoisie only when class distinctions between workers and peasants have been eliminated and the petty bourgeoisie, including the peasantry, have been converted into the working class. Kim Il Sung states:

The complete victory of socialism will be realized only when class distinctions between the worker and the peasant have been eliminated and when the petty-bourgeois strata of people, particular-

ly the farming masses, have come to support us positively. Until the peasantry has been transformed into the working class, their support for us cannot be firm enough, even when they say they support us, and vacillations to a certain extent among them will be unavoidable.⁶

A complete socialist society is, therefore, one in which classes have been eliminated completely—that is, a classless society. However, elimination of classes requires not only the powerful material basis of socialism, that is, industrialization, but also presupposes the ideological remolding of all members of society to the progressive ideas of the working class—collectivism and communism.

For instance, elimination of class distinctions between worker and peasant will be possible only when agriculture has been mechanized, electrified, chemicalized and irrigated, leading to a rapid development of agricultural productive forces. Kim Il Sung says:

A society—where the hostile classes persist in sinister activities and the corrosive action of old ideas continues, where there still remain distinctions between towns and countryside and class distinctions between the working class and peasantry, where industrialization of the country has not been realized fully and the material and technical bases of socialism have not been laid firmly—cannot yet be called a wholly triumphant socialist society.⁷

Thus, in referring to a complete socialist society, its overall scientific content should be defined not only from the standpoint of production relations, nor of development of productive forces, nor of the superstructure, but from a standpoint encompassing all these aspects, and especially the realization of a classless society.

Basically, transition from capitalism to socialism entails all-round transition from one socio-economic formation to a new socio-economic formation essentially different in quality. The transition should be carried out in all areas of politics, economy, culture and ideology. Since the transitional period contains features of both capitalism and socialism, the transi-

tional period will end when the characteristic features of socialism are victorious, or at least have attained decisive superiority over the capitalist system in all sectors. Kim Il Sung says:

We may say that the tasks to be carried out in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism have been realized when we have won the petty-bourgeois strata of people to our side by advancing socialist construction and when class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry have been eliminated.

In this way, unlike right and left deviationists, it seems to be correct for us to set a line of demarcation for the transitional period at classless society.⁸

This applies to all countries. But each country will have specific tasks to carry out in keeping with its historical conditions.

For instance, in some capitalist countries, most peasants have already been converted into agricultural proletarians, and the productive forces of agriculture are on the same high level as those of industry, although significant differences in working conditions remain. In such conditions, it is possible in a comparatively short transitional period to realize a classless society, following the overthrow of the exploiting classes through a socialist revolution, their expropriation, and transformation of their property to people's property.

Under such conditions, there is not a great distance separating the complete victory of the socialist revolution and the realization of a classless society or the complete victory of socialism, because the difficult and long-term task of eliminating class distinctions between workers and peasants is not a requisite in the transitional period. But, it goes without saying, in this case, too, it is necessary to liquidate the remnants of the exploiting classes and of the old ideas still remaining in the consciousness of people. Unless this task is fulfilled, it cannot be said that socialism has triumphed completely or a classless society has been realized, nor can it be said that the transitional period has come to its end.

The situation is more complex in a backward capitalist society. Such a country is characterized by the fact that the peasantry comprises a large majority of the total population and a peasant economy carries predominant weight in the national economy. Also, industry is markedly backward. Under such historical conditions, the tasks to be solved in the transitional period are naturally more difficult and complex.

In the first place, the working class, which has overthrown the exploiting classes and expropriated their property, is not in a position to expropriate the property of the petty bourgeoisie, including the peasantry. Furthermore, even rich farmers are excluded from the scope of expropriation, with only restrictive measures applied to them.

Consequently, the victorious working class is required to absorb small-scale commodity production and capitalist enterprises gradually into large-scale socialist cooperative farms and other enterprises through all forms of positive aid by the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the basis of free choice and example, and also by determined struggles. In other words, the working class has a task of unparalleled difficulty—the transformation of small-scale commodity production and capitalist enterprises into large-scale socialist enterprises, establishing the undivided sway of the socialist system.

The problem of eliminating class distinctions between workers and peasants and between town and countryside is posed for the first time in the transitional period, under the socialist system.

There are other problems during this period: liquidating remaining segments of the exploiting classes, smashing the machinations of hostile elements, eliminating the corrosive action of old ideas and substituting progressive ideas, collectivism and communism, and raising substantially the level of the productive forces of agriculture.

Thus the establishment of a socialist system in a backward capitalist country in the transitional period to socialism, fol-

lowing the socialist transformation of relations of production, does not immediately mean the realization of a complete victory of socialism or of a classless society. It is necessary to continue the revolution after the establishment of the socialist system in order to eliminate class distinctions between workers and peasants and distinctions between town and countryside. Only then can it be said that the transitional period has come to its end. Consequently, the transitional period of a backward capitalist country is necessarily longer than that of a developed capitalist country. Where people have cast off the colonial yoke of imperialism, the problem is particularly difficult and complex.

It is an irrefutable law of historical development that a people who have emerged from imperialist colonial subjugation must traverse the road of socialism in order to march toward freedom and happiness, national independence and prosperity. Kim Il Sung says: "Historical experience shows that a people who have gotten rid of the colonial yoke of imperialism must take the socialist path."⁹

A backward colonial or semicolonial country is characterized not only by the dominance of the peasantry and of backward farms in its total economy, but also by the fact that its industry is colonial in character. Such a country has to carry out the tasks of the transitional period without having gone through the normal development of capitalism and with the backward productive forces of a colonial agricultural country.

Because of this, the characteristics of its transitional period are distinct from those of a developed capitalist country or even a backward capitalist country. In the first place, the country has to pass through a preparatory stage before going into the transitional period to socialism. In other words, people who have won independence have to crush all resistance and subversive maneuvers of foreign imperialists and domestic reactionary forces, shatter the colonial imperialist agencies of domination and, at the same time, sweep away all

the economic footholds of imperialism and domestic reaction, laying the foundations for an independent national economy and a progressive social system, a people's democratic system, under the leadership of the working class.

The most important of these tasks in this stage is to overthrow imperialism and the domestic reactionary forces—landlords and capitalists—and eliminate their socio-economic basis. To do this, land reform and nationalization of key industries are of decisive significance.

When key industries are nationalized, a socialist economic system will be established which will gradually increase its leading role in the economy, and all conditions for entering the period of transition to socialism will have been created. This preparatory period is known as the stage of the *people's democratic revolution*, and its form of power is called the dictatorship of people's democracy. It is led by the working class and is based on a worker-peasant alliance. In this sense, it may be said to perform *essentially* the function of a dictatorship of the proletariat, relying on a broad united front, including even national capitalists, spearheaded by a worker-peasant alliance.

In short, in the stage of the people's democratic revolution, liquidation of the capitalist class in general is not a prerequisite; the important task is elimination of the comprador capitalists who are in collusion with imperialist forces.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is established when all the tasks of the people's democratic revolution are fulfilled and new tasks to be carried out in the transitional period to socialism are posed: socialist transformation of relations of production, rapid development of backward productive forces, and socialist construction to achieve rapid industrialization. National capitalists are to be educated and remolded into socialist working people. And private ownership of the means of production, including especially capitalist ownership, is to be abolished completely, as are distinctions between workers and peasants and between town and countryside.

The tasks to be carried out under a socialist system by a backward colonial or semicolonial country have characteristic features distinct from those of a backward capitalist country. These features are related, first of all, to the fact that it has inherited the backward productive forces of a colonial, agricultural country. Thus development of the productive forces, which should have taken place under capitalism, has to be undertaken by the socialist system, a situation that will affect greatly the task of eliminating distinctions between workers and peasants and between town and countryside. Referring to this question, Kim Il Sung says:

Because we failed to experience the stage of capitalist development in a normal way, we have to fulfill in our era of socialism the task of developing productive forces, which ought to have been carried out under capitalism. There is no need, however, to make our society capitalist, to foster capitalists, to overthrow them and then, after that, to construct socialism, because we failed to solve the task which ought to have been solved in the capitalist stage. The working class that has seized power is required, instead of reviving capitalist society, to carry out under the socialist system the tasks that ought to have been carried out in the bourgeois revolution to provide the basis for constructing a classless society.

We must by all means lay the material foundations of socialism firmly, raise the level of productive forces at least to that of developed capitalist countries and completely eliminate distinctions between the working class and the peasantry. For this purpose, we have to carry out a technological revolution to the extent reached in countries which have developed capitalist relations in the countryside, to mechanize farm work and carry out chemicalization and irrigation, and enforce a system of eight working hours.¹⁰

Because of the extremely difficult and complex nature of the problems facing a colonial or a semicolonial country, its period of transition to socialism will be comparatively long.

As has been made clear, the tasks to be carried out in the transitional period and its duration are naturally different according to the concrete, historical conditions of each coun-

try, or depending upon whether it was a developed capitalist country, a backward capitalist country, a colonial country or a semicolonial country. It is also clear that the tasks to be carried out in the transitional period have to be defined correctly according to the stage of historical development of the transitional period in each country.

Then, the question naturally is presented: When all these tasks in the transitional period have been carried out successfully and when, as a result, a classless society has been realized, what is the relationship between such a classless society and the higher stage of communism?

Realization of a classless society following the transitional period does not mean immediate realization of the higher level of communism or the start of a transition to it. Kim Il Sung says:

Needless to say, the end of the transitional period does not immediately lead to the higher stage of communism. Even after the end of the transitional period, it is necessary to continue the revolution and construction and to develop productive forces to a level where each works according to his ability and each receives according to his needs, so that we may pass on to the higher stage of communism.¹¹

By the higher stage of communism is meant not only a classless society where class distinctions no longer exist between workers and peasants, but also a highly developed society where each person works according to his ability and each receives commodities and services according to his needs. In a completely successful socialist society, a classless society, there still remain distinctions between mental and physical labor, and differences in the quality of labor between workers and peasants, although class differences between them have been ended. The criterion for the pace of progress at this stage is related primarily to the level of development of the productive forces.

The order in which these remaining distinctions will be

eliminated so far has hardly been discussed and remains to be solved. But, apparently, distinctions between mental and physical labor will last longest, and will be ripe for elimination only after the other distinctions mentioned have been abolished. This distinction will disappear only in the higher stage of communism, when the productive forces of society have reached a maximum, when all branches of the economy have been mechanized and automated, and when all working people have achieved the levels of engineers and technicians and have been educated and remolded into highly cultured and conscious communists.

To determine scientifically the demarcation between a classless society and the higher stage of communism, and consequently to define scientifically the content of each, is of great theoretical and practical significance. The conceptual content of scientific distinctions between classless society and the higher stage of communism can be defined only when the process of the historical development of the transitional period is analyzed concretely and a clear prospect is opened, scientifically, for a period beyond the transitional period or, in other words, when the overall construction of socialism and communism is placed on the order of the day.

The question of the relationship between the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat is most acute in the present stage of development of the world revolution. Today, these factors are considered simultaneous and inseparable from each other by some who mechanically repeat classical propositions of Marxism-Leninism and disregard the concrete, historical conditions of the present stage of the world revolution.

Though closely related, the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat are independent questions and strict distinctions should be made between them.

So long as a revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism is a historical process accompanied by sharp class

struggles, and the tasks of the transitional period can be achieved only through such sharp class struggles, the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the most powerful weapon of class struggle, is the form of power most suited to the characteristic features of this transitional period. It is clear both theoretically and practically that the form of power of the working class in the transitional period must be the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

However, the transitional period does not necessarily coincide in time with the historical period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The transitional period covers the entire historical period from the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the realization of a classless society. But the dictatorship of the proletariat has to be continued as long as the revolutionary struggle of the working class continues, even after all the tasks of the transitional period have been carried out successfully and the transitional period comes to an end. On this, Kim Il Sung says:

The historical mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat lies in liquidating the exploiting classes and putting down their resistance and in gradually eliminating all class distinctions and building communism by educating and remolding all the working people to revolutionize and working-change them.¹²

Thus, the historical mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not only to overthrow the exploiting classes and suppress their resistance, not only to eliminate all class distinctions, but precisely to realize communism, the highest ideal of mankind.

The working class is faced with the historic task of establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat not only within national borders but also on a worldwide scale and of constructing communism and socialism in an all-round way. Where the proletariat has won power, is accelerating the revolution and construction, is constantly confronting imperialism under

conditions of encirclement by international capitalism; even when the tasks of the transitional period have been carried out successfully within the national borders of one country or the higher stage of communism has been reached, aggressive and subversive acts will be continued by capitalism and imperialism as long as they remain on earth. Consequently, a dictatorship of the proletariat is an absolute necessity. Kim Il Sung writes:

Under conditions where world revolution has not yet been achieved and where capitalism and imperialism remain, even if communism is realized in one country or in one region, such a society would not be free from the threat of imperialism or from the resistance of internal enemies who are in conspiracy with external enemies. Under such conditions, the state will not wither away even if the higher stage of communism is attained, and the dictatorship of the proletariat must continue. If revolutions are carried out in all the countries of the world in succession and when capitalism is destroyed on a worldwide scale and the socialist revolution triumphs, the transitional period will coincide with the dictatorship of the proletariat, and when the transitional period ends, the dictatorship of the proletariat will no longer be necessary, with the result that the functions of the state will wither away. However, so long as we subscribe to the theory that it is possible to construct communism in one country or in one region, it is entirely correct to consider the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat separately.¹³

Thus, while the questions of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat are closely related and inseparable, their scientific content should be dealt with separately. If one disregards these distinctions and expects the end of the transitional period to be followed immediately by the completion of the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus weakening its functions or negating them, irretrievable loss will be caused to the revolution and construction.

Specifically, it is erroneous to say that the transitional period ends with the completion of socialist transformation of the relations of production and establishment of a socialist system. Kim Il Sung says:

It is wrong to think that the dictatorship of the proletariat has become unnecessary before class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry are obliterated, before ideological survivals of the old society are eradicated, and particularly at a time when the enemies at home and abroad continue to intensify their aggressive and subversive activities against socialism.¹⁴

The mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat under socialism is, first, to abolish completely internal and external class enemies and smash their resistance and subversive maneuvers; second, to advance the ideological revolution vigorously in order to revolutionize all working people and convert them into the working class, and, third, to promote economic construction and further accelerate socialist and communist construction. These tasks result from the undeniable fact that class struggle continues even under the socialist system as well as from the need for the working class, which has acquired power, to push economic construction and realize socialist and communist construction.

It is clear that the class struggle under the socialist system is necessarily different in form and content from the class struggle under the previous system. The object of class struggle during the socialist revolution is to eliminate the capitalists as a class. Under the socialist system the class struggle is carried out against internal and external enemies. But its most important, main content is the ideological revolution through which workers, peasants and working intellectuals are remolded. This is done mainly through cooperation in labor, to establish the unity and cohesion of the people.

The ideological revolution aims to transform all members of society into the working class—particularly the petty bourgeoisie, including the peasantry, intellectuals and the urban lower middle class. From this standpoint, it may be said that aid of the socialist state to the countryside and of the working class to the peasantry is a form of class struggle. The supply to the working class of machinery and to the peasantry of chemical fertilizer and large-scale irrigation projects is aimed at

eliminating the peasantry as a class and converting it into the working class.

At a time when left and right opportunist deviations are cropping up on this question, it is of special practical significance to understand correctly the characteristic features of the form and content of class struggle under socialism.

Apart from deliberate counter-revolutionary views, various theoretical and practical deviations in connection with the questions of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat spring mainly from the dogmatic or revisionist interpretations of classical propositions. It goes without saying that a thorough stand of *Juche* should be maintained in approaching the classical propositions on these questions. In other words, it is necessary to evaluate correctly the historical circumstances and the theoretical premises on which a classical proposition was based, to grasp its revolutionary essence and to apply it creatively to the new, changed and developed, concrete historical conditions of the revolution.

When Marx defined socialism and introduced the question of the transitional period, it is clear that he had in mind developed capitalist states such as Britain. These developed states were completely capitalist, not only in the cities but also, largely, in the countryside, and capitalist relations prevailed in the whole society. In England for example, there were no peasants; and there were agricultural laborers in the countryside side by side with workers in towns. Thus, there were no class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry.

Under these historical conditions, the elimination of class distinctions between workers and peasants was not posed as a task to be carried out in the transitional period. But in this case, too, the historical necessity for a transitional period could not be denied; the elimination of the remnants of the exploiting classes and the old ideas in the consciousness of people was posed as the task to be carried out.

On this premise, Marx thought that when the proletariat overthrew the capitalist class by a socialist revolution and expropriated their property for all the people it would be possible to carry out the tasks of the transitional period in a comparatively short time and to proceed to the higher stage of communism. In other words, Marx regarded the period from the conquest of power by the proletariat in a developed capitalist state to transition to socialism as comparatively short.

Marx also presented the questions of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat from the standpoint of an uninterrupted revolution.

Thus, Marx presented these questions on the premise that proletarian revolutions would occur almost simultaneously and continuously in the principal capitalist countries of Europe and that the world revolution would triumph in a comparatively short period of time. Living in the pre-monopoly capitalist era, Marx was unable to see clearly the uneven political and economic development of capitalism. On these premises, he thought that the dictatorship of the proletariat corresponded in time to the transitional period or, in other words, that the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat were inseparably related to each other.

On that theoretical premise, Marx's classical propositions on the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat were wholly correct. And Lenin's views on the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat were basically a continuation and extension of Marx's proposition, developed to correspond to the more complex conditions of monopoly capitalism, of the stage of imperialism.

Lenin, continuing Marx's stand on the historical necessity for a transitional period, deduced that theoretically there was no doubt that there would be a certain period of transition from capitalism to communism, and he exposed sharply the counter-revolutionary nature of arguments which denied the historical necessity for such a transitional period.

Lenin also grasped the essential content of the transitional period from the standpoint of class struggle, regarding the period as one of struggle between moribund capitalism and emerging communism and, consequently, as a period of unprecedentedly sharp and acute class struggle.

Continuing Marx's revolutionary stance, Lenin never interpreted the classical propositions in a dogmatic way or applied them mechanically. In interpreting and applying Marx's propositions, Lenin started from the concrete, historical conditions of Russia, a backward capitalist state, whose peasantry comprised an overwhelming majority of the total population and whose peasant farms contributed an overwhelmingly large weight in the economy. In other words, class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry had not been eradicated.

Under these circumstances, Lenin regarded the elimination of class distinctions between workers and peasants as a difficult and complex task to be carried out in the transitional period. According to Lenin, despite the fact that the working class had overthrown the capitalist system and seized power, there were still class distinctions between workers and peasants. Such a society was not a complete socialist society, still less a communist society; it was precisely a transitional society.

Consequently, Lenin considered that in order to realize socialism it was not sufficient to overthrow the capitalists as a class, but it was also necessary to eliminate class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry. He regarded socialism as a complete abolition of classes. It is clear that Lenin regarded the period from the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the realization of a classless society as a transitional period from capitalism to socialism or communism.

Needless to say, this definition of Lenin's on the transitional period was fundamentally correct. And the propositions pre-

sented in Marxist-Leninist works were all correct in the light of then prevailing historical circumstances and of their theoretical premises.

Today, however, right and left opportunists, completely disregarding the historical circumstances and theoretical premises of classical propositions, are greatly distorting their revolutionary content and are causing serious confusion by interpreting them in a dogmatic or a revisionist way.

The right opportunists regard the transitional period as the time from conquest of power by the working class to the victory of the socialist system and consider that this period coincides with the dictatorship of the proletariat. Starting from this, they consider that the historical mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat ends with the completion of the transitional period.

According to the right opportunists, socialist tasks tend to be confined to the areas of economic construction, with the result that the abolition of class distinctions and the victory of an ideological revolution, and other tasks, are neglected completely. This means abandoning the class struggle and surrendering to counter-revolutionary economism.

The counter-revolutionary character of right opportunism is expressed in mechanically equating in time the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat, in considering that the function of the dictatorship of the proletariat ends with the establishment of socialism and in denying the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat under the socialist system.

This results in emasculating the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the most powerful weapon of class struggle and for building socialism and communism, the most essential functions of a socialist state, and is, in effect, an abandonment of the revolution.

It is clear that such a right opportunist view is diametrically opposed to Marxism-Leninism and is based on a counter-revolutionary idea and standpoint. Kim Il Sung says:

To regard the transitional period at an end when the socialist system triumphs issues from the ideological attitude of discontinuing class struggle with the remnants of the overthrown exploiting classes at home, and of carrying on the world revolution while living in peace with world imperialism. Further, an argument is advanced that the dictatorship of the proletariat ceases to exist with the end of the transitional period. But how can it be so?... This is fundamentally wrong.¹⁵

On the other hand, left opportunists, starting with the idea that communism will be attained only many generations ahead, regard the transitional period as one that extends from capitalism to the higher stage of communism. This view is practically the same as not drawing any line of demarcation for the transitional period at all.

What is necessary is to grasp correctly the characteristic features of each historical stage of development up to the higher stage of communism, to analyze scientifically the concrete historical conditions of each stage, and to define correctly the revolutionary tasks for each of these stages. Herein lies the revolutionary significance of the transitional period. If its termination is obscured by extending its duration to the higher stage of communism, the working class will not be able to have correct, Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics in each historical stage in the development of the revolution during the long period of time up to the stage of communism.

Furthermore, left opportunists not only consider that the transitional period will extend to the higher stage of communism, but also assert that communism cannot be realized in a single country. According to them, it will be impossible to realize communism before the world revolution is completed. The left opportunists, therefore, scream about "class struggle," but ignore the concrete tasks of elimination of class distinctions, construction of socialism, and advance to communism. They end up in confusion in practice.

As is already clear, the form and content of class struggle

are defined differently according to each stage of the development of the revolution, and it is impermissible to regard them as the same under any circumstances. Left opportunists, failing to understand the dialectic development of the form and content of class struggle, confuse the class struggle under the socialist system with class struggle in the stage of the socialist revolution, with the result that the working masses are pitted against each other, greatly damaging the political and ideological unity of the working masses, which should be the basis of social relations under socialism.

Kim Il Sung's clarification of the question of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat demolishes these right and left opportunist deviations, which already have proved bankrupt in practice. His theory on these questions is not only a creative development of Marxism-Leninism, but also is of practical significance for the international communist movement, and particularly the practical struggle of the working class for the construction of socialism and communism.

2. THE COMPLETE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM

(1) Superiority of the Socialist System

Capitalism is the road of exploitation and oppression, subjugation and decline. Socialism is the only way to eliminate all forms of class exploitation and national oppression, to guarantee real freedom and happiness for all people, and to realize complete national independence and prosperity. Therefore, socialism and communism represent the bright future of mankind. This is the irrefutable truth, completely borne out in theory and practice. This truth has been demonstrated fully by the experience of the Korean people in their revolutionary struggle. All the great victories won by the Korean people during the past 20 years in revolution and construction under

the banner of the Republic have been achieved because they have advanced steadily along the road of socialism. All the achievements of the Korean people demonstrate clearly the essential superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system.

In defining the socialist system, Kim Il Sung says:

The socialist system is the most advanced social system, under which power is in the hands of the masses of the people; production is developed steadily in a planned way, on a high scientific and technical foundation, for the purpose of systematically enhancing the welfare of the people on the basis of public ownership of the means of production; all kinds of exploitation and oppression have been abolished for all time; and each works according to his ability and takes his share according to the quality and quantity of his work.¹⁶

Socialism from the standpoint of power is the state and social system whose political power is firmly held by the popular masses, headed by the working class. Thus, viewed from the relations of production, it is the social system in which all private or capitalist ownership of the means of production has been eliminated completely and social ownership is in control. Therefore, under these conditions, the prime motive of production is systematically to increase the welfare of all the people. The most modern scientific and technical facilities are provided in order to supply the ever-increasing material and cultural demands of the masses and, on this basis, production is developed in a planned way at a rapid pace. Herein lies the basic characteristic of socialist production. The argument that the tempo of economic development is slowed down under the socialist system as its economic development and scale expand has nothing in common with the Marxist-Leninist view on the nature of socialist production.

Finally, if viewed from the relations of distribution, in the socialist system the right to work is guaranteed to all and the socialist principle of distribution is enforced: Each works

according to his ability and receives according to the quality and quantity of his labor; all exploiting classes have been liquidated and their socio-economic foundations have been wiped out; profit from the labor of others and their oppression have been abolished for all time. The fruits of all labor, directly or indirectly, belong to the workers themselves. Therefore, socialism is the most advanced social system, whose realization mankind has desired for many centuries, superior in all respects to the capitalist system.

First, it is superior in regard to the fact that the people hold political power, that the masses enjoy completely guaranteed democratic rights. In the northern half of the Republic, all people participate in the country's politics freely, exercise their sovereign political rights for their revolutionary cause, have free choice of jobs according to their ability and aptitude, work and learn to their hearts' content, and live happily. Conversely, under capitalism, where capitalists, landlords and other exploiting classes hold power, no political rights or freedoms are securely guaranteed for the majority of the people. Historical experience demonstrates that bourgeois democracy is essentially a democracy for the capitalists and landlords, and means dictatorship to the overwhelming majority of the masses.

Second, concerning the means of production under socialism, working people are not only in control of the government but also are the masters of production and labor. There is no "alienation of labor" because the proletariat works for their state, for their society and for themselves. This is the powerful basis that enables the masses to give full scope to their creative capacity and talent and to increase production rapidly. As against this, under capitalism, the means of production are owned by capitalists and landlords and the purpose of production is to bring them more profit. The masses work to sustain a bare living. Labor presupposes exploitation and, consequently, workers are alienated completely from the

products of their labor, which belong to the capitalists. Workers are guaranteed the right to live only on the premise that they are exploited. Under such conditions, it is clear that the producing masses have little interest in production technique.

Third, in the socialist system, all sectors and enterprises of the people's economy are linked together, have a common purpose and interest, and are directed in a unified and planned way by the central economic planning body. Consequently, it is possible to develop a planned and balanced economy, to mobilize and utilize all human and material resources and the production potential of the state effectively and to a maximum. Under capitalism, there is anarchy of production, and economic crises due to overproduction are inevitable.

Fourth, under socialism, production is used entirely to improve the welfare of the people and, as a result, this system is characterized basically by a continual improvement in the people's living standard together with rapid development of production. As against this, the inevitable result of capitalism is the starvation and poverty, unemployment and pauperization of a substantial part of the working masses, an increasing gap between rich and poor, between the workers' needs and their satisfaction. The above is the basic content of the superiority of socialism over capitalism.

Since socialism and capitalism are as described, it is historically necessary for a people liberated from colonial enslavement to press ahead on the road to socialism. Historical experience clearly shows that if people, freed from imperialist exploitation and oppression that has continued for scores of years or for centuries, hope to realize complete national independence and liberation, real freedom and happiness for the people and autonomy and prosperity for the nation, there is no alternative for them but to march along the path of socialism.

In order for a liberated people to realize complete national independence and liberation, it is necessary for the masses, headed by the working class, to hold political power firmly. And it is necessary for them to use it as a powerful weapon to smash the subversive activities of foreign imperialists and domestic reactionaries if they are to eliminate the colonial domination and eradicate all the economic foundations of imperialism and domestic reaction. They are required to strengthen their revolutionary forces and establish a progressive social system, while socializing the principal means of production, and striving to construct a powerful independent national economy and culture. Only by so doing, can the liberated people take the shortcut to freedom and happiness and to national independence and prosperity without going through the trials and struggles unavoidable under capitalism.

It is important for people who have won political independence to never allow domestic reaction to wrest political power away from them. If domestic reactionaries should gain control, they will ally themselves with foreign imperialists and surrender national independence and freedom, returning the country to a declining neo-colonial status. This has been borne out by history.

The historical experience of the Korean people in their long revolutionary struggle demonstrates the irrefutable truth that a people liberated from imperialist colonial enslavement should advance steadily toward socialism and communism, the future of mankind.

(2) Requirements for Complete Victory of Socialism

It is the task of the working class and the socialist state, after the foundations of socialism have been laid, to carry on the revolution in politics, economics, culture and all other areas and to realize the complete victory of socialism. Today, the Korean people are facing this great, still unattained revolutionary task.

The continuation of the revolution in all areas after the socialist system has triumphed and the foundations of socialism laid is the objective law of the development of socialism.

First, even after the victory of the socialist system it is necessary to wage a continuous struggle against the remnants of the deposed ruling classes. Experience of the revolutionary struggles in Korea teaches that the overthrown ruling classes continue to resist for a long time. They never abandon their dream of regaining power, even after they have been liquidated as a class and deprived of their bases. Their resistance is due to the class nature of the exploiters and, at the same time, is related to the fact that while imperialism still exists they receive positive support from foreign imperialists.

Second, even after the socialist system has been established, age-old, feudalistic, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas, which are ideological survivals of the exploiting classes, still remain deeply rooted in the ideology and consciousness of the masses. These ideas are a negative factor in the development of revolution and construction.

They take the form of "excessive centralism," localism and other egocentric tendencies in the control and management of socialist economy. Needless to say, these ideas pertain to the main factors which determine the changed character of the socialist society and it requires obstinate struggles to root up these ideas completely and to remold the ideology and consciousness of the working masses to collectivism and communism. The control of socialist production relations creates material conditions decisively favorable for furthering the ideology and consciousness of communism. It is true that the dominant ideas of a socialist society are communist ideas. But this does not mean that the struggle to remold the ideology and consciousness of the working people in a socialist society can be weakened. On the contrary, the historical experience of socialist countries shows that the political and ideological education of the working people should be strengthened constantly and decisively.

Third, even after the victory of the socialist system, there remain for a considerable period distinctions between town and countryside and between the working class and the peasantry. The principal class distinctions remaining in a socialist society are those between the working class and the peasantry. These distinctions are also a main factor determining the transitional nature of socialism. Consequently, the working class can say that a completely classless society has been achieved only after the peasantry has been elevated to its level in ideology, consciousness, culture, morality and other areas.

Fourth, even after the victory of the socialist system, it is necessary for the working class to continue to develop socialist production to a level suitable for socialist and communist society and to improve the living standard and culture of the people. In order to establish socialism firmly, it is necessary, above all, to lay the proper socialist material and technical foundations. Generally speaking, socialism demands that productive forces be raised to a level of development far higher than the material and technological levels inherited from capitalism.

All-round development of all kinds of machinery and technology and full development of productive forces are possible only in a socialist system that has destroyed the narrow framework of capitalist relations of production. Machinery, technology and productive forces are placed under the direct control of man himself in a socialist system and fully serve the happiness and progress of mankind. In other words, the role of machinery and technology under the capitalists—to control, destroy and exploit man—comes to an end when capitalism is abolished.

This is particularly important to a country like Korea, which has taken the path of socialism without going through the normal development of capitalism and industrial revolution. Regarding the living conditions of the people, the social sources of exploitation and poverty have been eliminated

and the most basic problems in the material and cultural life of the people have been solved. But the task of continuously and decisively raising the living standard of the people still remains. Therefore, what is the task facing a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat and how can this task be realized?

In order to achieve the complete victory of socialism and accomplish the historical cause of the working class [Kim Il Sung says], the state must further strengthen its role as a weapon of class struggle, a weapon for the building of socialism and communism. In other words, the socialist state should strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, carrying on the class struggle on the one hand and vigorously pushing ahead with the building of the socialist economy on the other.¹⁷

Only by continuously and decisively strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat can a socialist state occupy the ideological and material fortresses that have to be occupied for the complete victory of socialism and the advance to communism.

It is important to carry out the task of occupying the ideological and material fortresses in a unified way, simultaneously. Overestimation or understatement will lead to deviations of left or right opportunism and there will be an irretrievable loss to the general course of socialist construction. Actually, these two tasks are inseparably interrelated and it is thus necessary to carry them out in an integrated way.

In other words, if the dictatorship of the proletariat and the ideological revolution are underestimated and the class struggle is weakened, it will be impossible for the working masses to give full scope to their creative capacity and conscious enthusiasm and to carry out the tasks of economic construction and technical revolution successfully.

On the contrary, if the class struggle and ideological revolution are overemphasized, and economic construction and the technological revolution are underestimated, it is difficult to ease the onerous working conditions of the people, to raise

their living standards and to carry out the ideological revolution itself successfully. Ideology and consciousness are determined by material conditions and, even in a socialist country, these depend to a great extent on technological development and improvement of living standards. We must man the ideological and material fortresses in a closely related and integrated way, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the complete victory of socialism.

It is important to combine the class struggle against a handful of enemy elements with the struggle to educate, remold and unite the masses who constitute the overwhelming majority of the people.

If one loses sight of the fact that under socialism unity and cooperation among the working class, peasantry and intellectuals are the basis of social relations, and if the class struggle is overemphasized and exaggerated, the error of leftism is committed. Conversely, if one ignores the fact that hostile elements and old ideology survive and that the class struggle continues under socialism, and if all the people are permitted to enjoy "pure democracy" or what is called "freedom" the serious rightist error is committed.

Democracy as a political concept assumes class character under any circumstances. All dictatorships of the exploiting classes are dictatorships against the exploited classes, and their democracy is democracy for the handful of people of the exploiting classes. In contrast to this, a dictatorship of the proletariat is a dictatorship of the exploited against the exploiters and democracy for the benefit of the masses of the people. Just as there has never been a state without a ruling class, so there has never been a democracy devoid of class character and there will never be such a democracy. In any state, democracy is democracy for the class in power, and goes along with dictatorship against the enemy classes.

In conditions where remnants of the deposed exploiters are active and where class struggles continue, there can be no

“pure” democracy or “complete freedom” for all people. Bourgeois democracy is the freedom for millionaires to exploit and plunder the working people and to earn profits, allowing the working people only the freedom of poverty. If one should fail to recognize the class nature of democracy in socialist society and assert that all people should enjoy “pure democracy” and “complete freedom” under the dictatorship of the proletariat, this will be tantamount to imposing bourgeois democracy and slavish freedom on the people. We are opposed to an abstract and supra-class interpretation of democracy.

Next, it is necessary to solve the rural and agrarian questions in order to realize the complete victory of socialism. As Kim Il Sung says:

To solve the rural question finally and to raise cooperative property to the level of public property is one of the most important tasks confronting the dictatorship of the proletariat after the triumph of the socialist system and one of the basic conditions for the complete victory of socialism. Only when the rural question is solved and the backwardness of the countryside is eliminated completely can the socialist state make a clean sweep of the reactionary bourgeois hangovers and footholds fostered from outside and of the remnants of the overthrown exploiting classes that plant themselves and engage in insidious maneuverings. And only when cooperative property is raised to the level of public property can the agricultural productive forces be developed to a high degree, can selfish ideas remaining in the minds of the peasants be rooted out, and can all the working people be led unswervingly along the path of collectivism, which will result in their working for the whole society and the entire people with a high degree of conscious zeal.¹⁸

It is clear that the rural and agrarian questions finally will be solved, in the complete sense defined by Kim Il Sung, in the stage of social development when the ideology and consciousness of the peasantry are remolded into the ideas of the working class or the ideas of communism, when agriculture will be equipped with modern machinery and cooperative ownership has been turned into ownership by the whole people. To

realize this, it is necessary, above all, to carry out energetically three revolutions—technical, cultural and ideological—in the countryside, on the basis of the rapid development of socialist industry and towns. At the same time, it is necessary for the working class to strengthen greatly its assistance to the peasantry, to raise agriculture to the advanced levels of industrial management and control and to strengthen relations of production between ownership by the entire people and cooperative ownership, and to bring them together.

Only when this task has been accomplished successfully can the working class complete one of the main tasks to be carried out in the transitional period, that is, winning the intermediate classes, especially the farming masses, a basic principle presented by Kim Il Sung for solving the rural and agrarian questions under socialism.

For a complete victory of socialism, it is essential to advance socialist economic construction, to raise productive forces to a level high enough to satisfy the requirements of socialism and communism, and to attain a high level of material and cultural life for the working people.

The communists not only fight for the freedom and liberation of people, but also strive for their happiness [says Kim Il Sung]. An important task confronting communists after they have overthrown the old system and liberated the people from exploitation and oppression is to build a satisfactory socialist economy. Concern for the enhancement of the welfare of the people is the supreme law governing the activities of the Party and state of the working class.¹⁹

This concern is the prime principle consistently upheld by the Workers Party of Korea and the government of the Republic in their activities. To implement it, it is necessary to promote socialist economic construction. The task here is to lay a firm material and technical foundation of socialism by carrying out industrialization, technical and cultural innovations, and a program to train all the working people in the skills and techniques of operating modern machinery. In other words, it is

necessary to develop a rapidly expanding modern industry and advanced agriculture by equipping all sectors of the economy, including agriculture, with advanced techniques and to remold all people into capable all-round builders of communism. It is necessary in this way, to liberate the working class from exploitation and from onerous and exhausting labor, to eradicate distinctions between industrial and agricultural labor, heavy and light labor, manual and mental labor, and to produce more material wealth with easier work. Further, it is necessary to raise decisively the material and cultural levels of all working people, based on the rapidly developing industrial and agricultural production. This is the meaning of raising productive forces to a level of development commensurate with socialism and communism. This is the realistic basis for fully realizing the highest principle governing the activities of the Party and state of the working class. This is also the basis for realizing the communist principle of distribution; where people voluntarily work for society and commodity circulation is transformed into distribution in kind.

The complete victory of socialism, as defined by Kim Il Sung, is not only wide in scope but also very high in quality—a complete transformation of the socio-economic formation.

Thus, socialism triumphs completely when the remnants of the exploiting classes have been demolished and liquidated completely; when distinctions between town and countryside and between the working class and the peasantry have been eradicated; when all the members of society have been transformed into conscious communists by having been converted into the working class; when the rural question has been solved so that there are no longer distinctions between cooperative property and property of the entire people so that ownership by the entire people, the highest level of socialization, holds undivided sway; when the technological revolution and socialist industrialization have been realized fully; when the material and technical foundations of socialism firm-

ly have been laid by equipping all sectors of the people's economy with modern technique; and when material and technical foundations have been completed for the full development of individuals and for the gradual elimination of distinctions between industrial and agricultural labor, heavy and light labor, manual and mental labor.

Only when these conditions are fulfilled can socialism have the requisite material and technical foundation, and communism will begin to develop. It is at this stage that a full realization of communism will be posed as a concrete and realistic task.

3. TOWARD WORLD SOCIALISM

The revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in countries where they have conquered power should be part of the revolutionary struggles of the international proletariat to overthrow capitalism and imperialism on a worldwide scale and to guarantee the ultimate victory of socialism and they should be developed in connection with the revolutionary struggles of the international proletariat in an integrated way. Only in this way can the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in individual countries win ultimate victory. This necessity is related to the fact that the revolutionary struggles in countries where the proletariat has seized power are being waged under encirclement of international capitalism and in direct confrontation with imperialism. Kim Il Sung says:

Where the proletariat has seized power in an individual country encircled by international capitalism, there cannot be freedom from the danger of imperialist aggression and capitalist restoration till communism is realized on a worldwide scale. Therefore, to win the ultimate victory in revolution, the proletariat of each country that has assumed power should consolidate its own internal revolutionary forces in every way and, at the same time, should be given the posi-

tive support of other contingents of the world socialist revolution and should cement true international solidarity with the working classes in all countries and with oppressed peoples all over the world.²⁰

Consequently, the proletariat that has assumed power in individual countries is faced with the revolutionary task of decisively strengthening and vigorously advancing the world revolution. The strengthening of the internal revolutionary forces and the victory of the revolution should be considered in their relation to the ultimate victory of the world revolution. In other words, the victory of the revolution and socialist construction in each country decisively strengthen the forces of the world socialist revolution, which, in turn, creates a condition decisively favorable for carrying out the revolution and construction in each country. This is the unitary relationship between the victory of the revolution in one country and the final victory of the world revolution.

The ultimate victory of the world revolution will be realized, says Kim Il Sung, "in the course of the outbreak of the socialist revolution and its complete victory in many countries, and the gradual expansion, consolidation and development of the socialist camp."

The ultimate victory of the revolution will be achieved as a result of the process by which revolutions will continue to occur in a large number of countries in the world, and especially in countries in proximity to those where the proletariat has conquered power; where imperialist encirclement is converted into socialist encirclement, breaking down the walls of imperialist encirclement of socialist countries and opening up a prospect for the transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a world system; where the isolation of the bastions of individual socialist countries encircled by imperialism is prevented; and where strong ties of militant solidarity between the working class and the oppressed peoples of the world have been formed precisely through this historical process.

Only when these conditions are realized can it be said that socialism is completely free from armed intervention by the imperialists and attempts to revive capitalism, and only then will the ultimate victory of socialism be secured. This is the concrete process of realizing the ultimate victory of the world revolution as made clear by Kim Il Sung—the great historical and actual process of revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism on a worldwide scale, the concrete process of realizing the ultimate victory of socialism.

The socialist camp is the invincible revolutionary base of the international working class for the ultimate victory of socialism and communism, the reliable bulwark of victory for the oppressed peoples and all progressive peoples throughout the world, and the powerful fortress of world peace.²¹

The existence of the socialist camp and its united strength are important factors determining the destiny not only of the socialist countries and peoples, but also the destiny of all mankind. The solution of all questions of world revolution today depends to a large extent on the united strength of the socialist countries. It is because of this that world reaction, led by U.S. imperialism, fears the existence of the socialist camp more than anything else, and continues plots and activities to undermine it.

Specifically, U.S. imperialism is following a two-pronged strategy of armed aggression and internal subversion through ideological and cultural infiltration to destroy the socialist camp. It is a policy of directly attacking, one by one, the countries that are taking a revolutionary road, holding high the banner of anti-imperialism. At the same time, the United States is intensifying ideological and cultural infiltration into countries that are not carrying out the revolution actively, spreading illusions about capitalism among the people and calling for unprincipled compromises with imperialism in order to undermine these countries from within. Under the circumstances, it is necessary for all the socialist countries

to unite to defend the socialist camp from the allied forces of imperialism. Thus, if it happens that a country of the socialist camp is exposed to serious danger because of the subversive activities of imperialism and domestic reactionary forces allied with it, the proletariat of the country concerned should receive active support from other contingents of the world socialist revolution. All the revolutionary forces of the world, including the socialist countries, should give all-out, active assistance to it. This problem affects not only the revolution of one particular country but also the destiny of the world revolution generally and the existence of the entire socialist camp. Since the socialist camp is the bastion of world revolution, it is clear that the failure of the revolution in any country will result in a major setback for the power and strength of the entire socialist camp.

Further, the existence of the socialist camp is a great common revolutionary gain for the working class of the entire world. Accordingly, its defense should be shared not only by the proletariat that has gained power but also by the proletariat that has not. It is a historic fact that the very existence of the socialist camp has opened a decisive phase for the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in different countries for the conquest of power. It is only imperialism that is afraid of the expansion of the socialist camp—and consequently of the victory of the revolution in individual socialist countries—and it is because of this that imperialist reaction is making desperate efforts to frustrate the revolution and construction. In order to strengthen the power of the socialist camp, it is necessary for the socialist countries to uphold the class position in solving questions, starting from the basic interests of the revolution and the essential requirements of the socialist camp as a class alliance.

The socialist countries are opposed to imperialism and colonialism and are fighting together for the construction of socialist and communist society where people can live freely

and happily. Herein lies the common political, economic and social basis and class content of all the socialist countries. This is the reason the socialist camp is not artificial, a creation of some international treaty. It is not a temporary alliance. It is a permanent alliance created by the need for class solidarity of the working class of the world, which has been victorious in sharp revolutionary struggle against international capital.

Consequently, it is impossible to exclude a country that has the prerequisites of a socialist state from the socialist camp because of differences of opinion, nor is it possible to include a country that is no longer a socialist state as part of the socialist camp.

Differences between fraternal parties and countries arise from different historical and geographical conditions, and from their different national tasks. Differences also arise from the failure to understand correctly the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to uphold a completely revolutionary stand. But these differences do not reflect contradictions between state and social system nor do they reflect basic differences between hostile classes. However sharp they may be, such differences are the internal affairs of the socialist camp and the international communist movement. It is not permissible to present these differences as contradictions between hostile classes. Therefore, the way to overcome such differences should be essentially different from the method of solving contradictions between hostile classes. They should be solved by means of ideological struggle based on the desire for unity among class brothers. A basic principle of communists that should be observed in all circumstances is to distinguish clearly between class brothers and class enemies. As long as this class position strictly is adhered to, difference of opinion surely will be overcome.

In order to achieve real unity among fraternal parties and states, it is necessary to observe strictly the norms of inter-

relationship among fraternal parties and fraternal states—complete equality, mutual respect for independence, non-interference in internal affairs, and comradely cooperation.

It is especially important for all socialist countries and communist and workers' parties to adhere strictly to a position of independence under all circumstances. Needless to say, socialist countries and communist and workers parties are completely equal and independent. They are all inseparably linked by the class solidarity of the working class and they are responsible not only for the revolution in their countries and for their people as completely equal and independent contingents in the militant ranks of the world revolution, but they are responsible for the world revolution and for the people of the entire world.

In this sense, distinctions between the parties of large and small countries, between the parties of long established and newly formed revolutionary countries are entirely meaningless. No country is permitted to claim special privileges in the ranks of the world communist movement because of such distinctions. None can claim a privileged position in the ranks of the communist movement and there can be no question of a higher or lower country in the socialist camp. The question is whether a party adheres strictly to the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism, whether it is responsible for successfully promoting the revolution and construction, and whether, in so doing, it performs its international duties in the world revolution.

However, it is impossible to maintain independence apart from economic independence. Only after it has constructed a firm national economy can a socialist country not only maintain political independence but also contribute to the strengthening of the socialist camp as a whole. In other words, the economy of each socialist country as a unit of the world socialist economic system develops in close relation and cooperation with other units. Consequently, the socialist economic

system is strengthened as each unit comprising it is strengthened. Further, the strength and effectiveness of the socialist economic system as a whole necessarily deepens the general crisis of imperialism and, consequently, of the capitalist world economic system and accelerates the ultimate downfall of world imperialist reaction. This, in turn, creates conditions more favorable for revolution and construction in each socialist country. In this way, it is necessary to understand correctly the interrelations between the construction of an independent national economy in each country and the general strengthening of the socialist economic system.

Today, the formation of the socialist market has dealt a severe blow to the imperialist monopolies and billionaires that dominated markets and controlled the world economy in the past. It has damaged gravely the expansionist policy of U. S. imperialism, which leads modern imperialism, and tries to monopolize overseas markets, plunder the raw material resources of the world at will, and establish a world market of its own. This has deepened decisively the general crisis of imperialism in economic matters.

In this situation, it is of decisive significance to expand and strengthen the socialist market in order to weaken imperialism and accelerate the world revolution. Consequently, it is of primary importance for the socialist countries to strengthen and develop their foreign economic relations. Economic relations with capitalist countries can have only secondary significance in the foreign trade of the socialist countries. In other words, the socialist countries are required to stick to their class position even in their foreign economic relations.

Construction of an independent national economy is the realistic basis for eliminating national inequality—the actual basis for national inequality is economic backwardness. The construction of socialism and communism is aimed at eliminating not only class distinctions but also national inequality.

National inequality cannot be eliminated immediately after the socialist revolution is carried out in a specific country, nor can such inequality be eradicated by integrating nationalities in one way or another.

In order to eliminate national inequality, all nations must become socialist, but all nations must develop with full freedom. This is the realistic way to do away with national inequality.

Maintenance of independence should be based firmly on the principle of proletarian internationalism and should be carried out so as to strengthen internationalism decisively. Just as there can be no internationalism apart from independence, so there can be no independence apart from internationalism. If this interrelationship is ignored, independence apart from internationalism will have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism but will be merely narrow bourgeois isolationism or bourgeois nationalism.

If someone ignores Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and takes to national egoism under the pretext of maintaining independence, he is gravely mistaken. What is more, it does not benefit a Communist to renounce the principle of class solidarity and reject joint action and joint struggle of class brothers under the slogan of independence. Such an act will do enormous harm to the development of the world revolution, and more, result in ruining the revolution in his own country, too.²²

CHAPTER III

Socialist Economic Management

Organization and perfection of economic management under a socialist system is a pressing theoretical and practical question in the construction of socialism and communism. Kim Il Sung wrote:

Following the completion of the socialist reorganization of production relations and the establishment of the socialist system, the successful building of socialism and communism depends largely on how socialist production relations are adapted to the ever-developing productive forces and how they are implemented; on how the superstructure is perfected to suit the foundations that are established; and finally on how the reverse influence of the superstructure on the foundations is to be stimulated.¹

This quotation refers to the most fundamental area of Marxism-Leninism: the interrelation between productive forces and production relations, and between the base and the superstructure. It is a problem that can be solved only by bold, creative development.

The general proposition is: In any society the form of production relations and economic structure must correspond to the level of development of productive forces and the nature of the economic base of society. How to apply this principle in a socialist society? How to insure correspondence between the constantly developing productive forces to the relations of production? How to perfect the superstructure, in particular the planning and management of state and economic organs, how to best adapt it to the socialist base, how to strengthen its positive influence on the base?

Solution of these questions is necessary to give full play to the essential superiority of the socialist system, which has completely liberated productive forces from the shackles of capitalism, and has opened a broad vista for free development, as well as for expansion and strengthening of the socialist base through state planning and management.

This means, primarily, that socialism enables millions of working people, liberated from all forms of exploitation and suppression forever—and thus absolute masters of social production—to display their revolutionary zeal and creative initiative and powerfully to promote socialist and communist construction.

In the final analysis, the problems boil down to the interrelationship between productive forces and production relations, and between the base and the superstructure. Under capitalism, these interrelationships are formed spontaneously. When they have reached a certain stage, contradictions and conflicts become their basic content. These contradictions finally are resolved only by the abolition of the capitalist production relations and superstructure through revolution.

Under the socialist system, these interrelations should be planned and purposeful. The slightest error may cause grave damage to the revolution and to construction. To form such interrelationships correctly, it is necessary scientifically to analyze the changing and developing situation and to apply the *Juche* principle. Several socialist countries suffered confusion and grave losses from failure to solve this question correctly.

In the DPRK this most difficult and complex question was solved by application of the Chongsanri spirit and the Chongsanri method created by Premier Kim Il Sung, and the Dae-an work system, to industry and agriculture, and by the new system of guiding agriculture. The correctness of the Dae-an work system and the guiding system of agriculture, which are new socialist systems of economic management established in

North Korea, has been demonstrated clearly and their vitality is being displayed fully in the form of a great upsurge of socialist construction.

1. ESSENCE OF THE CHONGSANRI SPIRIT AND METHOD

In the northern half of the Republic, the socialist transformation of the relations of production in industry and agriculture was completed in August 1958. This was a decisive factor in vigorously advancing socialist construction. The productive forces, freed from old relations of production, began to develop rapidly, and the workers' revolutionary enthusiasm and will to produce rose to new heights, while a technological revolution began in all branches of industry and agriculture. Along with the rapid economic development, the scale of production was expanded greatly and relations among different branches of production became more complex.

This development required reorganization of the state and economic planning organs in adaptation to a changed situation—that is, the creation and completion of a new socialist system of economic management related to the socialist system. In other words, it became impossible to accelerate the development of productive forces more positively and powerfully under the existing system of economic management which, though essentially a socialist system of economic management, was plagued by not a few survivals of capitalism.

For instance, the existing state agricultural bodies were organized mainly for the purpose of directing private farms. Needless to say, this direction reflected the realistic requirements in the stage where private farms played an overwhelming role in agriculture. However, this system proved inadequate when private farms were transferred into socialist cooperative farms and when the scale of cooperative farms was greatly expanded through merger of agricultural cooperative

association into *ri*-unit farms, and also when the technological revolution was beginning in agriculture in real earnest.

The gap between the completely new situation in the countryside and the existing operation of the state organs for directing agriculture resulted in the political and practical inability of the government bodies to cope with the rapid development of the economy. As Kim Il Sung pointed out:

The rate of progress of our national economy is unusually high. The successes we have scored in economic construction in the six years following the war are such as could hardly be achieved, even in scores of years, under the capitalist system. We have advanced in a spirit of taking ten steps while others take one.

Our economy has developed at a very high rate, but we can hardly expect people's knowledge and capacity to progress as rapidly.²

On-the-spot guidance given by Premier Kim Il Sung in February 1960 at Chongsanri, Kangso county, South Pyongan province, was of decisive significance for establishing a socialist system of economic management adapted to the entirely new situation, inasmuch as it solved this urgent revolutionary task and radically improved the system of direction and method of work of the Party, state and economic organs in the economy.

Through this historic guidance, Kim Il Sung analyzed the economic situation created after the socialist transformation of the relations of production and originated the Chongsanri spirit and the Chongsanri method as a new socialist system of economic management in North Korea, boldly applying the revolutionary mass line. This is explained by him as follows:

The essentials of the Chongsanri method are that the higher organ helps the lower; the superior assists his inferiors and always goes down to work areas in order to get a good grasp of actual conditions and to find correct solutions to problems. This method gives priority to political work or work with people in all activities, giving full play to the conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative of the masses so as to ensure the fulfillment of revolutionary tasks. This is not only

a powerful method of work, enabling us to carry out immediate revolutionary tasks successfully and substantially, but also a powerful method of education that enhances the ideological and political level and the practical ability of functionaries and revolutionaries.³

To mobilize to a maximum the inexhaustible creative capacity of the masses, to rely on their strength, and to lead them to give full play to their revolutionary enthusiasm, creative capacity and talent or, in other words, to follow a consistent mass line, are of decisive importance for promoting the revolution and construction.

The mass line, reliance on mass participation and initiative, is particularly urgent in a newly established socialist system, in which the levels of work of cadres were inadequate to cope with the rapidly changing reality. Cadres of the Party, of the state and economic organs, were relatively backward politically and practically in relation to the complicated problems posed. In addition, there were various strains which developed in economic control and management. These problems could be solved only by carrying through the revolutionary mass line.

It is true that vigorous promotion of a cultural revolution was a basic solution, but it would not overcome immediately the obstacles that were the source of the defects and shortcomings. The only immediate solution was to change the system of work and method of direction in economic affairs. In other words, it was necessary to establish a method of work whereby the center could help the provinces, counties and the *ri*. It was particularly important to radically change the method of guidance by counties to the *ri*. This required a changed orientation in the work of the county people's committees.

As a result of the merger of agricultural cooperatives into *ri*-unit associations, the *ri* became a production unit rather than an administrative one. Under these circumstances, a county people's committee was required to change its functions radically from directing lower administrative organs to

organizing and guiding the work of agriculture cooperatives established in each *ri* as a production unit.

Thus it became necessary for the county people's committee to be wholly responsible for the agricultural production of cooperative associations organized on a *ri* basis, as direct participants in them, and to bring its guidance decisively closer to the agricultural production of each cooperative. At a time when private farms dominated, the county people's committee used to guide private farms by administrative means through *ri* people's committees. However, now that a *ri* as a whole had become a production unit in the form of a cooperative, that system of guidance became extremely unrealistic.

In connection with the new system of guidance, by county people's committees to the *ri* directly, the structure of county people's committees was also improved substantially by adapting them to agricultural production by cooperatives. Thus, a county cooperative farm management committee was established independent of the county people's committee, as a special organ for the guidance of cooperatives' agricultural production. This new body later became the core of the new agricultural guidance system in North Korea.

The next task was to improve the method of guidance and operation of county Party committees—to get rid of formalistic administrative and bureaucratic work methods and to stick firmly to the basic line of Party work in order to increase its leading role. Kim Il Sung put it this way:

The basic method in Party work is not to give orders but to persuade and educate. . . .

You should have frequent talks with the Party members, lecture to them, induce them to read books, and direct their meetings so that all Party members will have a clear understanding of the intentions of the Party Central Committee, wholeheartedly uphold the Party's policies, and go through thick and thin to carry them out. Such is Party work, political work. By giving precedence to politics, which we have been calling for, we mean doing the political work well first,

then other work. When political work is done well, administrative work will naturally go well, too⁴

In the final analysis, this means political and ideological work should be given priority in all areas so that the Party's policy will be brought to broad sections of the working masses, rousing them to implement the proposed revolutionary tasks.

In connection with this, a series of questions were also presented. Included was the question of county Party committees directly leading all the lowest level Party organizations in the counties as the Party's terminal leading organs; the further strengthening of the system of collective consultation; establishment of correct business-like relations between the county Party committee and the county people's committee; raising the political level and business-like conduct of county committees and practical leaders.

Posed as important tasks in strengthening the collective leadership of county Party committees were, first, the problem of organizing the sections of collective leadership firmly and, second, the job of mobilizing the wisdom of broad sections of the masses. Creative, alive wisdom always comes from among the masses.

For all party activists to go to the masses to draw from their inexhaustible initiative and capacity, to formulate ideas through collective consultation, and to return these concepts to the masses, thereby organizing and enlisting all workers in the execution of revolutionary tasks—herein lies the most fundamental content of the Chongsanri spirit and the Chongsanri method.

Finally, in the field of economic activities, priority was given to the task of elevating decisively the level of economic management and planning. Where agricultural cooperatives were merged into *ri*-unit farms and were transformed into large-scale socialist collective farms, planned management and control of the cooperative associations became a pressing requirement.

In the control and management of the economy it was also necessary for the work method to locate a central link in the chain of activities and to concentrate all energy on it. For instance, in the northern half of the Republic, grains are the basis of agricultural production. Consequently, in the activities of the agricultural cooperatives, all energy had to be concentrated on production particularly of grains, without dispersing labor power, materials, funds, etc., to other secondary sections.

It was further proposed as an important task correctly to carry through the socialist principle of distribution and effectively to stimulate the material interest of farmers. As Kim Il Sung explained:

Although the means of production have been socialized, differences in skill and intensity of labor still remain, and the people's consciousness is not yet up to the communist standard. Under such conditions, the enthusiasm of the working people for production can be raised and the productive forces developed rapidly only by distribution according to the work performed. This is an objective law of the socialist economy and an important principle that must be adhered to in running it.⁵

This does not mean a one-sided emphasis on material incentives. The basic policy remains to educate the working people in the ideas of communism, raise their voluntary enthusiasm, and to link this with material incentives. Evaluation of working days in agricultural labor was proposed as the best means of measurement for applying material incentives.

A major change was effected in the work of the Party, state and economic organs during the application of the Chongsanri spirit and method in all areas of the country. Guidance was brought closer to the people, higher bodies helped lower, and leaders made direct contact with the masses and established a revolutionary course for educating, remolding and uniting them and for solving all problems by encouraging everyone to give full play to his revolutionary zeal and creative initiative.

2. THE DAEAN WORK SYSTEM—MANAGEMENT FOR INDUSTRY

The Daean work system, evolved by Premier Kim Il Sung through his on-the-spot guidance (in December 1961) at Daean Electric Machine Factory, was an embodiment of the Chongsanri spirit and method in the area of industrial management.

The Chongsanri spirit and method applied to the field of industrial management means to implement the mass line—i.e., to give prime importance to ideological, political and moral stimuli and to combine these stimuli with material incentives in order rapidly to develop production.

To strengthen political and ideological understanding of the working masses, priority should be given to raising the leading role of the vanguard party as well as of political and other work with the people. At the same time, it is essential to establish a closer relationship between higher and lower organs and for all leaders to make direct contact with the masses, to learn from them and to teach them, and to improve their revolutionary consciousness and enthusiasm.

In this way, the essence of the Daean system of economic management is that it relates most successfully to the nature of socialist society. It is a system of mobilizing the masses conscientiously for economic construction by strengthening political education as well as political and ideological stimuli and by adhering thoroughly to the principle of collective life. It is also a system of collectively managing and controlling the economy on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism under the leadership of the vanguard party, with the participation of the masses, learning from them and teaching them, higher organs directly helping lower organs.

The construction of socialism and communism is the great

revolutionary cause of the masses themselves. It can be realized only through their creative labor. Consequently, ideological stimulus to arouse this revolutionary consciousness and enthusiasm is of decisive significance. And only when there are socialist relations of production, free from all forms of exploitation and oppression, is it possible for millions of working people to display this zeal. Consequently, ideological stimuli fully reflect the objective requirements of socialist development.

Along with this, the essential superiority of socialist production relations must be brought out fully through economic control and management. The socialist economy, by its nature, is a highly organized, planned economy, which constantly develops at a rapid pace, according to schedule. This is the necessary law of the development of the socialist economy. At the same time, the more the economy is developed and the more its scale is expanded, the more complex will be the internal structure of the economy, with the result that a higher level of organization is required.

Planned management and control of a highly developed and organized socialist economy cannot be carried out successfully by a handful of specialists without the advice and cooperation of the people. Thus, to strengthen their ideological understanding and attain their participation in economic control and management is in accord with the objective development of the socialist economy.

(1) Essence of the Daeon System

The Daeon work system means, in a word, to embody the mass line in economic control; to get rid of survivals of capitalism in economic management such as bureaucracy, over-centralization and individualism, and to implement the Chongsanri spirit and method, enabling workers to contribute to the maximum in accelerating socialist construction.

In any kind of social system, economic management corresponds to that system and reflects its essential requirements. Under the capitalist system industrial management is adapted to that system and reflects its essential requirements. All the means of production are in the hands of capitalists and the organization, control and management of production are controlled by them. Needless to say, workers are completely alienated from the control and management of production. In the final analysis, the motivation, management and control of capitalist production are devoted to the search for surplus value and profit. It is obvious that labor and material controls, as well as distribution of funds, are subordinated entirely to the quest for profit. If a factory or enterprise is unable to realize these objectives, it will be shut down. The sole aim of rationalization and scientific methods of management and control is to intensify the exploitation of workers and achieve a maximum return with a minimum of materials and funds—that is, to squeeze out maximum surplus value and profit.

In this sense, the capitalist system of industrial management fully reflects the fundamental law of capitalist production—the law of surplus value; and completely serves the essential demand of the capitalist system—surplus value and profit. Thus, it is quite natural that workers have no direct material interest in the results of, nor do they care about, capitalist production. Their interest is confined to the fact that the management and control of capitalist production results in an intensification of their exploitation.

Thus, the capitalist system of industrial management intensifies class antagonisms between the worker and the capitalist. The more rational and scientific the system is, the more intensified will be the class antagonisms between workers and capitalists, until the capitalist system will be overthrown. This is the inevitable contradiction inherent in the capitalist system of industrial management, which is, after all, a reflection of the essential contradiction in the capitalist system itself.

The capitalist system of industrial management is fated for ultimate destruction following the collapse of the capitalist system itself. But this takes time, because the socialist society, newly born following the collapse of capitalism, unavoidably is plagued to a considerable extent by the survivals of capitalism. Before the establishment of the Dae'an work system, this was the case with the system of industrial management in the northern half of the Republic. Kim Il Sung put it this way:

It must be admitted that the old system of factory management, though socialist, still retained many capitalist elements. Bureaucracy, departmentalism, and individualism were found in large measure. Superiors shouted commands at their subordinates in a bureaucratic manner instead of going to help them; a spirit of cooperation between workshops was lacking; and among some people there was a tendency toward individualism of the "You attend to your business, I'll stick to mine!" variety. Therefore, under the old system of work, it was not possible to give full play to the activity and initiative of workers, people busied themselves for nothing, and no sizable achievements were made in production.⁶

Capitalist survivals found their concentrated expression in factories administered exclusively by managers. They were vested with sole decision-making powers and responsibility for production. Under such conditions, arbitrary control, subjective discretion, and other bureaucratic methods flourished. And where managers were not controlled by the Party, the damage was greater.

Workers participated insufficiently in factory control and management. It was impossible to stimulate their political, moral and material interest. They were little concerned with whether production was going well or not. Their job was to work for eight hours, as assigned, and then go home. Needless to say, this system did not reflect the essential superiority of the socialist system.

It could not be said that this was a socialist system of factory management, in the fullest meaning of the word, operating in

accordance with the essential requirements of the socialist system. In conditions of expanding production and more complex and varied organic relationships among different branches of production, where more scientific and rational economic control and management were required, it became all the more evident that a system of control and administration of a factory at the discretion of a manager or a group of several specialists did not fit in with the new circumstances.

After the completion of the socialist transformation of production relations in town and countryside, and after the establishment of the socialist system, it was quite natural that a system of industrial management fully reflecting the essential requirements of this system, characteristic of this system and socialist in the fullest meaning of the word, had to be established.

The content of socialist system of industrial management is defined primarily by the essential requirements of the socialist system itself. It has to faithfully reflect the superiority of the socialist system and satisfy completely the requirements of the fundamental law of socialist production.

The socialist system, in which the masses of people have power, own all the means of production and are completely liberated from all forms of exploitation and oppression, makes it possible for everyone to give rein to his creativity and talent and to develop production constantly and rapidly. It also enables the economy to develop in a planned and balanced way, mobilizing and utilizing effectively and to a maximum all human and material resources, and the full production potential. Kim Il Sung explained:

The working masses create history, and socialism and communism can be built only by the creative labor of millions of working people. Labor power is the most active and decisive element of production. Technology is developed by man, and machinery, too, is made by man and is operated by man. All precious and beautiful material and all cultural wealth are made by the labor of the working people.

After all, it may be said that whether we can construct socialism and communism faster and better depends on how the working people can give full play to their creative capacity and talent, on how we organize social labor and utilize it, and on how rapidly we can increase labor productivity.⁷

To achieve this, the vanguard party decisively should heighten its leading role and priority should be given to political work. At the same time, this must be linked with economic and technical work and with the material interest of the working people. This approach helps raise the level of consciousness of the working people, imbues them with collectivist and communist ideas, and ultimately converts them into communist men and women who devote themselves voluntarily, without any social compulsion, to the cause of society and the revolution. This will help guarantee democratic centralism, scientific quality and rationality in economic control and management.

The Dae'an work system evolved by Kim Il Sung is a creative Marxist-Leninist system of industrial management, completely equipped with the essential conditions for a socialist system of industrial management. Its essential content is, first, to give priority to political and ideological work with people, to strengthen ideological stimuli and thereby thoroughly to eradicate individualism and egotism and to enable people to give maximum play to their revolutionary enthusiasm and creative talent—all this for the purpose of economic management and control.

Above all it is vital in this connection to evaluate the people's ideology and understanding of economic control and, on this basis, to inform them about the economic policy of the Party. It is necessary for the people to participate in working out production plans and measures and to display their political enthusiasm and creative capacity. They should participate in production, control and management so that their enthusiasm for work and their creative talents will

continue. Achievements should be evaluated politically, before being evaluated materially, to strengthen ideological stimuli.

Second, the essential purpose of the Dae'an work system is to increase production and to control and to manage the economy by applying the principle of collectivist and communist life through promoting comradesly accommodation and close cooperation among producers and also among producing units. Thus, the Dae'an work system not only fully reflects the superiority of the socialist system and the fundamental law of socialist production but also amply contains in it elements of communist economic management. These elements are expressed in the fact that the producers consciously and positively participate in economic management and that their economic control and management is carried out on the basis of a high level of consciousness and revolutionary enthusiasm. It is clear that economic management in a communist society will take the form of collective management by millions of conscious, communist working people.

Consequently, the Dae'an work system is the prototype of communist economic management.

Furthermore, the people cooperate with each other and all work units help one another in economic management, and in this way the principle of collective and communist life is being implemented.

Finally, this system also helps train people as excellent and cultured producers and as able managers:

The Dae'an work system is radically different from the old; it is an advanced system with many factors of communist industrial management. This new system of work is an excellent embodiment of the principle of collective, communist life: "One for all and all for one." In this system, superiors help their subordinates, the well-informed teach the less-informed, all the people help each other as comrades, and all workshops cooperate closely.⁸

Third, the essential meaning of the Dae'an work system is

that economic management and control are carried out through aid by higher to lower organs and by superiors to their subordinates.

(2) *Superiority of the Daean System*

The Daean work system will prove superior in all respects in the actual management and control of the socialist economy, in the first place, because it completely guarantees collective leadership of the Party committee, the highest organ of the economic unit concerned.

It also ensures the principle of democratic centralism in socialist economic management, makes it possible to link centralized and unified leadership with democracy in the economy and, on this basis, to realize an effective economy. The unification and detailing of plans is precisely the focal point of the superiority of the Daian work system. Better planning of integrated production is based on the principle of superiors helping subordinates.

The most important point of the Daean economic management system is that it strengthens the Party's leading role in the economy and fully ensures collectivism in the control and management of factories. Under the previous system, the director was responsible for the factory and workers had hardly any interest in its control and management. No real material conditions were guaranteed for workers and thus they had no interest in whether production and management at their factories were successful.

In these circumstances, workers were not masters of production but only inactive employees obeying bureaucratic orders and directions. This situation was not in accord with the nature of socialism, nor could the workers display their initiative and play a positive role.

The new Daean work system removed these fundamental defects. In the new system, the factory Party committee

directly and collectively controls and manages the factory as the highest leading body enabling all Party members, workers and engineers to participate actively in factory management. Consequently, one particular person is not responsible for production, as in the old factory management system, but all Party members, workers and engineers are responsible, and, above all, the factory Party committee is responsible as the collective leading body. According to Kim Il Sung:

All the successes scored at the Daean Electrical Machine Factory have once again clearly demonstrated that the first and foremost task in the leadership of production is to strengthen the work of the Party committee and to enhance the vanguard role of the entire Party membership in the factory.⁹

If the Party committee does a good job in carrying out collective leadership, it encourages all Party members to be more active, and if all Party members become active, all people can be influenced to work with enthusiasm. All Party members and workers will work consciously to increase production and to manage and control the factory better; no collective leadership is more complete than this, nor is there greater proof of a factory's collective capacity. In addition, the Party's leading role guarantees that all work is political work and the production battle is a battle of the masses themselves.

The essential of Party leadership is not to give administrative orders or instructions or to exercise control, but to persuade and educate. The more complex and difficult the job, the more it is necessary to educate and transform the people so that they become conscious, learn the correct way, and forge ahead with conviction. Party and political work entails leading all Party members to grasp the intentions of the Party center correctly, to support Party policy wholeheartedly, and to concentrate on its realization.

The policy of giving priority to political work, which the Party has consistently upheld, attaches prime importance to

this work and subordinates all other activities to it. If the political work is done correctly, there will be no spread of administrative or bureaucratic methods. At the same time, the smooth execution of administrative control will be ensured.

The new Dae'an work system is superior, secondly, because it is most effective in managing industry in a planned way. Planning is the most important part of, and one of the keys to, the success of socialist economic construction.

Under socialism, all equipment, supplies and raw materials are used according to plan and all economic life, including production and consumption, is planned. In such conditions, if planning is not carried out smoothly, large quantities of equipment, material and labor power are wasted and grave loss is caused to the socialist economy.

And the most important part of planning is to ensure a balance among different sectors of the economy. In other words, balance must be maintained between accumulation and consumption, between industry and agriculture, between the industrial sector and other sectors, i.e., between heavy industry and light industry, between ore extraction industries and processing industries, etc. Balanced development of the economy is in itself the law of development of socialism.

However, smooth planning is not a simple task, but very difficult and complex. For planning work to be carried out successfully according to the scientific laws of economic development, it is necessary, above all, to make accurate judgments and calculations about the conditions of equipment and supply of materials, and especially with regard to labor power, the most decisive element of productive forces, i.e., the health, ideological level, awareness and skill of workers.

Without correct information on all these factors, it would be impossible to draw up a realistic scientific mobilization plan. However, a handful of specialists or members of planning committees cannot possibly grasp all these complex factors of production. Herein lies the decisive significance of mobiliz-

ing broad masses for participation in planning work, relying upon their creative capacity and talent.

Needless to say, it is the workers directly engaged in production who are most familiar with all the special problems of their factory, whether sufficient materials are supplied, and whether machinery operates properly. Therefore, to work out an objective and realistic plan, planners must consider production factors constantly and draw on workers' knowledge and creativity. It is impossible to evolve a practical plan if one juggles figures on one's desk without holding discussions with others who are directly engaged in production. Kim Il Sung says:

The present textbooks on political economy set forth many conditions for ensuring good planning. But they do not give importance to the problem of the mass line in planning. I think it is necessary to complete a new textbook on political economy in conformity with the mass line.¹⁰

To avoid bureaucracy and subjectivism in planning, collective efforts are required. A plan drawn up without participation of production workers is necessarily subjectivist, and bureaucracy results when such plans are imposed upon the masses. All plans—from the state, control bureau, factory, down to the workshop—should be drawn up after discussion with those who are directly engaged in production, taking into consideration the revolutionary initiative and experience of workers.

The basic content of the Dae'an work system is to strengthen the leading role of the Party in the economy, to draw broad working masses into active management and control of factories, and to encourage them to display their creative capacity and talent to the fullest extent. This system has opened the way for broad working masses to participate actively in planning and to contribute their creative capacity and talent. Kim Il Sung said: "Presented as the most important problem in the direction of the Dae'an Electrical Machine Factory was

the question of getting rid of bureaucracy and subjectivity in planning work and of thoroughly carrying through the mass line."¹¹

Third, the superiority of the Daean work system lies in the fact that it has established a system by which technological direction can be strengthened in production and by which production can be guided in an integrated way.

Complex technological production processes naturally require integrated direction by specialists who have mastered the required techniques, from the formulation of production plans down to technical preparations and control of production processes.

In the old work system, many production processes were separated from each other and there was no general staff that could direct production in an integrated way. In the new Daean work system, there is a unified general staff, with the chief engineer at the center, to guide the whole production process, including the planning of production and preparations, in a unified way. This makes it possible to subordinate all problems in the factory to the struggle to guarantee production.

Fourth, the new Daean work system is decisively superior to the old in that it has improved radically the role of each section responsible for guaranteeing production. By overcoming the old bureaucratic and subjectivist method of work it guaranteed the supply of materials. This made it possible for those directly engaged in directing production, including foremen, to concentrate on their proper work—preparing equipment and production, raising the level of consciousness of the workers, and guiding production.

Further, in order to increase production, a community supply system was established to guarantee the living conditions of workers. For instance, at the Daean Electric Machine Factory a management committee was organized, consisting of the assistant director in charge of community supply work

and representatives of the administration of the factory workers' living quarters, general stores, state farms and livestock-breeding farms, cooperative farms and of the organizations engaged in public supply work.

The decisive superiority of the Daean work system in arousing enthusiasm and initiative among the working masses, in strengthening leadership in production and in guaranteeing production and supplies for the workers is being demonstrated clearly in actual life through a great upsurge of socialist construction in the northern half of the Republic.

(3) *Significance of the Daean System*

The Daean work system was a clear-cut answer to the most difficult and pressing question confronting socialist and communist construction—how should socialist economic management be organized after the establishment of the socialist system? In this sense, it was an entirely new and original frontier reached in the Marxist-Leninist theory of economic management. The most essential requirement of the Daean work system is decisively to increase the leading role of the vanguard party in economic management, to strengthen collective leadership, to draw broad masses into production and economic management, to rely on their capability and to lead them to give full play to their inexhaustible creative capacity and revolutionary enthusiasm, i.e., to implement collective action—the mass line.

In a socialist system, all forms of exploitation and oppression are eliminated, all the means of production are socialized and all production is managed only for the improvement of the material and cultural life of all the people. But the question remains, how can the superiority of the socialist system fully be displayed, how should the economic management system be organized collectively?

The continued development of planned and balanced pro-

duction, based on socialized means of production, is a law. The question is, how can subjectivism be overcome in economic management and how can planning be organized correctly?

The Daeon work system answers these questions. It fully reflects the essential superiority of the socialist system.

If workers are to be encouraged to give full play to their inexhaustible vitality and initiative, priority in all activities should be concentrated on Party and political work. Material incentive plays its proper role only on condition that priority be given to political and ideological education and that the material incentive be organically linked to this education.

The Daeon work system gave a decisive blow to the theory which maintains that as the economy develops and as its scale expands under socialism, its growth rate declines. Such a theory is reactionary and is absolutely incompatible with the law of development of the socialist economy. The socialist economic system has the potential for economic development at a rate undreamt of in capitalist society, and as the economy develops and expands, this potential becomes greater.

For example, in capital construction, the principle means of realizing socialist expanded reproduction and one of the factors determining the rate of economic development, socialism is decidedly superior to capitalism. The socialist state, which is in a position to control production and distribution, accumulation and consumption according to a central plan, has the possibility of investing tremendous funds in capital construction.

Further, as the foundation of the socialist economy is expanded and strengthened, the scale of accumulation is increased, with the result that expenditures for capital construction can be increased systematically and at a rapid rate. This provides a realistic possibility of speeding up the tempo of socialist expanded reproduction.

With regard to increasing labor productivity, which is another decisive factor for determining economic development under socialism, it may be said that reserves in this field are still greater. The working people have unlimited capabilities and talents, and if their political and ideological awareness is raised constantly, and if their experience and enthusiasm are encouraged, labor productivity will continue to rise. And if this is combined with a technological revolution, if machinery and automated equipment are introduced, there is no doubt that labor productivity will be all the more enhanced.

Thus, the greater the scale of the economy and the more developed the production, the faster will be the rate of economic development. This is the law of the development of the socialist economy. The question is how to interpret this law, how to manage and control the economy, and how the system of economic management should be organized rationally.

The decisive significance of the Daeon work system lies in the fact that it is based on this objective law of development and that it is adapted to socialist production relations—the economic management system best suited to the expanding productive forces—and that it perfects the superstructure, the administrative system of the Party, state and economic organizations in such a way that these may be adapted fully to the established base.

Further, as mentioned earlier, the Daeon work system in many respects has ample factors of communist enterprise management. This system is permeated by the principle of collective and communist life. Its most essential content is that people work for society and for the community consciously and in a communist way, voluntarily and without any compulsion, helping each other in a comradely way. Consequently, this system is of decisive significance in educating and remolding people in a communist way. Kim Il Sung wrote:

When the communist principle is strictly observed in work, bureaucracy and egoism naturally disappear. Innovations in production have been made by many comrades, and they have worked devotedly solely in the interests of the state and the people, not merely to get more wages. If we allow people to become mercenary, it will be impossible to realize the transition to communism. Transition to communism requires not only economic development, but also the remodeling of the old ideologies in men's minds. It is important above anything else for people to work voluntarily and consciously.

Our system of work is one where people work and live in a communist way. It unites all the people without exception, and brings their devotion and creative ability into full play, enabling them to bring about greater results in production.

The great power of the new system of work is the great power of unity and cooperation, the great power of the vitality and creativity of the awakened masses; it is the great power which is born when Party leadership penetrates deeply into the lower units.¹²

The Daeon work system, which basically and decisively strengthens the leading role of the vanguard party and the socialist state in the economy and realizes the principle of democratic centralism in economic management, is of great importance in strengthening the function of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The socialist economy develops according to a planned and balanced law and it requires centralized and unified direction by the vanguard party and the state. The basic concept of a socialist economy precludes individual factories and enterprises from being managed and controlled spontaneously. The unified and detailed system of planning which is an important part of the Daeon work system, reflects this basic concept of a socialist economy and ensures that the unified socialist state can provide direction and control even to the smallest section of each sector of the economy.

The Daeon work system relies completely on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and is an economic management sys-

tem creatively adapted to the concrete conditions of the revolution and construction in the country. It is a great victory for the *Juche* idea and for the mass line of the Workers Party.

3. A NEW SYSTEM OF AGRICULTURAL GUIDANCE

After the completion of agricultural collectivization in August 1958, a decision was made (in October of the same year) to merge agricultural cooperatives into *ri*-unit farms. This was a very complex task. However, it was completed smoothly in a short period of one to two months in a great upsurge of political enthusiasm among the peasants as a result of their active struggles. The merger of cooperatives wrought a major change in the countryside. The number of cooperative farms was reduced from 13,309 to 3,843. The average size was increased from 80 to about 300 households and the average acreage from 130 to 500 hectares, or about four-fold.

The mergers created objective conditions for promoting land adjustment in earnest, for introducing modern farm machinery and advanced agricultural techniques, for utilizing natural and economic conditions more rationally, for developing diversified cooperative farms, for eliminating inefficient use of labor and materials and for promoting prompt and planned rural construction.

As a result of the merger of cooperatives, the chairman of the *ri* people's committee also assumed the post of chief manager of the cooperative. This meant that the local administrative body was brought closer to production and its leading role and functions in the economic and cultural construction of the countryside were strengthened.

Simultaneously with the merger of the cooperatives, measures were taken to transfer the stores of consumer cooperatives and of mutual-aid credit associations to the agricultural

cooperatives. As a result, the agricultural cooperatives had control not only of agricultural production but also of circulation and credit so that their economic activities could be managed according to plan.

Technological agricultural innovation thus arose as a serious task in the early part of 1959. Kim Il Sung saw it this way:

Today our basic task in the domain of agriculture is to realize a technical revolution and a cultural revolution in the countryside in several years and thereby to strengthen further socialist cooperative farms politically and economically and to develop our rural communities into prosperous and cultured socialist communities equipped with modern techniques.¹³

In only several years after this task was proposed, irrigation, mechanization and electrification projects, which are the main aspects of the technological revolution in the countryside, were carried out on a large scale and, as a result, the material and technical foundations of agriculture were strengthened further.

As a result of the rapidly increased material and technical assistance by the state to the countryside, at the end of 1962 Sukchon county, for example, completed a large-scale irrigation system. Its channels had a total length of 400 kilometers and it was equipped with 262 water-lifting pumps. The county also acquired 200-odd tractors, trucks, different kinds of farm machinery, transformers, electric motors, pumps and various other technical equipment. The county now had machinery and equipment comparable to that at a first-rate state-run industrial enterprise in those days.

Together with the completion of agricultural collectivization, the technical, cultural and ideological levels as well as the level of consciousness of the peasants were also raised. Farmers who had had only small farm implements, such as sickles and hoes, were now engaged collectively in agricultural production using tractors and other large-scale farm

machines. These conditions necessarily brought about a major change in their ideology and consciousness.

Thus, objective conditions were created for educating and remolding peasants with ideas of collectivism and communism. Moreover, as a result of the merger of agricultural cooperatives into *ri*-unit farms, a radical change was effected in the functions and role of the *ri* people's committee as an elementary unit of state administration. After the merger, the *ri* became a large agricultural production unit rather than an administrative unit. Formerly, individual farms had one or two hectares of arable land. After the merger, when the basic farm unit comprised more than 300 households and had an average of 500 hectares of arable land, the business of the *ri* people's committee became more complex and diversified. Before, each individual farmer was responsible for his farm, and the *ri* people's committee was the administrative director. However, after the merger it became necessary for the people's committee to control its farm directly and to manage it according to plan.

With the new and complicated situation created after the completion of collectivization and merger, a tremendous task faced agriculture, since the old system of management was no longer adequate. Consequently, establishment of a socialist system of agricultural management completely adapted to this new situation, a system and method of controlling and managing the new agricultural cooperatives, fully in accord with socialized agriculture, was presented as an urgent revolutionary need. Together with this was the need to overcome as soon as possible the backwardness of agriculture as compared with advanced industry, regarding relations of ownership and levels of economic management, as well as production.

Through his on-the-spot guidance of agricultural work in Sukchon county, South Pyongan province, in December 1961, Kim Il Sung scientifically analyzed the new situation created in the countryside. Creatively applying the general principles

of Marxism-Leninism, he founded an entirely new socialist system of agricultural management, with the county cooperative farm management committee as its main pivot. This agricultural guidance system is an embodiment of the Chongsanri spirit and method in the domain of agriculture and of the Marxist-Leninist system of guidance, reflecting the basic superiority of socialized agriculture and the fundamental law of socialist agricultural production.

Essentially, improved methods of control and management of socialist agriculture in North Korea were in the direction of raising their level closer to the advanced methods of industrial management. Counties were defined as strategic strongholds for the guidance and management of socialist agriculture and county cooperative farm management committees were established. At the same time, provincial rural economy committees were created as leading organs for county cooperative farm management committees; simultaneously, the Ministry of Agriculture was reorganized into the Central Agricultural Commission.

The creation of county cooperative farm management committees and provincial rural economy committees was an important measure to improve radically the direction of agriculture in accordance with the realities of the changed countryside. And it was, at the same time, the most appropriate measure to solve various problems that had to be solved for the development of socialist agriculture.

The most important role in the new agricultural guidance system belonged to the county cooperative farm management committee. It controlled in a unified way the state-run enterprises and the personnel serving agriculture, including technicians, as well as machine shops, farm-implement factories and irrigation control offices; it also organized and guided the work of cooperative farms directly. It was a specialized body which had the dual functions of directly guiding cooperatives and of providing them with material and technical aid.

The county cooperative farm management committee has the following tasks. First, it must strengthen its leadership with agricultural specialists and expand the ranks of agricultural engineers, to assign them to each work team on the cooperative farms and to institute a system of chief engineers on the farms. Especially important for all active workers is to follow the Chongsanri spirit and method in the management committee, and to introduce the Dae-an work method into the guidance of farm production and management. Following these methods, the task of the committee is to control production, to raise the level of planning and to secure more materials, fertilizer and agricultural chemicals.

Second, there is the matter of increasing decisively the utilization rate of machinery and equipment, especially tractors. The realization of mechanization in agriculture depends to a large extent on the rational utilization of tractors, and the management committee is required to assure the greater utilization of tractors in a variety of ways.

Third, an effort has to be made to improve seed constantly and to select superior seed best suited for the soil so as decisively to increase agricultural production. This is an especially important question in intensive farming, which is the basis of socialist agriculture.

Fourth, in addition to these technical matters, the management committee is required to raise the planning levels in agriculture. It is basic to the management committee's planning activities to have direct control over all planning, to draw up plans after direct and thorough consultation with the masses, and to explain to the masses fully the plans thus worked out.

Fifth, it is urgent to improve the administration of labor, which is a question of rationally organizing the labor force, of preventing its outflow and of persuading workers to settle in the countryside. It is also a task of labor administrators to set rational work norms in the countryside, and to evaluate accurately the quality and quantity of work, thereby enforcing

the principle of socialist distribution and increasing material incentives.

Sixth, there is the job of correctly directing and supervising the financial affairs of cooperative farms and of establishing a complete system of control over their property. Here the important question is to set a correct balance between the consumption and accumulation of the cooperative farm, to consider the living conditions of farmers, and to guarantee a proper level of joint accumulation.

Seventh, is the task of raising the technical education of farmers and concentrating on training technical cadres. This task is more and more urgent, along with the problem of the technical revolution in the countryside. The county Party committee has the responsibility for the political education of farmers in order decisively to raise their ideology and consciousness.

The advantage of the county cooperative farm management committee lies primarily in the fact that it can use industrial management techniques. Formerly, the county and *ri* people's committees directed agriculture by administrative means. As collectivization was completed and the scale of cooperative farms expanded, and as agriculture gradually was mechanized, administrative methods of guidance became ineffective. New socialist farms equipped with machinery and technological equipment need direction through industrial management methods.

The industrial method of management consists in directly controlling, organizing, and giving concrete leadership in all the activities of an enterprise — from planning to the organization of production, technical progress, supply of materials, allocation and organization of the labor force, financial activities and so forth. According to Kim Il Sung:

The fundamental element in leadership by the industrial method of management is the technical guidance of production.

Agricultural production, like industrial production, is a technical process. When farming was done by manual labor without the use of machinery, technology did not seem to count for much in agriculture. But as the technical reconstruction of agriculture forges ahead, it has become more and more obvious that agricultural production must also go through technical processes.

Not only have advanced irrigation systems been established today, but numerous tractors and other farm machines are being introduced, step by step, in our countryside. Without industrial management and without technical guidance, it is utterly impossible to administer this agricultural production.¹⁴

Administration of agriculture through industrial management thus means the rational and scientific organization and control of all sections of agriculture and providing modern, scientific techniques and advanced technical methods, including rational utilization of all sorts of agricultural equipment as well as irrigation, electrification, chemicalization and other improvements.

An important question is the proper size of enterprises. The county was set as the basic unit because within it there are available technical and management cadres, farm workshops and agricultural machinery repair shops, irrigation control offices and other state-run enterprises serving agriculture. The area of land under cultivation in a county is around 10,000 hectares, considered a proper size in all respects. In this sense, cooperative farms did not meet these conditions and the province was too large a unit.

Another advantage of the county cooperative farm management committee is that it is suitable for organically linking ownership by the whole people with cooperative ownership and for strengthening the aid of the state to cooperative farms.

Formerly, in many socialist countries, the strategic meeting point between joint ownership by all the people and cooperative ownership was the tractor station, through which techni-

cal aid was given to cooperative farms to promote the technical revolution in the countryside. However, although this could extend technical assistance to farmers, it could not regulate the production of cooperative farms directly and in an integrated way. This limited the role of the tractor station. Further, in some countries, tractor stations have been reorganized as tractor repair shops, with cooperative farms purchasing agricultural machinery on their own. Under these conditions, differentials are created between collective farms well-to-do enough to purchase agricultural machinery and others that are not. Further, when a farm purchases a tractor, it has to have a fairly high economic and technical level to utilize it fully.

In contrast to this, the county cooperative farm management committee has unified control of state-owned enterprises, technical equipment and capacity in agriculture, including farm machinery workshops, farm machinery factories, irrigation control offices, and livestock inoculation centers. It uses industrial management techniques to direct cooperative farms and, in this way, links state and cooperative ownership in an organic way in production so that the technical and economic assistance of the state to cooperative farms may be increased decisively.

A technical revolution in agriculture, which requires tremendous sums and advanced techniques, cannot be carried out successfully by individual cooperative farms; the active financial and technical aid of the state is necessary.

Rice is the main crop in the northern half of the Republic. It is extremely difficult to mechanize its culture. However, a clear-cut policy for the solution of this problem was presented after the creation of the county cooperative farm management committee, which strengthened cooperative farms not only materially and technically but also organizationally. Thus, shortcomings in agriculture were largely overcome.

The provincial rural economy committee, which controls

farm machinery factories and repair shops and helps county cooperative farm management committees in their work, directly guides all work in its province related to agricultural production technically. It draws up production plans and supervises their implementation, it supplies agricultural machinery, parts, fertilizer, agricultural chemicals and other materials to counties, selects proper crops and seeds, establishes fertilizer application systems, selects seed-sowing seasons, adjusts labor forces, etc.

Further, the provincial rural economy committee is obliged to report to the Cabinet and the Central Agricultural Commission regarding questions raised in the course of the fulfillment of production and production plans. In other words, the provincial rural economy committee completely takes over the job formerly done by the Ministry of Agriculture.

The most important task of the Central Agricultural Commission is to work out measures to develop agricultural techniques. It gives concrete guidance to all programs related to the development of agriculture, including studies on agricultural machinery, on the improvement of seed, on measures and efforts for land improvement, on long-term perspectives for land reclamation, on fertilizers and soil, on improvement of animal stock and stock-breeding, and on measures for the development of other activities in the countryside, as well as providing the wherewithal to guarantee this research and study.

In addition, the work of the Central Agricultural Commission includes the following: preparation of measures to guarantee the supply of materials and agricultural machinery, submission of final plans, supervision of the enforcement of current plans, submission to the Party Central Committee and the Cabinet of opinions about long-range agricultural plans, guidance of large-scale land reclamation projects, and training of cadres, including engineers and scientists.

Thus the provincial rural economy committees are entrusted with all administrative work related to the guidance of production and the Central Agricultural Commission is required to guide agriculture throughout the country from a general and long-range standpoint. It is now possible under the new system of agricultural guidance to set up a strong and direct system of guidance at the level of production, with counties as the main points, and to direct agriculture in the northern half of the Republic in a unified way according to a long-range plan for the future of agriculture. The new system is excellent not only for raising the management and control of agriculture to the level of advanced industrial management, but also for organically linking ownership by all the people to cooperative ownership, and for solving immediate and future problems of agricultural development by correctly linking them together.

As is well known, even under the socialist system the countryside is more backward than the urban areas not only in culture and ideology but also in ownership relations and in the level of economic management. These distinctions between industry and agriculture, arising from different relations of ownership, are the real basis that determines class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry. Distinctions on the level of economic management are also important.

Consequently, to eliminate distinctions between the town and the countryside and between the working class and the peasantry, it is necessary to overcome the backwardness of the countryside not only in technology, culture and ideology, but also in the relations of ownership and, particularly, the level of economic management.

Using industrial management techniques to direct agriculture is of decisive significance in overcoming backwardness in the level of economic management. Further, the new system plays an important role in determining the direction of the future development of socialist cooperative farms, particularly

with regard to the transformation of cooperative ownership into ownership by the entire people. When the technical transformation of agriculture is carried out, when machinery replaces human labor in agriculture as in industry, and when all people can live in abundance and enjoy their work, cooperative farms will be transformed into all-people's ownership.

This transformation is one of the most fundamental questions in the construction of communism. It is the basis for erasing distinctions between town and countryside and between the working class and the peasantry. The new system of agricultural control indicates clearly a realistic approach toward solving this question. Wrote Kim Il Sung:

Some people hold that the transition to communist society is possible even if the cooperative economy is retained, and go so far as to say that the transition to communism is feasible even if private economy is left intact. This is all wrong.

Of course, it is not my intention to dwell here on what stages the socialist economy has to go through to achieve the transition to communism. But, at any rate, there is no doubt that in order to attain communism the country's economy should be merged into one under a single form of ownership, namely, ownership by the whole people, and that, accordingly, cooperative ownership must be converted into ownership by the whole people.

The organization of the county cooperative farm management committees is the most rational way of bringing cooperative ownership constantly closer to ownership by the whole people by further strengthening the leading role of state ownership over cooperative ownership, and by establishing a closer relationship between these two forms.¹⁵

To transform cooperative ownership into all-people's ownership, it is necessary not only to increase further the role of the county cooperative farm management committee and to mechanize agriculture on a large scale, but also to remold the ideas and consciousness of peasants by decisively strengthening communist education among them. This is the shortest and most correct way to attain communism.

In this way, the new system of agricultural control established in the northern half of the Republic, together with the Dae-an work system in industry, is of great significance for the future construction of socialism and communism. In 1966, Kim Il Sung created the group management system, which is significant for further strengthening and developing the new direction of agriculture. This is a system whereby cooperative farm members are formed into groups of 15 to 20 members, and a certain area of land, a labor force, draft animals and other means of productions are assigned to each group. Under this system, a quota of harvest per *chongbo* is set for each group according to the state plan, and the number of work days for each group member is measured in accordance with his tempo of work.

Before the introduction of this system, the elementary unit of agricultural production was the cooperative farm work team. Consequently, work team members, participating in work organized on a work team basis, were unable to settle down to specific fields.

However, under the group management system, it is possible to organize production and labor according to the characteristics of each plot of arable land on the cooperative farm so as to make it most productive, and each farm member is able to work a specific field during the whole cycle of production. A member's work is evaluated and he is remunerated not only according to the number of days worked, but also according to the size of the harvest. Thus the quality and effectiveness of work are considered as well as quantity.

The first advantage of this system is that all peasants not only participate in production with the collective group, as a unit, but that political work can be conducted in the form best suited to their actual conditions. In this way political and ideological education, arming peasants with ideas of collectivism and communism, is developed more vigorously in close and direct connection with production activities. Also,

under this system, the Chongsanri spirit and the method—the revolutionary mass line—can be more thoroughly carried through in the socialist management of the countryside and, particularly, in the management and control of cooperative farms.

In other words, the introduction of this system has made it possible for the broad masses of peasants to participate positively in all the management activities of cooperative farms and to reflect fully their revolutionary enthusiasm, creative capacity and constructive opinions in the general work of their cooperative farms. At the same time, this has resulted in raising the level of political and practical work of leading activists of cooperative farms and county cooperative farm management committees.

Moreover, this system breaks down the state plan into work team and group levels of cooperative farms and enables each farm member to link his work directly to the concrete tasks of the state plan. This means that the principle of centralizing and detailing plans was carried through in the domain of agriculture.

Another advantage is that this system makes it possible to utilize land, the basic means of production in agriculture, and the other means of production more effectively. It greatly improves work in labor administration, which is of central importance in the management and control of cooperative farms. The system enables farm members to work a specific area in groups, putting a stop to the labor turnover in the countryside. Further, with the labor force mobilized in a planned and organized way, efforts can be concentrated on the basic area of production, e.g., on the production of grains.

The group system also makes it possible to define work norms and evaluate work days on the farm more correctly and realistically; it provides a base for the correct realization of the principle of socialist distribution. The group management system already has demonstrated its advantages by strength-

ening and developing the new agricultural controls and, especially, by sharply developing agricultural production and raising the standard of living of the cooperative farm members in the northern half of the Republic.

For instance, on the Pochon cooperative farm, Hyang county, Kangwon province, where the group management system was first introduced, grain production rose in 1967 to 166 per cent over 1965, before this system was introduced. On a county basis, grain production rose 133 per cent in the same period and, on 523 cooperative farms in 17 counties, where statistical returns are already available, average grain production rose more than 20 per cent on each farm in 1967 as compared with 1965, and the amount distributed to each farm household rose from 2,364 kilograms in 1965 to 2,995 kilograms in 1967, while cash income climbed from 642 *won* to 733 *won*.

At the same time a new upsurge was seen in the political and ideological life of peasants after the introduction of this system. The elementary production units of agriculture and of the collectives, as well as the activities of peasant masses, were organized more rationally. This meant that the guidance system, extending from the Central Agricultural Commission to county cooperative farm management committees, was firmly rooted in the places of production and among the peasant masses.

Further, the group management system ensured that the strategic points of political and ideological education of the peasant masses with ideas of collectivism and communism were established directly at the places of production. And this, in turn, meant that a powerful stronghold for ideological as well as material victory—a stronghold that must be captured in the course of transition to socialism and communism in agriculture—was secured.

It may be said that the group management system is the prototype of an agricultural guidance system in communist

society. It is run on the principle of collective and communist life and of such production units a communist society will be composed.

In this way, the new agricultural guidance system established in the northern half of the Republic, on the basis of county cooperative farm management committees and the group management system, not only strengthens the socialist system of agriculture and greatly develops agricultural production, but also is a powerful weapon to guarantee the complete victory of socialism and its transition to communism in the field of agriculture.

4. UNIFIED AND DETAILED PLANNING

In a system in which all means of production are socialized, the economy can be developed only in a planned and balanced way. The planned and balanced development of the economy is a fundamental law of socialism. Without a plan, the economy cannot move a step. All production equipment, resources and raw materials are set into motion according to a specific plan, and economic life, starting with production and consumption, is conducted according to the plan. If the planning is incorrect, large amounts of equipment and material will be wasted and precious labor will be lost. The basic superiority of a socialist economy can be displayed fully only when planning is done correctly.

Therefore, planning is one of the keys to success in socialist economic construction. It is most important for a plan to reflect correctly the objective and balanced development of the economy and fully to mobilize the workers to fulfill it. The plan should rely on the economic policy of the Party and should reflect it, because the economic line and policy of the Party are rooted in the scientific laws governing the development of the socialist economy.

On the basis of planning, Kim Il Sung wrote: "A planned development of the economy means, before anything else, a correct balance among different sectors of the people's economy. To secure such a balance is the basis of planning and the most important task of planning organizations."¹⁶

To maintain a correct balance between accumulation and consumption, it is necessary to combine expanded reproduction (for a planned development of the people's economy) and consumption (the people's requirements). This is the most difficult and complex question in socialist economic construction.

In addition, various other complex problems are posed, including the question of maintaining a balance between industry and agriculture, and among various branches of industry, e.g., between heavy industry and light industry and between ore extraction industries and processing industries. Under conditions of an expanding economy and larger economic units, the job of balancing these different sectors is even more difficult.

However, that does not mean that it is impossible to guarantee a correct balance. Kim Il Sung wrote:

It is not only possible but also necessary to develop a balanced economy under socialism. Whether it is possible to draw up a scientific, realistic and mobilizing plan, to secure a correct balance and to develop the economy at a rapid rate depends to a large extent on how the functions and role of the economic and, particularly, planning organizations are expanded and the work methods of personnel engaged in planning work are improved.¹⁷

The role of *Juche* in planning work is extremely important in implementing the mass line.

The first contradiction in the old system of planning was between the instructions of the state planners and the demands of the direct producers. The planners assigned maximum production tasks while guaranteeing minimum supplies; the producers tried to get by with minimum output tasks,

while obtaining maximum guarantees of supplies. This contradiction reflected bureaucratism and subjectivism of state planners, and local patriotism and undue dependence on central organs by the producers.

The second contradiction derived from the fact that although state planners had a fairly good knowledge of the general economic conditions and the prospect for economic development, they had no concrete knowledge of actual conditions and production reserves. On the other hand, producers were well informed of the concrete conditions and production reserves at their enterprises, but had insufficient understanding of the general economic conditions or of the general perspective of economic development. Consequently, it was necessary to take these two factors into consideration in planning. If this had been done, it would have been possible to draw up a scientific and coordinated plan based on a nationwide program. However, this was not done correctly in the old planning.

To overcome this contradiction and draw up a scientific, realistic and coordinated plan, it was necessary for planning personnel to acquire a good grasp of the objective conditions and the realities of production reserves—the labor force, materials and other factors of production. However, these production factors are complex and diversified, and it is impossible for planning personnel to grasp them fully with their limited data. So we have the problem of involving the broad working masses in planning and of mobilizing their creativity and talent fully, achieving mass participation in planning.

It was on this point that the question was posed of completely overcoming bureaucracy and subjectivity in planning, of gaining mass participation—the question presented as the most important in Premier Kim Il Sung's on-the-spot guidance at Daean Electrical Machine Factory.

The problem is to get rid of the subjectivity and bureaucracy of the state planning organizations while also strengthening state control and guidance of planning, and overcoming undue

dependence on higher bodies and the local patriotism of producers so that economic planning may be developed correctly. The only way is on the basis of centralized planning. Kim Il Sung says: "By centralized planning is meant the inclusion of state planning organizations and planning units scattered throughout the country into a single system of planning and a guarantee of a unified plan under the guidance of the State Planning Committee."¹⁸

With the establishment of a newly unified system of planning, several regional planning committees were set up in each province under the direct control of the State Planning Committee. The tasks of the state planning organizations at different levels are to supervise planning in the districts and sectors, to investigate production reserves, to provide guidance and aid in the formulation of objective and scientific plans. Further, the state planning bodies at all levels are required to report from time to time to their superior organizations and the Cabinet on defects, such as failure to organize production rationally, wasteful use of labor and materials, and the like.

At the same time, the planning departments and sections of the ministries, central organs, provincial people's committees, provincial rural economy committees and other economic organizations, as well as of factories and other enterprises, were defined as "hands and feet" or "cells" of the State Planning Committee. In this way, it is intended to strengthen the links between the state planning organizations and the planning departments of the ministries and enterprises, as well as the guidance of the state planning organizations to the "hands and feet." These are the essentials of the new unified system of planning.

Along with the unification of planning, a system of detailing plans was also established. This means the drawing up of concrete and precise plans covering all facets of the branches and enterprises of the economy on the basis of strict scientific calculations and a good grasp of the objective conditions.

Under the old system of planning, scientific calculations were not sufficient since concrete substantiation was lacking, so that the plans did not cover all aspects of all branches of the economy. For instance, plan figures for the production of ores, iron and steel, cement, automobiles, tractors and other key products were available, but plans for the production of small items, such as bolts, were not spelled out. Similarly, in the production plan of tractors, the number of tractors to be turned out was specified, and the "fund" materials such as steel plate and other steel products required for production were reflected in the plan, but hardly any non-"fund" materials, such as screws, valves and bearings were included. Plans for non-"fund" materials were arbitrarily drawn up by ministries, and since there was no system of detailing plans, the responsibility of planning personnel could not be clearly set. Further, such plans were not plans in the strict meaning of the word.

In the socialist system, it is necessary for a plan to coordinate the details of economic activities. For instance, the provision of non-"fund" materials must be sufficiently reflected. Needless to say, this is a tremendous job, requiring an increase in the number of plan indices. However, under the new system, detailed plans must be drawn up even if the number of plan indices reaches several scores of thousands of items. The scope of the plans is defined for the State Planning Committee, local planning committees and ministries. However, whatever the scope, and by whatever planning unit it is worked out, once a detailed plan is drawn up it assumes a legal character without exception, and is not permitted to be altered arbitrarily.

The new system reflects the *Juche* system of planning in which the general principle of Marxism-Leninism is applied creatively to the concrete realities of the country. It is the embodiment of the great Chongsanri spirit and method in economic planning, the system which combines centralized guidance and local initiative.

5. THE CHOLLIMA MOVEMENT

“The Chollima* movement is the general line of our Party in socialist construction. The essence of this line is to educate all working people in communist ideas, to remold them and rally them more firmly around the Party, and to give full scope to their revolutionary zeal and creative talents so as to build socialism better and faster.”¹⁹

The great upsurge in socialist construction, based on the revolutionary consciousness and creative labor of millions of workers who are making history, the rapid development of the socialist economy, is a law of socialism. This is the true meaning of the essential superiority of the socialist system.

However, the advantages of the socialist system and the people's keen interest and creative ability do not occur spontaneously, but are developed through stubborn and purposeful struggles based on full scientific calculations of the subjective and objective conditions. These aims can be realized only through outstanding political leadership in the revolution and construction and through the constant struggle of the vanguard party.

The Chongsanri spirit and method, the Daejan work system, the new system of agricultural guidance, the group management system, and the system of centralizing and detailing plans encompass the traditional mass line and the basic method of the Party in organizing and mobilizing the masses for revolution and construction.

*According to Korean legends, Chollima was a winged horse capable of bearing those fortunate enough to mount it at great speed toward the land of happiness.

The basic method our Party employs in mobilizing the masses for socialist construction [Kim Il Sung emphasizes] is to raise the Party's leading role and always to give priority to political work, combining this properly with economic and technical work, steadily to enhance the political awareness and the level of consciousness of the working people and properly to combine this with material interest.²⁰

North Korea's historic Chollima movement combines the traditional mass line of the Party and the outstanding leadership of Kim Il Sung. It is also an entirely logical development of the socio-economic transformation realized in the northern half of the Republic in the postwar period and of all the material and spiritual factors accumulated in the course of the long, bitter struggles. But since socialist construction does not advance automatically, even under the best conditions, for a real upsurge to take place in socialist construction there must be a subjective factor, a subjective force: a political leader and a vanguard party capable of organizing and enlisting millions of working people for the great upsurge in the revolution and construction. At the same time, the masses must firmly resolve to realize completely the aims and policies of the Party.

Of decisive importance for the start of the Chollima movement were the plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea in December 1956, and Kim Il Sung's on-the-spot guidance at the Kangson Steel Works. At that time, as indicated previously, North Korea was faced with serious difficulties. Immediately after the plenum, Kim Il Sung appealed directly to the workers of the Kangson Steel Works, telling them about the grave internal and external situation and the intentions of the Party, and he called on all workers to forge ahead at the speed of the Chollima horse. He also appealed directly to the workers of the Hwanghae Steel Works on January 4, 1957, to the workers of Haeju in February and to the workers of Hungnam and Shinpo in March. Later, the Premier appealed to the workers of Hwangchoryong, the

Nampo districts, the construction workers of Pyongyang, as well as to the workers in the coal-mining areas in the west.

The workers responded to the appeal, effecting a great innovation in socialist construction. They discovered items in short supply, created goods that were non-available, destroyed old standards and designs, and established new standards. They built a blast furnace with an annual capacity of 300,000 to 400,000 tons in less than a year, laid over 80 kilometers of wide-gauge railway in 75 days, and built a large-scale vinylon factory in a little more than one year on a broad expanse of wasteland. They developed a "machine-tool-to-beget-machines" movement and produced some 13,000 machine tools in excess of the state plan; they constructed over 1,000 local enterprises, utilizing idle local materials and labor, and they carried out a large-scale reclamation project to irrigate 370,000 hectares of farmland in only six months. Countless other examples could be cited. In this way, the flames of the Chollima movement, kindled among the workers of the Kangson Steel Works by Kim Il Sung, spread like wildfire over all areas, factories and enterprises in the northern part of the Republic.

While this was going on, Kim Il Sung again visited the Kangson Steel Works in February 1959, and suggested that the workers initiate a Chollima work team movement to strengthen the Chollima movement in a more organized way.

So the Chollima movement was raised to a new stage of development in the form of the Chollima work team movement. Its central task was to do political and ideological work among the people, to arm them with the ideas of collectivism and communism, to eliminate the old ideas still found among the masses, in order to revolutionize them and convert them into a fully conscious proletariat. In other words, the main task of the movement was to carry out an ideological revolution among the masses. The second task was to forge a cultural revolution. The Chollima work team movement is a school of communist education, created by the workers themselves for their own education in the ideas of collectivism.

Thus, the important characteristic of the Chollima work team is its effective development of a collective innovation movement in production by emphasizing and strengthening the education and remolding of working people, and by directly linking these educational activities with the fulfillment of production assignments:

The main feature of the Chollima work team movement, which is being extensively unfolded among our working people [wrote Kim Il Sung] lies in the close combination of the mass innovation drive in production with the education and remolding of the working people.

This work team movement, as an intensified and developed form of the Chollima movement, has become not only a powerful impetus to the development of the national economy and an ideal form of mass economic management by the working people, but also constitutes an excellent medium of mass education for remolding everybody into a person of a new communist type. Our Chollima riders are not only innovators in production, but also able management personnel, expert organizers and real communist educators.²¹

The Chollima work teams rapidly spread and developed, embracing industry, agriculture, construction, science, education, health preservation and other areas, and in August 1960, the first national conference of Chollima Work Team Riders was held.

As of August 1961, or just before the historic Fourth Congress of the Workers Party of Korea, more than two million working people were participating in this movement, and 4,958 work teams, comprising 125,028 persons, had the title "Chollima Work Team." Fifty-five work teams, comprising 1,459 workers, had the title "Double Chollima Work Team."

By May 1968, when the second national conference of Chollima Work Team Riders was held, the number of Chollima work teams had risen 21-fold and the number of double Chollima riders 23-fold since the first national conference. The Chollima work team movement developed into a national, large-scale innovation movement, embracing millions of working people in the northern half of the Republic. That

is why the Chollima movement is the general line of the Workers Party of Korea in socialist construction.

The most important political and economic significance of the Chollima movement is that it guarantees the rapid tempo of socialist economic construction. After the start of this movement, industrial production in North Korea developed rapidly, recording an annual growth rate of 40 to 50 per cent, and the overall Five-Year Plan was successfully fulfilled in only two and a half years. A rapid growth rate of industrial production is being maintained in fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan. For instance, with economic construction and defense build-up developing simultaneously, the northern part of the Republic retained its remarkable growth rate in industrial production in 1967 and 1968.

Rapid expansion of the economy is a requirement of socialist society, a requirement rooted in the essential superiority of the socialist system. It is a direct reflection of the desire of the masses of people to construct socialism and communism better and more quickly. This desire is particularly keen among the working masses. The revolutionary tasks imposed on them—eliminating the remnants of the colonial economy, rehabilitating and constructing the war-destroyed economy, unifying the fatherland, etc.—demand that North Koreans take ten steps forward for every step others take. It is because of this that the masses accepted the Chollima work team movement wholeheartedly and developed it effectively as their own, all-people innovation movement.

What is especially important in this connection is that, although this movement was created by the masses from among themselves according to the necessary law of development of socialist society, it would have been impossible to develop it into a dynamic national movement if it were not for the outstanding leadership of the vanguard party and the leader who took hold of it, reflected it correctly in policy, and mobilized the masses positively to carry it out. The historical experience

of the Chollima work team movement clearly demonstrates this. Kim Il Sung says:

The wise leadership of the Party, its firm unity with the people, their firm resolve to advance rapidly and their revolutionary zeal—these are the foundations for the great upsurge in socialist construction and the Chollima movement and constitute the decisive guarantee for all our victories.²²

Some Theoretical Problems of Socialist Economy

Premier Kim Il Sung made public a new work entitled "On Some Theoretical Problems of Socialist Economy" on March 1, 1969 in answer to questions submitted to him by scientific and educational workers through the Science and Educational Department of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea.

In this work, the Premier gave clear-cut theoretical explanations on the question of the correlation between the scale of the economy and the rate of development of production, the question of the means of production in the form of commodities and the application of the law of value, and on the problem of the peasant market and the way of abolishing it in a socialist society. These are the most fundamental questions in the area of the economic theories of Marxism-Leninism, particularly as they pertain to a socialist economy. The theoretical elucidation of these issues is urgently required because of their practical importance.

The problem of the correlation between the scale of the economy and the rate of development of production in a socialist society is fundamental to the law of the whole process of development of a socialist economy. The attitude toward this question clearly determines whether the position is a revolutionary and principled one based on Marxism-Leninism or reflects left or right opportunism. It is already known how right and left opportunist views have caused serious confusion and loss in the practical struggle for socialist and communist construction.

The problem of the means of production in the form of commodities and the application of the law of value, as well as the problem of the peasant market, reflect the basic characteristics of a socialist economy as a transitional economy.

A very practical problem in a socialist economy is that of commodity-money relations. This should be solved effectively in relation to the problem of securing a constant and rapid development of the socialist economy in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. However, this problem has been regarded as very complex and difficult and repeatedly has been discussed internationally over scores of years. No clear-cut conclusion was reached. The recent theoretical work of Kim Il Sung has presented a solution.

While fully explaining the characteristics of the transitional economy and economic laws that operate in the transitional period, Kim Il Sung has given lucid explanations on the correlation between the base and the superstructure, on the positive role of the Marxist-Leninist party and the state of the proletarian dictatorship in the development of socialist economy, and on the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the organizer of the economy. By doing so, he has made clear, theoretically and practically, the unified relations between the working masses as the vanguard in the historical development of socialist society, on the one hand, and the Party and its political leadership on the other.

In this way, Kim Il Sung's recent theoretical work on the central problems of the economic theories of socialism is of great significance for the creative development of the economic theories of Marxism-Leninism and for the completion of the entire system of the political economy of socialism. Furthermore, it is also a powerful theoretical weapon in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for the complete victory of socialism and the realization of communism.

1. PROBLEMS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE SCALE OF THE ECONOMY AND THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION

In the first part of his work, Kim Il Sung presents a new and original theory on the correlation between the scale of the economy and the rate of development of production in a socialist society. He writes:

In a socialist society, the great revolutionary zeal of the people is the decisive factor which impels the productive forces to germinate. The intrinsic superiority of the socialist system lies in the fact that the working people, freed from exploitation and oppression, work with conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative for the country and the people, for society and the collective, as well as for their own welfare.¹

It is due to this basic factor that the development of the socialist economy according to scientific laws results in the possibility of greater expansion of production as socialist construction proceeds and as the scale of the economy is increased, and that production expands at a rate of development undreamt of in capitalist society.

It has been generally conceded for a long time that the rate of development of socialist production is higher than that of capitalist production. This is a natural corollary of the general proposition that socialist production is based on the abolition of capitalist relations which have become fetters preventing the further development of production.

Today, however, the questions are: What should be the proper level for the rate of development of production in a socialist society? Should we regard the proper rate of development as much higher than that of capitalist production, or only slightly higher? Even when we admit the proposition that the rate of development of socialist production naturally should

be far higher than that of capitalist production, should we regard this revolutionary proposition as generally valid for all stages of development of a socialist economy? In other words, should we regard this proposition as applicable only to a certain stage in the development of a socialist economy, i.e., to the initial stage or recovery period, and as not applicable to a more developed stage or a period of technological innovation in the development of socialist economy?

Today, right opportunists admit that the economy grows constantly under socialism but at the same time they argue that when the economy has reached a certain stage, it is impossible to raise the rate of development of production above four to seven per cent, since the scope for the growth of production narrows, the possibility of further expanding production decreases, as the economy increases. According to this view, then, the rate of development of socialist production not only differs little from the growth rate of capitalist production when a socialist economy has reached a certain level, but also it may lag behind the rate of development in some capitalist countries.

If this were true, the intrinsic superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system (the higher rate of development of socialist production over capitalist production is precisely a concentrated expression of this superiority) would display its vitality in the initial stage or in a recovery period but would become untenable when the socialist economy reached a certain level of development.

Furthermore, if it were true that as a socialist economy expands and its scope for further development gradually diminishes as the rate of development of production decreases, then we have to admit that it would be impossible to complete the material foundation of socialism or, if not impossible, it would be possible to do so only gradually. This means that it would take several centuries to realize communism.

Thus, continuously maintaining a high rate of development

throughout the entire period of socialist and communist construction by analyzing correctly the correlation between the scale of the economy and the rate of development of production would confirm the scientific basis of the economic development of socialism. This concerns the intrinsic superiority of the socialist system and is a key question that determines the future of socialist and communist construction.

Kim Il Sung's original theory on the correlation of the scale of the economy and the rate of development of production in a socialist economy is a Marxist-Leninist answer to this pressing problem and a refutation of left and right opportunist views. He holds the principled position that this question should be tackled in its relation to the decisive and intrinsic superiority of socialism over capitalism.

The crux of the problem is to determine the scope of expansion of the scale of the economy, or the possibility of further increasing production. In other words, should we consider that the scope diminishes or increases with the expansion of the scale of socialist economy? And, if we consider that it increases, where should we look for the greater scope?

In a socialist society there is unlimited scope for developing production, unlimited possibility for increasing it. Certainly it increases along with the strengthening of the economic foundations and the consolidation of the economy-organizing functions of the proletarian dictatorship. These potentials lie in socialism, in the objective intrinsic superiority of the socialist system. The problem is to analyze correctly the various factors determining these potentials in relation to the essential superiority of the socialist system and how to relate them to the rapid development of production expansion.

These factors are, first, the planned and balanced development of a socialist economy; second, the planned and rapid development of technology in a socialist society; and third, the unlimited revolutionary enthusiasm and creative initiative of the working masses which can be given full play only in socialist society.

Planned and balanced development of the economy is a law applicable only to a socialist economy and is the most fundamental characteristic of the process of socialist reproduction. Further, it operates as an important factor for rapidly developing socialist production. As Kim Il Sung says:

In capitalist society production cannot grow steadily, the process of reproduction being periodically interrupted and much social labor wasted owing to crises of overproduction. In a socialist society, however, all the labor resources and natural wealth of the country can be used efficiently, and production can be raised incessantly according to plan.²

Capitalist society, where private or capitalist ownership of the means of production prevails, is characterized by the anarchy of production. The crises of overproduction caused by the contradictions between the social nature of production and the private or capitalist form of ownership interrupt and destroy the process of capitalist reproduction periodically, with the result that tremendous amounts of production materials and products are wasted.

This cyclical interruption and destruction of production and its chronic stagnation are a law characteristic of capitalist production. However, in a socialist society, where capitalist ownership has been abolished completely and socialist ownership of the means of production established, this law disappears. The anarchistic and abnormal development of production is replaced by planned and balanced development, and the cyclical interruption, destruction, and chronic stagnation of production, by its constant and rapid development. The development of socialist production is based primarily on the social ownership of the means of production, on the seizure of power by the proletariat.

Under these conditions, the proletarian dictatorship can achieve a planned and balanced economy by utilizing to a maximum all the economic levers, which it controls, and by distributing the social means of production and labor power to various economic branches according to the law of develop-

ment of a socialist system. As the organization functions of the state are strengthened and as economic control and management are extended to maintain and coordinate a rational balance among different branches of the people's economy, scope for the growth and potential of production is greatly increased.

This is not affected by the factor of the expanded scale of the economy. In other words, however much the scale of the economy is expanded, scope for further growth will increase if the economic planning bodies of the state are strengthened and the planning levels raised.

The fact that the state controls distribution, accumulation and consumption in a unified way and according to a plan makes it possible to develop socialist expanded reproduction on a larger scale by channeling more funds to accumulation.

Planned, rapid development of technology is possible only in a socialist economy, and this, in turn, raises labor productivity which becomes a factor also for developing socialist production rapidly. Kim Il Sung observes:

... The production relations of socialism give a broad scope for the unrestricted development of productive forces, and the socialist state, by making use of this potential, rapidly can develop technology according to plan. It is an economic law of socialist and communist construction that outmoded technique is replaced by new technique, and the new one by an even newer one; that manual labor is mechanized, mechanization becomes semi-automation, and semi-automation becomes full automation. It is a demonstrable truth that in socialist society, with the rapid development of technology, labor productivity increases constantly and production develops at a high rate.³

In capitalist society, machinery and technology made and developed by man are turned into instruments to dominate and oppress man; the capitalist utilizes machinery and technology to exploit and oppress workers. Under such conditions, the development of machinery and technology intensifies

the exploitation of workers and alienates them from the process of direct production. Machinery and technology are used in production only insofar as they increase profits. If the equipment fails to serve this purpose, it is discarded, however excellent it may be. The development of technology is hindered by capitalist production relations themselves.

Machinery and technology are controlled by the people only under socialism and then they are used in the interest of the masses, for their happiness and improvement of living conditions. In a socialist society, all machinery and technology are utilized fully as a powerful means to liberate the worker from difficult manual labor and to improve productivity. Full and rapid development of modern equipment and technique is the direct concern of the state and the masses. Machinery and technology are developed not only by a handful of scientists or engineers but also by the unlimited creativity of the people.

The decisive factor in expanding and developing socialist production should be sought in the revolutionary awareness and creativity of the liberated masses. As Kim Il Sung puts it:

In a socialist society, the great revolutionary enthusiasm of the people is the decisive factor which actively encourages the productive forces to spread. The intrinsic superiority of the socialist system lies in the fact that the working people, freed from exploitation and oppression, work with conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative for the country and the people, for society and the collective, as well as for their own welfare.⁴

Thus, labor power is the most active and determinant element of production. Technology is developed by man, machinery is made by man, and it is man that operates it. All precious and beautiful material and cultural products in the world are made by the labor of working people. Man himself is the basic element of productive forces, the human power that conquers nature, and man plays a decisive role in the development of productive forces. The issue is the ideology and consciousness of man.

Under capitalism, workers are exploited and oppressed because they do not possess the means of production and they are forced to work to live; therefore they take no interest in the development of machinery and technology since all the fruits of production belong to the capitalist and the development of technology results only in increasing a worker's exploitation. Under socialism where the means of production belong to the society the worker, as direct producer, is complete master of the state, society and production. The results of production belong to him directly or indirectly and serve to improve his material and cultural life. Machinery and technology are developed to lighten his labor and to improve his living standard. In these circumstances, the development of production and technology is of direct and great concern to the worker. This is the decisive condition that enables the masses in a socialist society to give full scope to their inexhaustible creativity and talent, and this, too, is the basic content of socialist relations of production, with the working masses freed from all exploitation and oppression.

These factors make it possible for a socialist society to expand production constantly, however much the scale of the economy may be increased. There is an unlimited scope and potential for expanding production that is derived from the intrinsic superiority of the socialist system itself.

For production constantly and rapidly to develop so as to realize socialism and communism successfully, the socialist state first must strengthen decisively the functions of the proletarian dictatorship, continue the class struggle with this as a weapon, remold the consciousness of the people by carrying out an ideological and cultural revolution, and raise technical and cultural levels, thus implementing the task of revolutionizing the entire society. Kim Il Sung says:

The more the Party and state of the proletariat, in conformity with their proper functions, strengthen the ideological revolution among the working people and gradually eliminate the survivals of

old ideologies from their minds, the more the working people will devote their talents and stamina to the development of socialist production.⁵

In a socialist system the working masses can be encouraged to show their awareness and creativity only when the state actively promotes an ideological struggle to uproot individualism and egotism—the ideological survivals of the old society—and arm all people with the advanced ideas of the working class, that is, the ideas of collectivism and communism.

For a constant and rapid development of socialist production, the socialist state must strengthen the economic planning functions of the proletarian dictatorship as a weapon of class struggle. The socialist system has created all the objective conditions for developing a planned and balanced economy. The socialist state is required to raise decisively the plan level on the basis of these conditions to prevent a waste of labor power and materials and to mobilize maximum productive reserves.

When the ideological revolution, carried out by the proletarian dictatorship, is joined with a powerful technical revolution it can become a decisive propelling force for developing socialist production rapidly. There is no doubt that when all the branches of the people's economy are equipped with the latest machinery and technology and when this equipment is operated by ideologically inspired workers, socialist production will develop rapidly. As Kim Il Sung says: "All this shows that we can develop the economy as fast as we want, no matter how large its scale if we, by conducting political work successfully in accordance with our Party's program, enhance the political consciousness of the masses, arouse their revolutionary zeal and constantly improve techniques."⁶

The famous proposition put forward by Lenin after the victorious October Revolution, "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country," should be interpreted as demonstrating this requisite for proletarian dictator-

ship and technological revolution. Lenin's proposition indicates that communism can be realized only when the proletarian dictatorship is strong enough to carry out ideological and cultural revolutions, to convert the entire society into the working class, and, at the same time, to carry out a technological revolution, laying solid material and technical foundations for realizing a high level of productivity. Only then can the socialist state occupy the two strongholds, ideological and material, which it must capture in the course of its advance to socialism and communism, and guarantee the complete victory of socialism. If we neglect either of these, the dictatorship of the proletariat or the technical revolution, we can neither develop the socialist economy at a rapid rate nor build socialism or communism.

The correctness of the revolutionary proposition advanced by Kim Il Sung on the correlation between the scale of the economy and the rate of development of production in a socialist society has been borne out amply by the historical experience of the Republic in socialist construction. The rate of development of production was higher, not lower, in the period of the Three-Year Postwar Rehabilitation Plan, and particularly during the period of the Seven-Year Plan, a time of full-scale technological innovation in which the scale of production was many times larger than previously.

When the Republic tackled the Five-Year Plan, the people's standard of living was not satisfactory, although in the main the ravaged economy had been restored and the living standard had been stabilized as a result of the successful implementation of the postwar Three-Year Plan. Further, the Republic found itself in a very difficult position. Reactionaries at home and abroad were directing the thrust of their attack at the Republic and were engaged in undisguised maneuvers to frustrate its economic construction. It was in these circumstances that the DPRK was faced with the urgent task of laying the foundation for industrialization, and for this purpose, large quantities of steel products were needed.

However, at that time there was but one blooming mill in the Republic, and its rated capacity was only 60,000 tons of rolled steel, far from enough. Under these difficult conditions, the Party and the government, under the leadership of Premier Kim Il Sung, solved the problem by putting complete trust in the working people and encouraged them to give full play to their inexhaustible revolutionary zeal and initiative. Kim Il Sung personally visited the Kangson Steel Works and explained to the workers the difficult situation facing the revolution and construction, and proposed to increase the rated capacity from 60,000 tons to 90,000 tons:

We have barely managed to rehabilitate the ravaged economy, and now the factionalists have reared their heads against the Party and the great-power chauvinists are putting pressure on us, and the U.S. imperialists and the Syngman Rhee puppet clique are frantically clamoring for a "March North." But is that any excuse for us to get disheartened and to yield to the grave difficulties facing our revolution and construction? No, that won't do. We trust only you workers, the main power of our revolution, and we have only you to rely on. To overcome these grave difficulties facing our Party, you must be in high spirits and work hard, produce plenty and construct, so as to press economic construction more vigorously, isn't that so?

In response to Kim Il Sung's call, the workers of the Kangson Steel Works resolved to produce 90,000 tons and immediately set about to improve existing machines and equipment. Overcoming a number of difficulties and ordeals, they succeeded in turning out 120,000 tons of steel products, instead of 90,000, by the end of that year, giving full scope to their revolutionary zeal and creative initiative. Today, the production capacity of the Kangson Steel Works has been raised to a level of 450,000 tons, or eight times the rated capacity. This example evoked innovations in all parts of the country, and old rated capacities were scrapped. In this way, the Five-Year Plan, which envisaged a 2.8-fold increase in total production value, was fulfilled successfully in two and a half years.

How about the situation in the seven or eight years after the

Five-Year Plan? In economic construction, the Republic carried out the tasks of the full-scale technological revolution and many new industrial branches were created, with machinery and equipment radically improved and the scale of production increased many times.

Did the growth rate of production decrease when productive capacity was increased in this way? Precisely under these conditions, production maintained a high rate of development during the Seven-Year Plan. The National Economic Plan for 1967, the first year for implementing the decision of the Party Conference on building the economy and defense simultaneously was a tight plan envisaging a 12.8 per cent increase in total industrial output value over the previous year. But in 1967, the Republic actually overfulfilled the plan by far and raised industrial output by as much as 17 per cent in a year.

Further, in 1968, great reserves were created in the course of the struggle to realize the economic plan. In view of the frantic war cries by the United States following the *Pueblo* incident, the Party addressed an appeal to the factories and enterprises in all fields of the national economy to fulfill all their production and construction assignments ahead of schedule and produce more with the released labor power, materials and equipment. This call was answered by workers in all factories and enterprises, and many not only carried out their assignments but also asked for more work which they did well.

In this way, a socialist society has an unlimited potential for constantly developing the economy at a rate undreamt of in capitalist society, and this potential increases as socialist construction proceeds and its economic foundations are strengthened. Consequently, if political work is successful in raising the political consciousness of the masses and in arousing their enthusiasm, and if techniques are constantly improved, the economy can be developed at a high rate, however large the scale of the economy. This is the basic proposition on the economic development of socialism. Its correctness has been borne out fully, theoretically and practically.

This revolutionary proposition advanced by Kim Il Sung is the most powerful theoretical and practical weapon for defending resolutely the purity of Marxism-Leninism and exposing thoroughly the counter-revolutionary nature of the theories of left and right opportunism. Premier Kim Il Sung says:

The theory that when industry reaches a certain stage of development its reserves will diminish and a high growth rate will not be ensured in industrial production has nothing to do with the Marxist-Leninist theory of the economy. The "theory" that a large-scale economy cannot develop rapidly is only a sophistry brought forward by some to justify the fact that their technical progress is slow and their economy stagnant because they, talking about "liberalization" and "democratic development," did not educate their proletariat and, as a result, the workers are ideologically so sluggish that they fiddle about and loaf on the job.⁸

2. PROBLEMS OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION IN THE FORM OF COMMODITIES AND THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF VALUE

In the second part of his theoretical work, Kim Il Sung gives a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the designation of the means of production as commodities and of the law of value in socialist society.

Involved here are also questions related to the conditions for and characteristics of commodity production, and its abolition; definition of the form of the means of production provided by state enterprises; the production and circulation of means of production as commodities, and the utilization of the law of value and its significance. Thus, included are all the important questions in the general area of the use of commodity-money relations, commodity production, and the law of value, presented in the context of the transitional nature of a socialist society. Kim Il Sung says: "After all, the question of utilizing commodity-money relations is an important one

which the proletarian state must settle properly in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Right or 'left' errors in this question can result in serious harm."⁹

It is common knowledge that left and right opportunists, who have failed to solve this question correctly, cause great confusion and bring about serious losses to our cause. The question of commodity-money relations is crucial for clarifying the characteristic features of the transitional economy.

Utilizing commodity-money relations, i.e., the means of production as commodities and the law of value, is of extremely important theoretical and practical significance in the struggle of the working class for socialist and communist construction. This is a very difficult and complex theoretical problem, which has been discussed actively for a long time among Marxist-Leninist theoreticians, without any clear conclusion having been reached.

The general question of commodity production under socialism was stated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. Engels, on the supposition that socialist revolutions would triumph almost simultaneously in highly advanced capitalist countries, presented the proposition that commodity production would be abolished when private ownership of the means of production was replaced with social ownership. Thus, in a developed capitalist society which Engels had in mind, class distinctions between the working class and the peasantry would be eradicated before the socialist revolution, and consequently there would be no ownership of the means of production by the peasantry. Under these conditions, abolition of capitalist or landlord ownership would mean not only abolition of private ownership in general but also the establishment of social ownership as the only form of ownership. There would be no separation of social ownership into two main categories, ownership by all the people and cooperative ownership. It is clear that if ownership relations were not divided, commodity-money relations would disappear.

After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, Lenin said, "When we have won on a worldwide scale, we will be able to build public lavatories with gold on the streets of some of the largest cities in the world." He meant that when socialism has triumphed on a worldwide scale, the significance and role of gold as money will disappear.

Stalin, who was a pioneer in socialist construction, gave considerable thought to the utilization of commodity-money relations. For instance, on the question of the form of the means of production in socialist society, Stalin advanced in his later years the proposition that "the means of production lose their characteristics as commodities in domestic commercial transactions and are placed outside the law of value, maintaining only the accouterments of commodities (cost accounting, etc.)."

According to this proposition, the means of production in a socialist society cease to be commodities *uniformly*, at least within national boundaries. If we admit that the means of production have the accouterments of commodities, why is this so, and what significance does this have? Thus Stalin's proposition has left some questions unanswered.

At present, right opportunists, defining all the means of production in a socialist society indiscriminately as commodities, are trying to carry out economic management in a capitalist way, while overestimating the significance of commodity production and the law of value. On the other hand, left opportunists, ignoring the transitional nature of a socialist society, are unable to rationalize the management of socialist enterprises and are wasting substantial quantities of means of production and labor power because they refuse completely to recognize the role of commodity production and the law of value under socialism.

In clarifying this question, Kim Il Sung first states the Marxist definition of a commodity: "A commodity is something produced not for one's own consumption but for sale.

In other words, not all products are commodities, but all things produced for the purpose of exchange are commodities."¹⁰

Commodity production presupposes a social division of labor and a differentiation of ownership. Should either of these be lacking, there can be no commodity production.

Commodity exchange among communities in the closing stage of primitive society is explained as the differentiation of communal ownership among different communities, and commodity exchange in a capitalist society as the differentiation of private-capitalist ownership relations among individual capitalists as owners of commodities. Consequently, commodity production in a socialist society should be explained on the basis of the differentiation of ownership.

In past controversies, the general proposition of Marxism-Leninism on the nature of the commodity and its origins was not only misunderstood but also greatly distorted, causing serious confusion in the settlement of this question. Some people, relating the nature of commodities and the origins of commodity production mainly to the private ownership of the means of production, asserted that there can be no commodity production in socialist society, where private ownership has been abolished. Other people, asserting that commodity exchange was carried on even in primitive communities where communal ownership prevailed exclusively, have distorted the general proposition of Marxism-Leninism.

If we take private ownership and private labor as the basis, there would be no commodities in a socialist society, where there is no private ownership or private labor, and one naturally is led to the extreme leftist conclusion that no means of production are commodities in a socialist society under any circumstances.

On the other hand, if we regard as commodities the products of the communal labor of primitive man in primitive communities where communal ownership dominated exclusively, we will be led to regard all products in a socialist society, even

the means of production among state enterprises, as commodities in the true sense of the word. Then will follow the right-opportunist view that commodity production will continue even in a communist society where ownership by the entire society prevails.

Kim Il Sung formulated this definition of conditions for commodity production and commodity-money relations in a socialist society:

The reason commodity-money relations exist in a socialist society is that the social division of labor and different forms of ownership of products exist. As everybody knows, in a socialist society, the division of labor not only exists but develops every day. As for ownership, there exist state and cooperative ownership of the means of production as well as private ownership of consumer goods, although in the course of a socialist revolution, private ownership is abolished and different economic forms that existed early in the transition period are gradually fused into a single, socialist form of economy. In addition, socialist states must carry on foreign trade in a situation where communism has not yet triumphed on a worldwide scale and frontiers exist.¹¹

Needless to say, in a socialist society, private ownership is abolished in the course of the socialist revolution, and various forms of capitalist economy and commodity economy which existed in the early stage of the transitional period are fused into a single, socialist economic form. However, in a socialist society, the socialist forms of ownership are not yet unified in the single state form but are differentiated. This is an expression of the transitional nature of socialism as seen in the relations of ownership.

The characteristic feature of commodity production in a socialist society is that there are no capitalists and the law of value applied to commodity production does not operate blindly, as in a capitalist society, but within a limited scope. It can be utilized in a planned way by the state as an economic lever for effective economic management.

Under capitalism, commodity production is the means by which the capitalist makes a profit. The capitalist employs workers for commodity production and obtains profits by selling their products. Workers are thoroughly exploited in the process. Consequently, the law of value operates without limit and blindly in all areas of social production and commodity circulation, and even in the sale and purchase of labor power.

On the other hand, in socialist society commodity production is carried on to satisfy the material and cultural demands of the people, and its scope is limited. It is confined to the production and distribution of consumer goods and, partially, to the production and distribution of the means of production. Therefore, the operation of the law of value is restricted to these areas.

Thus, since the conditions for commodity production are the social division of labor and the differentiation of ownership relations, commodity production also will be abolished when the transitional period is over and cooperative property is converted into the property of the entire people so that a unitary form of ownership is established, aside from foreign trade. As pointed out by Kim Il Sung, then products of social production no longer will be commodities but will be called simply means of production and consumer goods or by some other names. Commodity circulation then will be transferred to a distribution system and the law of value will cease to operate.

It is important to remember that even in that stage, the social division of labor will continue to exist and to develop, for commodity production is not a prerequisite for the social division of labor, though the social division of labor is a condition for commodity production.* In other words, the social

*Revisionists try to explain the conditions for commodity production in a socialist society in terms of the "immaturity of the degree of socialization of ownership by all the people" and the consequent "heterogeneity" of social

division of labor exists and develops irrespective of the existence of commodity production.

After clarifying the nature of commodities, the conditions for commodity production generally and under socialism, its characteristics and the prospect for its abolition, Kim Il Sung posed the question, In a socialist society, when are the means of production a commodity and when not? And answered:

The determination of when the means of production are a commodity and when they are not in socialist society should also be based on the differentiation of ownership. In a socialist society, the means of production, even when shifted to other places, are not a commodity if they do not change hands, and a commodity when they do change hands.¹²

According to Kim Il Sung, means of production are a commodity (ownership of a means of production changes) in the following cases: (1) when a means of production is transferred from state ownership to cooperative ownership; (2) when a means of production is transferred within the cooperative ownership, or between cooperative farms, between producer cooperatives, or between a cooperative farm and a producer cooperative; (3) when a means of production is exported. In all these cases, a means of production becomes a commodity because it changes hands and, consequently, the law of value operates not in form but in substance.

When the confederation of the South and North is effected, and businessmen in South Korea ask us for machines and

labor. In other words, they try to explain it by distinctions in labor skills—between simple and complex labor, between manual and mental labor, etc. If this view were followed, commodity production would continue to exist even in a complete socialist society, before distinctions between manual and mental labor are eradicated. Further, when they refer to the "immaturity of the degree of socialization of ownership by all the people," the question is, what is the yardstick? According to this view, commodity production will continue to exist even when ownership by all the people prevails exclusively, if socialization is considered still "immature." This is nothing but sophistry.

equipment, the northern part of the Republic will sell them. In that case the machines and equipment will be commodities, and the law of value will operate.

When are the means of production not a commodity? Means of production or equipment, raw and other materials do not become commodities when they are transferred between state enterprises or within the ownership of all the people. In that case, the socialist state maintains its ownership. Further, the means of production are not transferred through the transactions of sale and purchase but are distributed according to the state plan for distribution of machinery, equipment and materials, in the same way that the state provides the army with weapons. Thus transfer of ownership does not occur, and the item cannot be a commodity, nor does the law of value operate.

If a means of production transferred between state enterprises is not a commodity, what is it? And how do we explain the prices and cost accounting that have to be taken into consideration when it is transferred between enterprises in the present stage of socialism? Furthermore, what should be used in such accounting if the law of value is not used? Concerning these questions, Kim Il Sung holds:

It would be correct to say that the means of production which are transferred between state enterprises according to the plans for equipment and material supply and for cooperative production are not commodities, but assume the form of commodities and, accordingly, in this case the law of value does not operate in substance, as in the case of commodity production, but in form.¹³

Thus, as Kim Il Sung points out, since the law of value does not operate in the proper sense but only in form, in the case of exchange of the means of production among state enterprises, the form of value is utilized simply as a means of economic accounting, and does not represent the value itself.

Then, how can it be explained in social and economic terms that the means of production transferred between state enter-

prises are not commodities but merely assume the form of commodities? On this, Kim Il Sung bases his explanation on the relative independence of state enterprises whose managements operate an independent accounting system within the state sector and the consequent principle of equivalent compensation.

In a socialist society, all state enterprises are owned by the state, but they are relatively independent in using and managing means of production, as if they were under different ownerships. All the business-accounting enterprises in the state sector separately use the means of production received from other enterprises according to the unitary plan of the state and according to the system of independent accounting, and must net a certain profit for the state after they recover their costs.

Under these conditions, enterprises have to be particular about what is theirs and what belongs to others, and transactions have to be conducted on a strict accounting basis according to the principle of equivalent compensation. This is why the means of production transferred between state enterprises assume the form of commodities and the law of value operates not in substance but in form.

Why, then, are enterprises within the state sector granted independence in management, and why are the delivery and receipt of the means of production strictly accounted for according to the principle of equivalent compensation, when they are not commodities?

Kim Il Sung explains this on the basis of the transitional character which is the specific feature of a socialist society. The specific features of a socialist society relevant to this question are:

First, the productive forces have not yet developed to an extent where each works according to his ability and each receives according to his needs.

Second, there still remain survivals of the old ideologies in the thinking and consciousness of members of society, who

are not yet sufficiently educated and remolded in the spirit of collectivism and with ideas of communism. Consequently, not all people possess sufficient collective spirit to take care of and protect state properties as their own. There are some who still harbor old ideas of taking advantage of the state or other organs and enterprises, placing their own local interests before everything.

Third, under socialism labor has become honorable and worthwhile, but not yet life's prime requirement or man's physiological need as in communist society.

All these factors require that under socialism equivalent values be strictly cost-accounted in transactions between enterprises. When the tasks of the transitional period have been carried out successfully and the productive forces greatly developed; when our society has a great abundance of goods; when the working people of all enterprises have been educated and remolded in the spirit of collectivism and ideas of communism and completely have overcome old ideas of individualism and everything else; and when people are as concerned about state property as about their own and conduct all state affairs as devotedly and consciously as their own—there will be no need to keep accounts on an equivalent basis.

It is of extreme practical importance to utilize correctly the commodity form and the commercial form in the production and distribution of the means of production. Regarding this, Premier Kim Il Sung says:

A proper use of commodities and commerce in the production and distribution of the means of production is of definite significance in methodically increasing the profits of enterprises and the accumulations of the state by eliminating the wastage of social labor and strengthening the save-and-spare regime. It is therefore necessary to make proper use of them in all branches of the national economy and all enterprises.¹⁴

Under limiting conditions resulting from the transitional nature of a socialist society, or when people do not yet work

consciously and devotedly both for the society and their own welfare without social compulsion, the use of the commodity and commercial forms is an inevitable social and economic regime for rational control and management of socialist state enterprises. If there were no such regime, the managing staff and working people of the enterprises would not be sufficiently interested in fulfilling plan assignments, controlling raw and other materials, utilizing labor power rationally, reducing production costs, improving the quality of products, etc., and enhancing their sense of responsibility.

Only when efforts are made to use the form of value properly in providing the means of production will it be possible to strengthen the strict accounting system and the control by *won* (the monetary unit of the Republic) over the use of materials and labor power and to save on material per unit.

In North Korea, the importance of the materials' supply agencies for using correctly the commodity and commercial forms for the means of production is emphasized. And this assumes the existence of the Daean work system, which is the basis of socialist economic management.

To increase decisively the leading role of the vanguard party, to enable broad sections of the working people to participate actively in economic management and give full scope to their creativity, and, for this purpose, to strengthen the political and ideological education of the working people it is important to combine the use of the commodity form and the law of value with the implementation of the principle of socialist distribution.

Kim Il Sung pointed out that the most important factor in utilizing the law of value in a socialist society is that of fixing the prices of commodities properly: "Prices should be assessed on the basis of correctly calculating the requirements of the basic economic law of socialism and the law of value."¹⁵

To fix the prices of commodities on the basis of the law of value means that prices should be based on the socially neces-

sary labor contained in the product. This is the basic requirement of the law of value; it applies to commodity production and circulation in socialist society. Therefore, if prices are not based on the outlay of socially necessary labor, price equilibrium cannot be maintained, socialist distribution cannot be carried out properly, and the development of social production cannot be implemented correctly.

In pricing, it is also necessary to consider the requirements of the basic economic law of socialism, in other words, to fix prices of mass-produced consumer goods at lower levels. In the final analysis, the purpose of economic activities in a socialist society is to satisfy the growing material and cultural needs of the people. It is for this reason that production facilities are equipped with the latest techniques and newest equipment. The highest law governing the activities of the Party and the proletarian state is precisely to improve the living standards of the masses constantly.

Therefore, it is necessary for the Party and the workers' state to price mass consumption goods as low as possible: rice, textiles, footwear, mosquito-netting, sewing thread, matches, stationery and other essential goods so that all people can be clothed and fed adequately and live comfortably. In this case, the prices of commodities should be set lower than their values.

This is not meant to ignore the law of value, but to apply it correctly in a socialist society. Thus, while it is necessary to fix the prices of commodities in the direction of making them coincide with their values on the basis of the law of value, it is also necessary for prices of commodities to differ from their values in accordance with the requirements of the basic economic law of socialism. This is the correct use of the law of value in a socialist society.

Kim Il Sung clarified the difficult and complex questions of utilizing commodity-money relations in a socialist society, and particularly the question of defining the form of the means

of production on the basis of his concept of the differentiation of ownership, the nature of commodities and the conditions for commodity production. On this basis, he gave consistent, full and comprehensive explanations regarding conditions for and special features of commodity production in a socialist society, particularly on the definition of the form of means of production, the prospect for abolition of commodity production, and utilization of the law of value. The theoretical concepts clarified by Kim Il Sung lead to the correct utilization of commodity-money relations in a socialist society.

3. PROBLEMS OF THE PEASANT MARKET AND OF ITS ABOLITION

In the third part of his theoretical work, Kim Il Sung gave Marxist-Leninist explanations on problems of the peasant market in a socialist society, including the nature of the peasant market, objective conditions for its existence, scientific prospects for its abolition, and the principled stand of the Marxist-Leninist Party and the proletarian dictatorship on the law that governs the transition of socialist commerce to a complete system of distribution.

These questions are treated also in connection with the transitional nature of a socialist economy. Where there are class distinctions between the proletariat and the peasantry and where there are two forms of social ownership, that is, ownership by all the people and cooperative ownership, the existence of the peasant market is inevitable. Thus, the proletarian state must solve the question of the peasant market as one of the tasks in the transitional period to the complete victory of socialism.

It may be said that the peasant market is a component part of commodity-money relations in the sense that its socio-economic basis is the differentiation of ownership and that it

is a special form of socialist commerce. After all, this problem is unavoidable in the course of doing away with class distinctions between worker and peasant and of solving finally the agrarian question by completely converting the peasantry into the working class. In this sense, the problem is part of the agrarian question in a socialist society and it is important in the economic theories of socialism.

Nevertheless, the questions of the peasant market and its abolition hardly have been dealt with in the economic theories of socialism and still remain entirely unsettled. As a consequence, tendencies of left and right opportunism on such questions are causing serious confusion and loss in the practical struggle for socialist and communist construction.

A rightist tendency is toward expanding the peasant market under socialism and encouraging its spontaneous development as a capitalist element. This only results in encouraging the selfishness of the peasantry and in greatly hampering the development of socialist agricultural production. On the other hand, a left opportunist deviation is toward ignoring the objective necessity for the peasant market in a socialist society and overestimating the capitalist element in the peasant market, in demanding that it be abolished immediately. This reflects the complete failure to understand the transitional nature of socialist society.

The character of the peasant market in a socialist society was analyzed by Kim Il Sung as follows:

The peasant market represents a form of commerce whereby people buy directly from peasants, at definite places, farm produce and animal products grown on cooperative farms and as a sideline of individual cooperative farmers. Although a form of trade in a socialist society, the peasant market retains many features of capitalism.¹⁶

In a socialist society, a substantial part of the animal products and industrial crops produced by cooperative farms are purchased directly by the state and are paid for in money. However, part is distributed among the peasants in kind for

their own consumption or for sale to the purchasing agents of the state. Also, they can take part to the peasant market. In addition, cooperative farmers may cultivate their own small plots of land and keep a few animals. Farmers may use their produce for their own consumption, sell it on the peasant market or barter it for other products.

However, a peasant market under socialism differs radically from the farmers' market in a capitalist society. First, there is no exploitation in the socialist peasant market, which is a direct relationship between working people, or a direct producer-consumer relationship. Further, the socialist farm market is under the influence of state commerce regulations and cannot but be affected by them. However, the peasant market still retains characteristics of capitalism. One example is that peasant-market prices are determined spontaneously according to demand and supply and, therefore, the law of value operates there somewhat blindly.

The objective conditions permitting the continuation of peasant markets in a socialist society arise from the transitional nature of such a society. Kim Il Sung believes it is not all bad for the peasant market to exist under such circumstances. In a socialist society where the state is not yet able to supply all the goods necessary for the people's life, particularly daily necessities and supplementary provisions in sufficient quantities, it will be beneficial for the people if these goods are produced by peasants and sold in the peasant farm market. That is the role that the private plots and the peasant market play in a socialist economy. Therefore the socialist state should not abolish the peasant market in haste but, on the contrary, should utilize it positively.

If peasant markets were abolished forcibly, in spite of the present objective circumstances, it would lead to black marketing and also great confusion and inconvenience in the people's living conditions and in economic construction.

The state must take steps to eliminate the conditions which

give rise to the peasant market, while fulfilling the general tasks of the transitional period, but meanwhile the peasant market must be utilized. In doing so, it is necessary to limit the size of gardens and to strengthen the coordinating functions of the state over the peasant market. In this way, the growth of capitalist elements in the peasant market will be prevented and it will be used consciously and purposively. The next step is to develop socialist commerce and to increase its leading role. It is especially necessary for the state to coordinate peasant-market prices by purchasing agricultural produce in a more planned way and by expanding and strengthening such purchasing operations.

Then, in what stage of the development of socialism will private plots and the peasant market disappear? And how will they be abolished? They will disappear when there is no longer any basis for their support. In other words, private production and the peasant market will be abolished only when socialist industrialization has been realized and technology developed enough to supply sufficient quantities of all the consumer goods the people need.

Even now, articles that are plentiful are not sold in the peasant market. Therefore, it is important to reduce the number of articles bought and sold on the peasant market one by one and gradually to reduce the sales by developing production rapidly to meet the demands of the people. In this way, the peasant market will become unnecessary and will be abolished.

Moreover, private production and the peasant market will be abolished when cooperative property is transferred to the whole people. Since peasant markets are associated mainly with cooperative farms and private production, they will vanish when all the people own all the property, as against cooperative property; when the two forms of ownership are organically welded together and cooperative property finally is transformed into the property of the entire people. Then

commodity distribution in general will no longer be needed. Consumer goods will be distributed according to the diverse needs of the people. Kim Il Sung concludes:

The peasant market as well as underhand dealings will disappear and trade will go over finally to the supply system only when the productive forces have developed to such an extent that the state can sufficiently turn out and supply all kinds of goods required by the people and cooperative ownership has grown into ownership of the entire people.¹⁷

Today, the Korean people, led by Kim Il Sung, are in the vanguard of mankind's march toward socialism and communism. They have undergone revolutionary struggles in unprecedented situations. There were no ready-made formulas of Marxism-Leninism to follow. Marxist-Leninist propositions could be applied only to the concrete, historical conditions of these struggles. Kim Il Sung's revolutionary idea of *Juche* is a typical example of the creative application and development of Marxism-Leninism. It is because of this that his idea has led the Korean revolution to victory. He wrote:

I have read the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and the works of Stalin who directly led socialist economic construction. Further, I have studied the systems of economic planning in other countries. But no rational system of planning that suits the actual conditions of our country was found either in the classical works of Marxism-Leninism or in books written by others. There was no alternative for us but to complete our own system of planning for our country so that the general theories of Marxism-Leninism on planning might suit the realities of our country.¹⁸

PART TWO

Revolution in South Korea and Unification of Korea

The struggle of our people to drive the U.S. imperialist aggressors out of South Korea and unify the fatherland [wrote Kim Il Sung] is developing in close connection with the anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle which is being unfolded dynamically on a worldwide scale.

South Korea is not only a complete colony of the U.S. imperialists but also their military base for invading the whole of Korea and Asia, and our country is one of the fiercest battlefronts in the anti-imperialist struggle where we stand face to face with the chieftain of world imperialism. We must force the U.S. imperialist aggressors out of South Korea and accomplish the unification of the fatherland, thereby fulfilling our national and international duties.¹

Today, U.S. imperialism's occupation of South Korea and its artificial division of the country is the fundamental obstacle to the development of the revolution in South Korea on a nationwide scale and in a unified way. As a result, the differences between North and South Korea are gradually increasing—in politics, the economy, ideology, culture and in all other respects. The identity of national characteristics, formed through a long history, gradually is being obliterated.

The split keeps the Korean people from mobilizing and utilizing the country's resources and the people's abilities in a coordinated way for the development of their fatherland, and this causes great hardships to all the Korean people, but

particularly to the South Koreans. The only way to end these misfortunes and save the South Korean people is to drive the United States out of South Korea and eliminate their agents, carry out the South Korean revolution successfully and unify the fatherland.

The question of the South Korean revolution and the unification of the fatherland is a new one, and there is no ready-made formula for its solution. An original development of Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics is required. Kim Il Sung has analyzed the situation in and around Korea and the balance of forces between the revolution and the counter-revolution, and he has presented the strategy and tactics for the South Korean revolution and for the unification of the fatherland, so as to reflect the strivings of the South Korean people.

The basis of the strategy and tactics is the *Juche* principle of assuming responsibility for the revolution in our own country and of carrying out the revolution ourselves for the all-Korean victory against U.S. imperialism.

CHAPTER I

U.S. Imperialism in South Korea and the Pak Chung Hi Regime

Kim Il Sung concretely analyzed the colonial aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism against South Korea and the realities of its society, which still remains colonial and semi-feudal. He also exposed the real nature of the South Korean "regime" as a mere tool of the United States for its aggressive policy.

As a result of the long occupation, the United States controls all power in South Korea. The U.S. ambassador rules South Korea as its virtual "governor general"; its politics, military affairs, economy, culture and all other domains are under American colonial domination. The people are oppressed. And the Pak Chung Hi regime is a puppet serving U.S. imperialism — a traitorous, subordinate, anti-people and reactionary regime.

The United States has turned South Korea into an aggressive, military base as a link in the chain of its general military strategic plan for world domination. It intends to perpetuate the division of the Korean nation.

To carry out this policy, the United States has reorganized socio-economic relations in South Korea along the same lines as under Japanese imperialist rule, but with certain different features. The feudal landlord system still dominates the countryside, preserved, strengthened and protected by the United States. The feudal exploitation of the peasants by landlords is closely linked to colonial plunder by U.S. imperialism, creating a decisive obstacle to the development of South Korean agriculture.

Further, U.S. imperialism protects and fosters comprador capitalists in various ways and at the same time blocks independent development of the national economy, precipitating national capital down the road to bankruptcy and ruin.

These colonial-capitalist and feudal production relations are a major obstacle to the social development of South Korea. Because of U.S. imperialism, the people, beginning with the workers and peasants, have been hurled into intolerable starvation and poverty, are completely deprived of political freedom and enjoy no rights.

1. CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. IMPERIALIST DOMINATION OF SOUTH KOREA

The U.S. imperialists have enforced the most reactionary, colonial-military, fascist rule in South Korea for over 20 years. They have converted it into an absolute colony and military base for aggression and have plunged the South Korean people into a living hell where poverty and hunger, terrorism and massacre prevail. All sorts of brutalities, committed by the U.S. imperialists in the southern half of our country ever since its Liberation, have left a disgraceful page in the aggressive history of modern imperialism.²

After World War II, the U.S. imperialists supplanted the Japanese as the new colonial rulers of South Korea. The main purpose of U.S. domination is to turn South Korea into a military base for aggression not only against the northern half of the Republic but also against the socialist camp in Asia. To this end, it developed a series of specific policies to reorganize the society, economy, ideology and culture of South Korea. This was done through its "military government," which continued for two years and nine months after the Liberation.

Immediately after the Liberation, the South Korean people, like the North Koreans, overthrew the machinery of Japanese imperialism and established people's committees as their

own organs of power. However, immediately upon landing in South Korea in September 1945, the U.S. imperialists declared that they were going to establish a "military government," and ordered people's committees and other organs of sovereignty disbanded. They hoisted a sign "U.S. Military Government" to replace "Government General of Korea," and took all power.

Then the U.S. military suppressed the patriotic democratic forces of South Korea on the one hand, and gathered together reactionary forces to support the colonial domination, on the other. Many of the reactionaries were traitorous pro-Japanese who had been exploiting and plundering the Korean people in collusion with the Japanese imperialists, and others were pro-Americans whom the United States had been supporting for a long time. The central figure of the latter was Syngman Rhee.*

When, in May 1948, the United States finally held the "separate elections," they cooked up the Syngman Rhee puppet regime, ignoring the will of the Korean people for the establishment of an independent and sovereign state. They intended to carry out "indirect domination" through this regime while at the same time spreading the illusion among the people that they had been given "independence" instead of the "Government General" of Japanese imperialism. Needless to say, the "government of the Republic of Korea," which they cooked up, was essentially a continuation of U.S. military government, its policies merely an unmodified continuation of the policies of the U.S. military occupation and domination.

The United States has concluded over 60 treaties and agreements with the South Korean puppet regime from 1948 to the present in order to legalize its domination over South Korea, supported by domestic laws formulated by the puppet regime.

*Known in Korea as Li Sung Man, Syngman Rhee had been kept in Hawaii for many decades as a reserve puppet of U.S. imperialism.

The most important are the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the ROK-U.S. Administrative Agreement and the ROK-U.S. Economic and Technical Agreement.

On this legal basis the U.S. Embassy was established in the Republic of Korea, as well as the U.S. Military Command, U.S. International Development Agency, U.S. Information Center and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. These agencies are used to maintain domination over the South Korean puppet regime. And since the U.S. Embassy is actually the supreme authority over all phases of life in South Korea, the legislative and administrative organs labeled "Republic of Korea," such as the Government and the National Assembly, are only formal institutions under the direct control of the United States, their activities fully controlled from planning to execution.

For instance, according to the ROK-U.S. Economic and Technical Agreement, the United States is in a position to "check and reexamine without reservation all projects and related documents" of the puppet regime and may also "decide the nature and scope of each project." Further, this agreement makes it obligatory for the puppet government to "provide complete information required by the U.S. Government." Likewise, the U.S. Economic Development Agency has the right to "prior examination" of all the materials and reports from the puppet government concerning the compilation of the national budget to the puppet National Assembly debate on the budget. Not only that, the imperialists have the right to "post-factum examination," that is, to revise a bill that has already been approved by the puppet National Assembly. Thus even the national budget, which is the financial basis of the government's activities, is under the complete control of the United States and without its consent, the puppet government can make no decision at all.

Further, under the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the ROK-U.S. Administrative Agreement and other arrangements,

the United States is vested with the power to use the territory, territorial waters and air space of South Korea as an extension of U.S. territory. For instance, the United States is free to deploy its army and its naval forces within the territory of the Republic of Korea at any time, in any number and in any place and, furthermore, the United States even enjoys "extraterritorial rights" in South Korea.

U.S. imperialism subjugates South Korea not only politically but also militarily. The United States installed military bases in the name of "joint defense," deploying over 60,000 U.S. troops in various parts of the country, and it has some 600,000 South Korean troops as local mercenaries under its command. According to the Taejon Agreement and also the ROK-U.S. Administrative Agreement, the U.S. Military Command controls the puppet army, from the defense budget to the internal life of the "national army," so that they are not allowed to use even a drop of gasoline, let alone arms and ammunition, without the consent of the U.S. Military Command.

The fact that over 50,000 South Korean troops have already been mobilized for the aggressive war in Vietnam will suffice to show the real nature of the puppet "national army."

Moreover, U.S. imperialism places South Korea under its control economically. "Aid" is the main means used for aggression against South Korea and for plundering it. It is classified roughly into "military aid" and "economic aid." Between 1945 and 1968, about \$13 billion in "aid" was poured into South Korea, of which about \$4.2 billion was for "economic aid," and the rest for "military aid," used directly to equip the 600,000 puppet troops with aircraft, tanks, firearms and other weapons. "Economic aid" was used to mobilize the South Korean economy for U.S. military aggression and for colonial plunder through manipulation of the so-called "collateral funds" and other funds—particularly to maintain the puppet armed forces and to obtain revenue for military spending. Thus military and economic aid are complementary.

The U.S. imperialists make the puppet government include "aid funds" in the budgetary system in the form of "collateral funds," assuring complete controls over the budget and enabling the puppet government to obtain revenue for military spending.

With respect to defense spending, a large part of which is comprised of the maintenance costs (salaries, etc.) of the puppet armed forces, the collateral funds included in the revenue of the budget reach about 40 to 50 per cent of the total revenue and military expenditures account for about 60 to 70 per cent of total budget expenditures. The difference is made up by tax revenues. In other words, U.S. imperialism is dumping its weapons and other surpluses on the South Korean people, paid for out of the funds of the puppet regime, while the deficit is covered by taxes levied on the South Korean people. Thus "aid" is a means of supplying and raising funds for maintaining cheap local mercenaries serving U.S. imperialism.

Furthermore, since 1958 the U.S. imperialists, as a result of the deepening of the dollar crisis, have been reducing "aid."

However, while cutting back, since 1959 they have been resorting to credit to supplement their domination. At the end of 1968, the amount of credits had already reached \$588,480,000 in 159 cases, including both government and private. Credit, though different in form, is essentially the same as "aid" in that its aim is to control the South Korean economy and mobilize to a maximum its military potential at the expense of the interests of the people. Furthermore, since the effectuation of the ROK-Japan Treaty in 1965, the United States has been drawing Japanese monopoly capital into South Korea in an attempt to continue its own domination over South Korea even if it means turning it into a dual colony of the United States and Japan.

The United States controls not only the budget of South Korea but also over 30 per cent of the funds financed, monop-

olizes 70 to 80 per cent of raw material supplies and 80 per cent of South Korean imports, thus establishing a system by which it can directly control and plunder individual enterprises.

The United States also attempts to control South Korea ideologically and culturally. The imperialists use the U.S. Information Center in the Republic of Korea as their base of operation to launch an offensive to benumb the national and class consciousness of the people, instill anti-communist and pro-American ideas and to spread the so-called American way of life to facilitate colonial domination. While suppressing progressive ideas and organizations, efforts are made to spread reactionary ideas and set up cultural organizations. Films, newspapers, magazines, publications and broadcasts are utilized fully. Further, the educational system is organized in this direction.

In connection with the U.S. imperialist domination we must not overlook the reinvasion of South Korea by Japanese militarism. On this subject, Kim Il Sung says: "The Japanese militarists, dreaming of regaining their old position, have started worming their way into South Korea again with the backing of U.S. imperialism, and they appeared on the stage as a dangerous force of aggression."³

Following the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, Japanese militarists seriously have been attempting to invade South Korea in the areas of politics, military affairs, the economy, ideology and culture. They have an embassy to which they dispatch military attachés. They are investing "aid funds" in South Korea at an annual rate of \$30 million, a total of \$50 million in the name of "property claim funds," and the amount of government and private credits totaled about \$410,380,000 at the end of 1968. Japan ranks second only to the United States in the amount of government credits granted to South Korea, and exceeds the United States in the amount of private credits.

However, this does not change the fact that while remaining the real ruler of South Korea, it was the United States that brought about the ROK-Japan treaty, helping to revive Japanese militarism, and invited Japan into South Korea. Obviously, the intent of U.S. imperialism was to save its Far Eastern strategy and its system of colonial domination in South Korea from a direct crisis—a crisis which found concrete expression in the collapse of the Syngman Rhee regime as a result of the popular uprising of April 1960, and other internal developments. The purpose was to reinforce the domination of South Korea by U.S. imperialism. Therefore, the steps toward joint colonialization of South Korea by the United States and Japan do not signify that the former means to give Japan an equal footing, but intends to keep it as a junior partner to bolster its own dominant position in South Korea. The result, however, is to raise an additional—and ominous—threat for the Korean people. Although a component part of the U.S. system of command, the participation of Japanese armed forces in joint operations with the puppet ROK forces, as provided for in the ROK-Japan treaty, brings the threat sharply home.

In the realm of political domination the Japanese are also active. There are yen as well as dollar collateral funds, signifying Japan's role in South Korean affairs, although the yen funds serve to make up for a decrease in the dollar collateral funds (used for military purposes, it should be noted) following the dollar crisis and the consequent reduction of U.S. "aid."

Similarly, Japanese credits are granted as a link in the chain of measures for the militarization of the South Korean economy as required by U.S. policy, and are placed under the control of the United States. Consequently, Japanese monopoly capital is permitted to have a share of the hunting ground in exchange for its positive service to the U.S. policy of colonizing South Korea and turning it into a military base. In this way,

the reinvasion by Japanese expansionists, thus far at any rate, is fused with and basically reinforces domination established by the United States, in politics, military affairs and the economy. But as the revival of Japanese monopoly capital and militarism proceeds, Japanese imperialism may be expected to attempt a more direct role in East Asia.

"After occupying South Korea," wrote Kim Il Sung, "the U.S. imperialists partially reorganized the social and economic relations of South Korea in order to create a basis more favorable for their colonial domination."⁴

Colonial domination by the United States is based on the old reactionary social and economic system, reorganized to facilitate American requirements. Essentially, the socio-economic relations, even as modified by U.S. imperialism, retain the colonial and semi-feudal characteristics which existed under Japanese rule. There are three types of the economy: capitalist, feudal, and small-scale commodity production. Actually, changes in class relations effected in connection with the reorganization have resulted in a further intensification of socio-economic contradictions.

The basic class composition remains essentially the same as under Japanese imperialism; capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, as well as petty-bourgeois in urban areas and reactionary bureaucrats serving the colonization policy of the United States. The capitalist class consists of comprador capitalists and national capitalists; the peasantry of rich farmers, medium and poor peasants, and hired peasants; and the urban petty-bourgeoisie includes handicraftsmen and small merchants.

While retaining the class composition basically intact, the United States reorganized it to a certain extent to suit the new historical conditions. Class supporters were recruited as U.S. agents, while at the same time measures were taken to sidetrack the revolutionary advance of the working masses. This

was accompanied by a series of changes that had not been observed under Japanese imperialist rule.

The United States made serious efforts to foster comprador capitalists in order to dispose of the surplus commodities produced at home, to help private monopoly capitalists export capital to South Korea and to procure a part of military supplies locally. A main lever was the "sale of enemy assets" to comprador capitalists; they were also accorded monopoly rights in the purchase and sale of "aid" goods as well as preferential treatment in financing "government" loans. Later, under conditions of reduced "aid," introduction of foreign capital into South Korea served as a shot in the arm to the compradors. In this way, their ranks, insignificant in the days of Japanese imperialist rule, today have grown into ten major financial groups, comprised of about 500 entrepreneurs clustered around top comprador capitalists. They now occupy a leading position in the key industries.

As soon as they occupied South Korea, the U.S. imperialists issued Military Ordinance No. 2, by which they took possession of all the public and private assets held by Japanese imperialism—both movable and fixed—as "enemy assets." These "enemy assets" were made with the sweat and blood of the Korean people and should have been returned to them immediately after the Liberation. These assets, according to an official announcement made in those days, were tremendous, amounting to as much as 80 per cent of the total assets of South Korea. By taking over all these "enemy assets," the United States was able to control the main arteries of the South Korean economy at one stroke.

Renamed "returned assets" in May 1948 as soon as the puppet regime was cooked up, they came under the control of that regime, at least in form. Now they were fully utilized by the U.S. occupation authorities as a lever to colonize the South Korean economy. Those necessary for colonizing South Korea and converting it into a military base were renamed "state-run

enterprises" or were "sold" to comprador capitalists; others, considered unnecessary, were destroyed.

The "returned assets" were "sold" to compradors for next to nothing, at a price less than one-tenth of market value, and the payment was to be made in equal installments spaced over 10 to 15 years. Further, spiraling currency inflation made the sale of "returned assets" little different from distribution without compensation. The industrial enterprises sold to compradors were mostly light manufacturing, particularly flour milling and textile plants. This is closely related to the fact that farm surpluses given South Korea as aid were mostly wheat and raw cotton, and it was intended to have the compradors process them. Consequently, the comprador capitalists were supported by trade and also by engagement in light industries, particularly the "three whites"—flour milling, sugar refining and cotton spinning. As the number of comprador capitalists developed under Japanese rule was limited, some "returned assets" were also sold to landlords who were thus turned into compradors.

In this way, by the end of 1958, about 92 per cent of 2,203 enterprises, in the form of "returned assets," had been sold to private entrepreneurs. Further, U.S. imperialists today are helping compradors to expand their business operations from light to heavy and chemical industries with the aid of foreign capital. This, too, is basically a link in the chain of measures for militarizing the economy and for placing it firmly on a war-time footing.

During the last ten years, U.S. monopoly corporations have directly invested their capital in enterprises in the textile, electronic, and other industries in South Korea. In these enterprises the Korean people are compelled to work at starvation wages and under colonial conditions, while the U.S. monopolies boast of reaping profits of 1,000 per cent and more. The goods produced in these factories are almost all for export to the United States and other countries. They claim the aim is

to develop South Korea, but, in fact, they are only stealing the labor power of the people for their own profit. Also, in such enterprises, important war goods are produced for use in aggression against the Vietnamese and other peoples.

On the countryside, the feudal system of exploitation, favorable for colonial domination and plunder, has been basically preserved. The "land reform" was no more than a fraudulent measure to appease the demand of the South Korean peasants for land, which had been stimulated by the land reform carried out in the northern half of the Republic. Even after enforcement of the "land reform" in South Korea, feudal relations of exploitation continued to dominate the countryside, and the landholdings of peasants became smaller. About 100,000 landlords account for 40 per cent of the total arable land, on which they exploit 1,400,000 peasant households. Land rentals in kind reach as much as 50 to 60 per cent of the harvest.

In this way, the landlords and compradors are identified with colonial domination by U.S. imperialism and provide a class support for it.

Having established a system of domination, the U.S. imperialists are foisting an unprecedented, barbarous military dictatorship on the South Korean people. There is a police force of about 160,000 men, augmented by 400,000 special political agents. Some 32,000 bureaucrats are directly or indirectly in collusion with the ruling circles of the United States and with the landlords and compradors, serving to maintain the colonial, semifeudal society by directing and enforcing traitorous policies. All these factors are major obstacles to the development of the South Korean economy and the democratization of its social life.

In supporting comprador capitalists and protecting the feudal landlord system, the method used by the United States differed from that employed by the Japanese. The latter openly had supported the tenant system in Korea and main-

tained big landlord exploitation. The United States maintains feudal exploitation but emphasizes medium and small landlords. It continues the basic system, although with modification, as we shall see, because:

First, it wants to utilize the landlord class and the comprador capitalists to strengthen colonial rule, particularly as a base for suppressing the revolutionary forces in the countryside. In South Korea, a backward agricultural area, the overwhelming majority of the population is engaged on the land.

Second, even from a backward agriculture the United States can obtain, on the spot, foodstuffs and other crops needed for aggression and war. Further, the system hastens the pauperization of the peasantry and increases the number of "underemployed," who can be enlisted more easily into the puppet army. Thus, the system forces the peasantry to carry a larger military burden.

Third, the system maintains feudal production relations, thus restricting the development of agricultural productive forces and provides conditions favorable for the disposal of U.S. farm surpluses.

To this end, the United States and its puppets carried out the fraudulent "land reform" in October 1950 to reorganize the feudal relations of landownership. By it, landlords were allowed to possess legally a restricted but considerable area of land for their own cultivation. Land was distributed to about 1,550,000 farming households with compensation, but it amounted to only 490,000 *chongbo* (or about 32.5 per cent) of the total area of 1,447,359 *chongbo* that was cultivated by tenant peasants under the Japanese.

Forests, wasteland, reclaimed land and river embankments were excepted from the land reform, and landlords were allowed to retain these areas without limit. In exchange for the land purchased from them, the United States issued to landlords securities with which to purchase "returned assets"; thus some landlords became comprador capitalists. The end

result was to retain the landlord system, although in a somewhat hidden form, with medium and small landlords as the core.

Not only were high prices set on land distributed to cultivators, but land taxes and an irrigation tax and other taxes were levied on the newly created landholders. These taxes proved an unbearable burden on the peasants, and they were compelled to sell their land. Thus, more than 40 per cent of the distributed land was reclaimed by the landlords and rich farmers. As a result, some 1.2 million peasant households, about 50 per cent of the total number of peasant households in South Korea, work as tenants and have to turn over to the landlords 50 to 60 per cent of their harvests as land rentals in kind. Further, peasants are being squeezed at a high annual interest rate of 70 to 100 per cent by moneylenders. In South Korea, poor peasants till only 0.2 to 0.5 of a *chongbo* of land, and are small-scale commodity producers.

The poor peasants, along with hired rural proletarians, account for 73.3 per cent of the total farming households of South Korea, but the land they cultivate is only 45 per cent of total arable land. The poor peasants, who also work as hired laborers, are semi-proletarians who suffer from increasing exploitation and are going bankrupt. Thus the landlords, maintaining their dominant position in the countryside, are the basic exploiters as well as the main agents of U.S. imperialism.

Nationally owned economy, outside the direct grip of U.S. imperialism and its compradors, is in a state of decline. The national capitalists, of whom there are some 50,000, are robbed by foreign monopolists and compradors, and suffer from lack of funds, materials and markets. Their factories and plants are operating at the average annual rate of about 40 to 50 per cent of capacity, and every year over 1,000 enterprises close down. In addition, the South, once called the granary of Korea, is in a state of chronic starvation, importing annually several million *suk* of rice. Several million people are jobless or partially employed.

The national culture, mores and customs of the Korean people are being trampled underfoot, and the decadent American way of life is destroying the fiber of South Korean society.

2. REAL NATURE OF THE PAK CHUNG HI REGIME

In the light of the U.S. role in South Korea—its colonial, military-fascist control which it is trying to conceal by stressing the “independence” of the puppet regime—it is of special importance to understand the real nature of that regime.

The Korean people are a single nation and have only one state and one government [says Kim Il Sung]. The only state of the Korean nation is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the government of the DPRK alone represents the real national interests and will of all the people of North and South Korea. The so-called “Republic of Korea” is a puppet regime which can never represent the South Korean people nor exercise any sovereignty.⁵

The DPRK differs from the puppet regime of South Korea in that, first, the government of the Republic is patriotic and anti-imperialist, whereas that of South Korea is traitorous. The Republic is led by patriotic revolutionary fighters who have fought against foreign aggressors for the liberation and independence of the fatherland. The successive rulers of South Korea have been, without exception, stooges fostered by the U.S. and Japanese imperialists who have sold the country and the nation to their masters. As for the present rulers who form the South Korean puppet regime today, they are also traitors who have betrayed the country and the people.

While Korean communists, led by Kim Il Sung, waged a bloody 15-year war against Japanese imperialism, the present South Korean rulers swore allegiance to the enemy. They are traitors who suppressed and murdered the revolutionaries and patriots who fought the Japanese. And, after the defeat of Japanese imperialism, they changed their master and became the faithful lackeys of the United States.

While the DPRK is a sovereign and independent power, South Korea is an out-and-out colonial and dependent country. All domestic and foreign external policies of the Republic reflect the national interests and will of the Korean people and encompass the principles of political independence, economic self-reliance and military self-defense. In contrast, U.S. domination is firmly established in the politics, military affairs, ideology and culture of South Korea, and the puppet regime is merely a compliant tool for their policy of war.

The Republic has a genuine people's government which represents and defends the interests of working people—workers and peasants—whereas puppet South Korea is anti-people and reactionary, representing the interests of landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats. The power of the DPRK is made up of representatives of the people, and government bodies at all levels include legitimate representatives of the people, elected by secret ballot on the principle of democratic and direct election.

In the puppet regime of South Korea reactionary bureaucrats, spokesmen for the landlords and comprador capitalists, occupy leading positions; they are allied closely with the U.S. imperialists, whose interests they serve. The South Korean regime does not include even one representative of workers or peasants but is made up only of reactionaries and exploiters. For example, the First National Assembly (May 1948) consisted of landlords (42.4 per cent), comprador capitalists (16.2 per cent), reactionary bureaucrats (21.7 per cent), representatives of cultural and religious organizations (7.6 per cent), and others (12.1 per cent). In the Fourth National Assembly (May 1958), the proportion of landlords was reduced to 12.4 per cent and that of comprador capitalists was increased to 38.6 per cent, but the basic composition remained unchanged. The composition of the Seventh National Assembly (June 1967) of the Pak Chung Hi regime is 4.6 per cent landlords, 28.0 per cent comprador capitalists, 32.0 per cent reac-

tionary bureaucrats, 5.7 per cent “political merchants” and 29.7 per cent military and others. The great importance of the military in the present setup reflects the political direction of U.S. imperialism—a strengthened military-fascist system.

The United States began preparing for a new war in Korea before the ink on the armistice agreement of 1953 was dry. War preparations were stepped up after President Johnson visited Korea and emphasized the “position of strength” policy in October 1966, and particularly after the *Pueblo* incident. At that time, the Pak Chung Hi regime, to keep pace with the maneuvers of the United States, increased the strength of the puppet army, improved its equipment, and took measures to make it combat-ready and put it on a wartime footing. The regime called up reserves, suspended the demobilization of army officers and men, lengthened the term of military service and took various other “emergency” measures. It increased the strength of the army by one division and formed a “motorized attack battalion” for each of the 10 reserve divisions, placing them under army headquarters. At the same time 2,620,000 civilians were recruited into what is called the “native land reserve forces” to reinforce the puppet army.

The United States and the Pak Chung Hi regime, while preparing South Korea for war, are carrying out vicious war provocations and armed attacks on the North more and more openly. The number of provocations is increasing. Between the armistice and April 20, 1968 there were over 54,800 incidents on land, some 990 on the sea, and over 730 in the air. The number rose sharply after the *Pueblo* affair, with 8,400 incidents and over 194,000 rounds of ammunition shot into the northern half of the Republic between capture of the *Pueblo* and October 20, 1968.

In addition, the wartime general mobilization setup was tightened. Fascist laws were passed to implement the military dictatorship. The Pak Chung Hi gang, in 1967, cooked up an

“election” for president and for the national assembly, resulting in a so-called “legislative organ” dominated by the military and comprising comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats. In 1968, the army succeeded in putting military-fascists in almost all the top official posts and in all important law enforcement and police posts. The puppet police have been placed on a sub-wartime footing, and terror and violence increase as they are being equipped with new weapons.

Since the start of the Pak Chung Hi regime, the budget for military spending has risen more than four times, and government investments in military industries have been increasing. As a result of the militarization of the economy, which is being effected in the name of modernization, some industrial sectors directly related to military uses, such as telecommunication, road construction, railways, port and harbor facilities, are growing and the military potential is being increased further.

To obtain funds for the militarization of the economy, the ROK government actively encourages foreign investment and as a result the South Korean economy is more and more dependent on foreign capital. Actual foreign investments in South Korea reached \$1,508,120,000 by the end of 1968; if “approved” cases are included, the total was \$1,850,000,000. A large part is invested in roads, railways, telecommunications, power, ports and harbor construction and airports to increase the mobility of the armed forces, as well as in strategic industries such as oil refining, cement, fertilizer, power and construction. The dependence of the economy became more marked particularly after the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, as militarization accentuated subordination of South Korea to both U.S. and Japanese monopoly capital.

Because of the contradictions inherent in it, militarization deepens the crisis of the economy, which is reflected in the foreign currency shortage, the collapse of medium and small enterprises, and the devastation of agriculture.

While according all kinds of preferential treatment to the

compradors, the Pak Chung Hi regime prevents national capital from obtaining funds and taxes it heavily. Under these circumstances, medium and small enterprises, which comprise 98.3 per cent of the total, are finding it very hard to survive. In 1968 alone, 157 enterprises closed down in South Chungchong province, over 140 in Kyonggi province, 150 in Seoul. In North Kyongsang province, 82 per cent of the total number of medium and small enterprises and in South Kyongsang province two-thirds suspended or went out of business.

Despite slogans of “agriculture first,” and “modernization” coined by Pak Chung Hi and his clique, agriculture is falling into a most serious kind of bankruptcy. On top of effects of policies already described, because of the great drought in two successive years, the 1968 crops were very meager, in some areas decreasing 80 to 90 per cent. In South Cholla province, 80 per cent of all acreage under cultivation was affected. Crops in Kangjin, Hwasun and Haenam, in the same province, were totally destroyed.

In view of all this, it is a wonder the South Korean people can stay alive. According to a survey by the Economic Planning Board, the average monthly living cost for a family of five in the cities of South Korea is 23,530 *won*; the average monthly wage of workers in the manufacturing industries was only 7,730 *won* in November 1968.*

Almost all workers barely manage to live, earning wages less than one-fourth or one-third of the cost of living. There is an 8-hour work day at only 43.3 per cent of all mining and manufacturing industries of South Korea; up to 12 hours at 23.3 per cent and more than 12 hours at 33.4 per cent, according to a survey by the ROK Industrial Health Association, as reported by the March 9, 1968 issue of the *Kyonghyang Shinmun*. Thus South Korean workers are exhausted, physically

*About \$25 at the official buying rate of 305 South Korean *won* per dollar, considerably less at the black market rate.

and mentally, many toiling as long as 12 or 15 hours a day in poor working conditions and subjected to speed-up. For instance, in the first five months of 1968 alone, 11,500 labor accidents were reported, involving 11,700 workers, of which 158 were killed, a two-fold increase over the comparable period of the previous year.

The conditions of the peasantry are also beyond description. Even according to conservative figures released by the puppet regime, more than four million peasants were hit by drought in South Korea in 1968, of whom 2.6 million were said to be so hard hit that they were unable to lead even a hand-to-mouth existence. In the Ryongnam and Honam districts, where the peasants were hit hard by the drought in 1968—as they were in the previous year—98 per cent of all peasant households had no grain stock. In September and October when they harvested grain, two million peasant households, accounting for 80 per cent of the total farming households in South Korea, were suffering from the shortage of food. It is estimated that the number of peasants who left their villages in a vain search for other means of livelihood reached 30 per cent of all the peasants. It is also reported that over 300,000 rural students are dropping out of school to go to work in larger cities.

All this shows [Kim Il Sung points out] that the actual rulers, holding real power in South Korea, are no less than the U.S. imperialists themselves. The so-called “Republic of Korea” has been in existence, to all intents and purposes, as a camouflage to “legalize” the military occupation and cloak colonial rule and has served as a faithful instrument in the execution of the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism.⁶

CHAPTER II

Tasks and Methods of the South Korean Revolution

The South Korean revolution is an important component part of the Korean revolution, a revolution to liberate the southern half of Korea and two-thirds of the population still under foreign domination. Kim Il Sung made a scientific analysis of the concrete socio-economic and class relations in South Korea and the development of the revolution, and on this basis, he formulated a strategic and tactical line for the South Korean revolution.

The South Korean revolution is an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution. The main target of struggle is U.S. imperialism, and the main link in the chain of struggle against it is to frustrate the invasion maneuvers of Japanese militarism. In addition, the struggle against domestic counter-revolutionaries allied with U.S. imperialism is important in undermining the influence of imperialism and leading to victory of the revolution.

The motivating force of the South Korean revolution is the working class and its allies—peasants, youths, students, intellectuals, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and even national capitalists. The policy for carrying out the South Korean revolution is based on the principle that all struggles are part of the battle for the seizure of power and that victory in the decisive battle can be achieved only by revolutionary violence. This principle is derived from the historical fact that no colonial rulers or reactionary governments have ever voluntarily surrendered power without being overthrown by

revolutionary violence, and also from the realities of U.S.-ruled South Korea. In addition, to win people's power, it is necessary to meet counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary violence and to smash the domination of U.S. imperialism to achieve freedom and liberation.

1. REVOLUTIONARY TASKS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE

The occupation of South Korea by U.S. imperialism and its aggressive policy [writes Kim Il Sung] is the source of all misery and suffering of the compatriots in the South. The South Korean people should fight more stubbornly to oppose the occupation of South Korea by U.S. imperialism, smash its colonial rule and overthrow its stooges—the landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats.¹

The colonial social, political and economic systems in South Korea, established by the United States, hinder the development of society and national unification. They ruin the economy and force the people into the depths of misery, fomenting sharp social and class contradictions. The basic contradiction in South Korea at the present stage is between U.S. imperialism, landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats, on the one hand, and the workers, peasants, urban petty-bourgeoisie and national capitalists, on the other.

The basic task of the South Korean revolution is to liquidate U.S. domination, to guarantee the democratic development of South Korean society and to achieve national unification with the socialist forces of North Korea. The targets of the revolution are the aggressive forces of the United States, and the landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats who are allied with it.

Thus, the South Korean revolution at the present stage is an

anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution to carry out the tasks of an anti-imperialist national liberation revolution and an anti-feudal democratic revolution.

To solve the complex contradictions existing in South Korean society, there have to be two revolutionary stages—the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. However, these two stages are not clearly delineated nor are they independent of each other: they are two stages in the continuing development of the revolution.

When all the factors of the South Korean revolution are thus defined, the next question posed is: What strategic line should be taken to effect the revolution? Kim Il Sung, defining U.S. imperialism as the main target of struggle, said: "In order for the Korean people to win freedom and liberation, it is necessary for them to drive out the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism and smash the landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats who are their allies."²

Directing the spearhead of struggle against U.S. imperialism is part of the strategic plan to accelerate the general collapse of the counter-revolutionary forces and hasten the victory of the revolution by isolating the main enemy and concentrating attacks on it. This strategic policy is related to the fact that the basic contradictions in South Korean society are complex and there is no single target.

The basic contradictions consist of two component parts: (1) the contradiction between U.S. imperialism and the South Korean people and (2) the contradiction between the landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary bureaucrats, on the one hand, and the people, on the other.

However, the two component parts have different roles to play; but occupying the most important position and playing a decisive role is U.S. imperialism. The puppet "regime" is wholly dependent on the United States; in itself it is very weak politically, economically and militarily. Consequently the main strategic attack should be toward driving out this

dominating force. Only if attacks are made on the U.S. aggressors and on the comprador capitalists at the same time will it be possible to overthrow the imperialist forces and destroy the counter-revolutionary forces. It is also necessary to struggle against the feudal forces if they are also to be eliminated.

Following the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, the Japanese militarists have made substantial inroads in South Korea. Under direction of the United States, they are in collusion with reactionary forces of South Korea to exploit and plunder the people. Thus we cannot relax our struggle against the Japanese militarists.

Referring to the struggle against revived and armed Japanese imperialism as part of the struggle against U.S. imperialism, Kim Il Sung said:

It is important, in the struggle of the South Korean people for national independence and unification, to shatter the aggressive schemes of Japanese militarism. . . .

All South Korean patriots must wage a decisive struggle to abrogate the "ROK-Japan Treaty" and frustrate any aggressive designs by the Japanese militarist forces against South Korea. This struggle is, at the same time, part of the struggle against U.S. colonial domination.³

Only after the U.S. forces and their agents are overthrown and reinvasion by Japanese militarism is prevented can the South Korean people win freedom and liberation.

Another problem in connection with the South Korean revolution is to formulate a correct strategic policy to mobilize all the revolutionary forces in such a manner that they have maximum effect. Only in this way can the revolutionary forces achieve overwhelming superiority in the balance of forces between the revolution and the enemy, and can the counter-revolutionary forces be routed.

The South Korean people must carry out the revolution at the present stage on their own, with a perspective of an uninterrupted revolution; the people of the northern half of

the Republic are not in a position to fight for the South Korean people, in their place, although they can aid their southern brothers. This principle should be the basis for struggle, once the balance of class forces in South Korea, their circumstances and political attitudes to the revolution, are analyzed scientifically.

The workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, national capitalists and others—all may be part of the motive power of the revolution, even though there are certain differences among them affecting the relation of forces and in their political attitudes. In defining the main force of the revolution and its auxiliary forces Kim Il Sung said:

By the main force of the revolution is meant the basic class that can be mobilized in the revolution, and the Marxist-Leninist party must be deeply rooted in it. Only when the main classes of the society, workers and peasants, are mobilized under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party can a revolution triumph.⁴

Thus the Marxist-Leninist party in South Korea should be strengthened as a mass party deeply rooted among the workers and peasants. Today, the working class of South Korea is the most revolutionary class, fighting for the victory of the revolution in South Korea. It is part of the revolutionary Korean working class that fought so bravely in the anti-Japanese national liberation struggle.

Simultaneously, it is of decisive significance to organize the peasantry as a main contingent of the South Korean revolution. The peasantry comprises 65 per cent of the total population of South Korea: 95 per cent of the farming population are working peasants and 77 per cent are poor or hired. They are doubly or triply exploited and oppressed. There has been a worker-peasant alliance since the 1930's and peasants share with workers the most miserable social and class position.

The core of the South Korean revolution is the Marxist-Leninist party, armed with the revolutionary ideas of Kim Il Sung. The Party must be developed as the general staff of the

revolution and must lead the revolution if its growth and progress are to be expected. It is important, in building such a party, to form ranks of leading cadres and to expand and strengthen the ranks of the Party through practical struggles, to train and qualitatively improve the party with experienced revolutionary cadres. To improve the quality of Party members is an important factor in increasing the fighting capacity of the Party. The situation in South Korea demands it.

What is important, next, is to rally workers and peasants around mass organizations as well as around the Party. In this way, while a strong Marxist-Leninist party is built, a very effective contingent will be formed for the Korean revolution. In this respect, Kim Il Sung says:

The important task in organizing revolutionary forces in South Korea is to rally masses of people in all walks of life around a united front. South Korean intellectuals, youths, students, urban petty bourgeoisie, conscientious national bourgeoisie and all other people in all walks of life who cherish democracy, should be included in a united front.⁵

A united front is necessary to create conditions favorable for organizing the main contingent of the revolution. It can be the rallying point for broad masses, isolating the counter-revolutionary forces and weakening enemy attacks on the main forces of the revolution. Further, it can protect the revolutionary forces and expand and strengthen them. Such a united front also can create forces in support of the main contingent of the revolution. People in various walks of life cannot be the main force of the revolution, but when they work together with workers and peasants they become an important supplementary force that can deal a blow at the counter-revolutionary forces.

Consequently, it is necessary to consolidate the main force of the revolution and, at the same time, to concentrate on developing a united front to win various strata of the people to the side of the revolution.

At the present stage, the concepts that can be a basis for a coalition of different political forces are liquidation of U.S. imperialist colonial rule and establishment of people's power, democratization of South Korean society, and national unification. The basic policy of the Marxist-Leninist party is to increase the leading role of the Party and strengthen the worker-peasant alliance in forming the anti-American national salvation united front. As Kim Il Sung writes:

What is important next is to weaken the counter-revolutionary forces. To weaken the counter-revolutionary forces is synonymous with strengthening the revolutionary forces. It is necessary to concentrate every effort not only on strengthening the revolutionary forces but also on weakening the counter-revolutionary forces in politics, the economy, culture, military affairs and in all other areas.⁶

The army is the last stronghold of the ruling classes. The history of revolutions shows that when the army is on the side of the people, no ruling class can survive. At present, the officers of the South Korean Army are men of reactionary class origin, but the overwhelming majority of the soldiers and low-ranking officers are of working class and peasant origin. When the soldiers of the "National Army" become class conscious, the "National Army" of South Korea will be on the side of the revolution.

2. FORMS OF STRUGGLE IN THE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION

The South Korean people can wipe out the oppressors and attain genuine freedom and liberation only by their own determined struggle. The South Korean people should wage a struggle to drive the U.S. imperialists out of South Korea and demolish their colonial rule in close combination with the struggle to seize power, and should subordinate all forms of struggle to it. . . .

But whatever their forms, these struggles should all be preparatory to the decisive struggle for winning power, and this decisive struggle can be victorious only by using force.⁷

Kim Il Sung's perspective for the revolution is based not only on a scientific analysis of the present relations of forces between the revolution and the counter-revolution and on the prospect of the development of these relations. It is based also on a correct analysis of the peculiarities of the South Korean revolution as an important component of the all-Korea revolution as well as of the international situation in relation to the South Korean revolution.

The struggle to drive out the United States and overthrow its colonial rule is a sharp class battle between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. The strategy and tactics of this battle cannot be decided arbitrarily but is related to subjective and objective factors, particularly the resistance of the reactionary ruling classes. In order to retain their domination the reactionary classes take ruthless, suppressive measures against the people fighting for their freedom and liberation. Counter-revolutionary violence is the method the exploiting classes use to stay in power.

The United States, leader of world imperialism, is determined to maintain its rule in South Korea and to resort to any means to achieve domination over the northern half of the Republic and Asia. Actually, when faced with serious crises because of the heroic struggles of the South Korean people, the U.S. imperialists mobilized armed forces and took bloody and suppressive measures against the people. When the Syngman Rhee puppet regime was toppled by the April (1960) uprising of the South Korean people, the answer of the U.S. imperialists was to establish a nefarious military-fascist regime instead of getting out of South Korea. The people have to face counter-revolutionary violence even when they struggle for better living conditions and for the defense of their fundamental rights.

Under these conditions, it is foolish to think that the South Korean people can win power peacefully. This is what the people themselves think after their bitter experiences in the past 20-odd years. But this does not negate various other forms of struggle in the development and strengthening of revolutionary forces. Nor does it mean that the South Korean people should engage in leftist, adventurist struggles, because of an incorrect assessment of the balance of forces between themselves and the enemy. As the history of revolutionary struggle shows, adventurism only results in causing serious damage to the combined revolutionary forces and a retreat for the revolution. However, if one should fail to develop positive struggles, waiting for a favorable situation to be created, it would be difficult to accumulate revolutionary forces or to surmount a difficult phase in the course of the revolution.

Consequently, in order to develop revolutionary movements it is necessary to combine various forms of struggle, such as political and economic, legal and illegal, violent and non-violent, small-scale and large-scale, in keeping with the subjective and objective situation at different times, while maintaining strict vigilance against left and right deviations. And these struggles should be in preparation for a decisive battle or violent struggle for the conquest of power. This is all the more urgent in view of the complexity and difficulty of the South Korean revolution, as stressed by Kim Il Sung:

Many difficulties and obstacles are in store for the South Korean revolution. The complexity, difficulty and protracted nature of the South Korean revolution are a result of its occupation by the U.S. Army and its aggressive policy. . . . It is the concentration point and den of domestic reactionaries. . . . U.S. imperialism forms a counter-revolutionary force, joining hands with the domestic reactionary forces assembled there, and is opposed to the revolutionary forces.

Anti-communist ideas are deeply rooted in South Korea. . . . Not a few people are still deceived by the enemy's anti-communist propaganda. And this is a great obstacle to the development of the South Korean revolution.

Under these circumstances, the South Korean revolution has to be carried out under very difficult conditions and go through many twists and turns.⁸

The complexity and difficulty arise from the fact that the counter-revolutionary forces relatively are stronger in the balance of forces between the motive power of the revolution and the target of the revolution. This is due to the following three factors.

First, the occupation of South Korea by the U.S. Army and the U.S. policy of turning South Korea into a colony. The United States plunders South Korea as a market for surplus goods, as a supply base of strategic raw materials and a source of cheap labor power. It regards South Korea as a supply base for the occupation of all Korea, as a bridgehead for aggression against socialist countries and all of Asia, and as a strategic bastion for world domination. The United States will continue to make desperate efforts to perpetuate the occupation of South Korea and will never pull out on its own. Thus, South Korea is one of the sharpest anti-imperialist and anti-American fronts of struggle in the world.

Second, South Korea is a concentration point of domestic reaction. U.S. imperialism assembled domestic and foreign reactionaries in South Korea and fostered and protected them. As a result, in contrast to what happened in North Korea, the remnants of Japanese imperialism were not liquidated but were transformed into pro-American forces and increased. Furthermore, as North Korea strengthened the revolutionary struggles and dealt blows at reactionary elements, some landlords, comprador capitalists, pro-Japanese elements, traitors, vicious bureaucrats and fascists, fled to join the reactionary forces of South Korea. Then, too, not a few reactionaries returned from overseas. All these forces are being strengthened under the protection of U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism, as counter-revolutionary forces.

Third, anti-communist and pro-American ideas have a

certain effect on the South Korean people as a result of U.S. imperialism's propaganda. Japanese imperialism inculcated anti-communist ideas in the minds of the people for 36 years. The county had an overwhelming majority of petty bourgeois and cultural levels were very low. In addition, after the Liberation, the United States and its stooges further strengthened anti-communist propaganda. During the Fatherland Liberation War (1950-53) the people's army in South Korea tried to transform the ideology of the people in the liberated areas, but the effect was not significant—the time was very short. As a result, a large proportion of the South Korean people are deceived by anti-communist propaganda and duped by the policies of U.S. imperialism and its stooges. This underlines the importance of enlightening and revolutionizing the people.

However, historical experience shows that the revolution will triumph when the united people rise and fight. However difficult the revolutionary struggles of the South Korean people may be, they are not isolated; they are fighting under conditions far more favorable than when the Korean communists fought for 15 years against Japanese imperialism, which boastfully claimed invincibility. The communists had no state support and no regular army assistance, nor did they have as strong support as they have today from international revolutionary forces.

Today, the South Korean people have the powerful revolutionary base and enjoy the positive support of North Korea which, under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, considers it its duty to do all possible to render support to the southern brothers.

Unification of North and South

Premier Kim Il Sung set forth a firm principle of the Workers Party of Korea and the government of the Republic for the solution of the question of national unification and he also clarified the revolutionary strategic and tactical policy for its realization.

The basic policy is for the peaceful unification of the North and South of Korea on independent and democratic principles, without any interference from foreign forces after the United States has been driven out of South Korea. It embodies the *Juche* idea and a tactical line that can solve the question of national unification best.

Kim Il Sung presented a threefold position—to strengthen the forces of socialism in North Korea, gather revolutionary forces in South Korea, and to develop the international revolutionary movement and strengthen ties with it in order to achieve success. This tactical line of strengthening the three revolutionary forces also defines the interrelations among these forces and advances the principle of building the internal forces of North and South Korea, while strengthening solidarity with the international revolutionary force.

1. BASIC POLICY ON UNIFICATION

Since the first days of its formation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has advanced reasonable and concrete proposals to unify the country, expressing the unanimous will and desire of the entire Korean people, and it has exerted every possible effort to

implement these plans. The basic plan is for the North and South to unite independently without any interference from outside forces, following the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea. Our proposals for peaceful unification are fair and realistic, acceptable to all.¹

Kim Il Sung's policy as thus outlined is correct because, first, it is aimed at solving the question of unification on independent and democratic principles. Independence is the most important of the basic principles for unification. It is an embodiment of the *Juche* idea that the people of a country should assume full responsibility for their revolution and should carry out their revolution themselves. No one else must be allowed to interfere.

To solve the question of national unification by relying on external forces would be an illusion and lead to national suicide. This has been borne out by the experience of our country as well as by the historical experience of the national liberation struggles of many colonial and dependent countries.

The Korean people are certainly capable of solving the question of unification. Under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, the Korean people defeated Japanese imperialism and U.S. imperialism, which boasted that it was the "mightiest" in the world. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a socialist power independent in politics, self-reliant in its economy and self-protective in its national defense. Thus a decisive guarantee for national unification has already been provided.

Further, the *Juche* idea would solve the question of unification democratically and fairly. In solving problems of a nation, the yardstick of fairness is the general will of the people and their national interests. Where there is interference by an external force, the free will of a nation and its interests would be violated.

Neither the United Nations nor any external force can interfere in the question of unifying our country. In the past 20 or more years, the UN has been utilized by the United States

as a tool for aggression against Korea, and inasmuch as the flag of the UN was used by U.S. imperialism in its aggressive war against the Korean people, it has been degraded as a belligerent. Even today, in the name of the UN, the U.S. Army occupies South Korea, violating not only the national sovereignty of the Korean nation, interfering in the internal affairs of Korea and preventing unification, but also completely depriving the South Korean people of their political rights and freedoms.

There are no foreign troops in the northern half of the Republic. Consequently, withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea is a precondition for unification of the fatherland. Once this is done, the Workers Party of Korea proposes the principle of democracy as a basis for national unification. The question of unifying the fatherland is to be solved in a democratic way, according to the free will of the people. Referring to the principle of democracy, Kim Il Sung says: "When all foreign troops have been withdrawn and we are not subjected to any foreign interference, we shall be able to achieve national unification by holding a general election in North and South Korea on democratic principles and by establishing a unified central government."²

Today there are different social systems in the two parts of Korea. National unification thus presupposes the removal of political and economic barriers separating South from North Korea and establishment of a single social and economic system throughout the country. Both the question of unification and of what social and political system should be chosen can be decided entirely according to the will of the Korean people. This is the only fair way.

The Party and the government set forth two basic proposals to assure that the principle of democracy may be strictly observed in a North-South general election for national unification: first, the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea; second, the free passage of people between North and South Korea, democratization of South Korea, and guarantee

of free social and political activities—freedom of the press, publication, assembly and association must be guaranteed for all political parties, mass organizations and individuals in North and South Korea.

All inhabitants should have an equal right to vote and to eligibility in all parts of North and South Korea, irrespective of political affiliation, political persuasion, property and education, religion and sex. A unified democratic government representing the interests of all strata of people can be established only through an election to be held by secret ballot on the principles of universal, equal and direct election in a completely democratic atmosphere, in which there are no factors obstructing or suppressing the free expression of the will of the Korean people. Referring to this question, Kim Il Sung says:

Our Party and the Government of the Republic have made consistent efforts to effect a peaceful solution of the Korean question. We have no intention of "marching South" nor do we intend to solve the question of Korean unification by use of arms.

"Communist aggression from the North" is no more than a camouflage used by the U.S. imperialists to continue their occupation of South Korea and to cloak their nefarious design to invade the whole of Korea and subsequently the rest of Asia.³

Why have the Workers Party of Korea and the government of the Republic been making consistent efforts to realize the unification of the fatherland peacefully? This approach is derived from their class position. As historical facts show, an aggressive war is, by its nature, launched by imperialists and monopoly capitalists, and the working masses, beginning with the working class, never invade another country or start a war, although they may fall victims to imperialist wars. This is obvious from the class nature of aggressive wars.

Because the government of the Republic is a genuine people's power, representing and defending the interests of workers, peasants and other working people, it fosters peace-

ful unification and is making efforts to effect it. Also, although the government of the Republic is not afraid of war, it does not want a fratricidal war. Instead, in accord with the national interests of the Korean people and the peace-loving peoples of Asia and the world, the government of the Republic calls for peaceful unification. Then, too, there is a fair prospect of unifying the fatherland by peaceful means and there is a realistic and rational method for achieving this aim.

Since the Liberation, the Party and the government have made all possible efforts toward this goal according to the above stated basic policy. But, the U.S. imperialists and the successive puppet rulers of South Korea have refused on every occasion to accept this program and consistently have replied to our efforts with aggressive, provocative acts.

Immediately after Liberation, the Party at its inaugural Congress on October 10, 1945 projected the policy of "establishing a democratic people's republic that will guarantee the complete sovereignty and independence of our nation by broadly rallying patriotic and democratic forces." Under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, the Party concentrated its efforts on peaceful unification of the fatherland, based on the will of all the Korean people.

In contrast, the United States started various kinds of maneuvers designed to oppose the construction of a sovereign and independent state with the intention of perpetuating the occupation of South Korea and the split of the Korean nation. The first maneuvers were to obstruct the implementation of the Three Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow.

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain met in Moscow in December 1945 to discuss questions dealing with Germany and Japan. They decided on concrete measures for developing Korea as a completely democratic, sovereign and independent state. The Soviet-U.S. Joint Committee was set up and charged with the task of implementing the decision. However, the United

States moved to trample underfoot this decision by whipping together the reactionary forces of South Korea.

In this situation, the Party, while frustrating the aggressive maneuvers of the United States, isolating and weakening the reactionary forces, put forward the basic policy of rallying all the democratic forces to realize the decision of the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference, clearly indicating the way to Korea's democratic development. To realize this policy, the Party organized and developed mass support for the decision of the Foreign Ministers Conference, while stepping up political activities on a large scale to expose the aggressive designs of the United States.

This struggle paralleled that in North Korea to create a democratic base of the revolution. Under the revolutionary influence of the northern half, the South Korean people actively struggled against the U.S. policy. There were the general strike of workers in September 1946, the October People's Resistance, and the general strike of workers on March 22, 1947. (See Chapter 4, Part II.) These demonstrations temporarily frustrated the plot of the United States to cook up a reactionary government consisting mainly of pro-American and pro-Japanese elements. Thereupon, the United States finally wrecked the activities of the Soviet-U.S. Joint Committee in September 1947, developing new maneuvers to place the Korean question before the UN, which led to a separate election in South Korea in May 1948 under the aegis of the UN to set up a South Korean puppet government.

In his 1948 New Year's message and in his report to the Second Congress of the Workers Party of Korea in March 1948, Kim Il Sung set forth the policy of frustrating a separate South Korean election under "UN supervision," establishing a democratic people's republic of Korea as a unified power through the efforts of the Korean people themselves, and promoting national unification under its banner. This new policy was supported wholeheartedly by the South as well as

North Korean people, as shown by the Joint Conference of North and South Korean Political Parties and Social Organizations, held in Pyongyang in April 1948, which was attended not only by middle-of-the-road but also by some right-wing political parties. The conference unanimously supported the unification policy proposed by the Workers Party of Korea. This is also graphically illustrated by the fact that the South Korean people developed sharp and sustained struggles against a separate election in South Korea.

Workers in various parts of South Korea called a general strike against the separate election, and the people raided police stations in all parts of South Korea and burned ballot boxes. The protests on the Cheju Island developed into an armed uprising on April 3, 1948. Further, the South Korean people expressed opposition to the spurious separate election by boycotting it. In Kyongsang province alone, as many as 80 to 90 per cent of the eligible voters abstained from voting. The separate election in South Korea was a farce but, in spite of this, the United States set up the Syngman Rhee puppet regime.

In this situation, the Party, relying on the rising mass movement, intensified struggles for the establishment of a unified Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The election of deputies to the Supreme People's Assembly held on August 25, 1948 was participated in by voters in the South as well as the North. This was the legitimate election for the whole of Korea. In the North, 99.97 per cent and, in the South, 77.52 per cent of the eligible voters took part in the elections in defiance of barbarous suppression by the traitorous U.S.-Syngman Rhee clique. As a result, the Supreme People's Assembly was constituted of the real representatives of the people, and the government of the Republic was established.

The DPRK is the only government of Korea, representing the general will of the people of the entire country, established democratically. Its establishment was a new victory of the

Korean people and gave a powerful impetus to their struggle for peaceful unification of the fatherland.

As soon as they concocted the Syngman Rhee puppet "government," the U.S. imperialists started to prepare openly for armed aggression against the North, while compelling the puppet regime to call for a "march to the North" as its "national policy."

The Party repeatedly tried to avoid the fratricidal struggle and to establish a unified governing body. It even proposed to federate the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK with the National Assembly of South Korea as a single legislative body for the whole of Korea. This proposal was welcomed enthusiastically by the people in the South as well as the North, and mass movements arose in South Korea in support of this policy.

However, the U.S.-Syngman Rhee puppet clique not only oppressed and murdered supporters of the proposal but finally replied to it by launching an aggressive war on June 25, 1950. It was an aggressive war launched by the United States and the Syngman Rhee clique to sabotage peaceful unification of Korea, to perpetuate U.S. occupation of South Korea and, finally, to transform North Korea into a U.S. colony. After three years of heroic struggle, the Korean people won a decisive victory and frustrated the designs of the United States, creating the possibility of solving the question of national unification by peaceful means.

After the Korean War, at the Geneva Conference in 1954 to find a peaceful solution of the Korean question, and repeatedly in the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, the Party and the government made various proposals to turn the armistice into a lasting peace and to open up a new phase for national unification. However, the United States and its puppets have refused adamantly to accept proposals for unification.

Under the circumstances, the government of the Republic

proposed to create conditions for national unification through a series of transitional stages, since the basic program for unification cannot be realized immediately. In August 1960, it proposed a plan for a North-South Korean Confederation as a transitional measure to reestablish severed national ties, a step which may be feasible even before unification and a North-South general elections are possible. The proposed confederation would be a supreme national committee consisting of an equal number of representatives appointed by the North and South Korean authorities, while existing political systems in the North and South remain unchanged for the time being. The supreme national committee would adjust economic and cultural developments and promote mutual cooperation and exchange between South and North Korea in the common interests of the nation. The confederation, if realized, would not mean complete unification, but would deepen mutual understanding and open a new phase favorable for the promotion of national unification.

Further, should the South Korean rulers be unable to accept the plan for confederation, the DPRK proposed that economic, cultural and personnel exchanges be effected immediately to alleviate as much as possible the hardships endured by the Korean people as a result of the split. It was also proposed that if even this plan is not acceptable to South Korea, at least the exchange of mail should be permitted between parents, wives and children, relatives and friends who are separated.

The Eighth Session, Second Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, November 1960, discussed peaceful unification of the fatherland, and made recommendations for economic and cultural cooperation between North and South and for independent development of the national economy. To change the armistice into a lasting peace, to ease tension between North and South, is considered of prime importance. On several occasions the DPRK proposed reduction of the strength of the armed forces of both North and South to less than 100,000 men

and an agreement not to use arms against the other. On several occasions, the DPRK has offered to receive South Korean unemployed and orphans – to give them jobs and guarantee their livelihood, to grant scholarships, and extend relief to victims of natural disaster.

Recently, the Third Session, Third Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, on the instance of the government, proposed a joint conference of political parties and mass organizations of North and South to encourage national unity and cooperation through contact and exchange of opinions. Also, North Korea offered two million *suk* of rice every year, 100,000 tons of steel products, one billion kwh of electric power, 10,000 tons of chemical fiber, and large quantities of cement, timber and machinery to South Korea to rebuild its destroyed economy and contribute to stabilizing the conditions of the people.

All the proposals reflect the unanimous desire of all the Korean people for national unification. However, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique rejected them outright. They are opposed to any form of contact between South and North and have refused adamantly to accept any proposal that will contribute to the unification of the fatherland. Moreover, the South Korean authorities also suppress the rising aspiration among the South Korean people for national unification. People are charged with committing an "act of treason" or an act prejudicial to what is called "national policy" for promoting economic or cultural exchanges and mail or personnel exchanges, let alone complete unification of the fatherland; they are arrested and imprisoned at random in frantic acts of fascist terrorism.

If the puppet authorities of South Korea do speak about "unification," they speak about "unification through a UN-supervised election." This is only silly twaddle that ignores the principle of national self-determination and is aimed at introducing an external force into the internal affairs of the

nation. The UN is not qualified to meddle in the Korean question, nor does it have any right to do so, especially since the UN is used by the United States as a cover to justify its aggression against Korea. In this connection, Kim Il Sung says:

We consider that the United Nations has neither the right to discuss the Korean question nor the right to meddle in the internal affairs of our country. The Korean question should not be discussed by foreigners in New York or Washington, but should be discussed by Koreans in Pyongyang or Seoul.⁴

What the United States and the South Korean puppets mean by "unification by a UN-supervised election" is merely an attempt to expand to the North the U.S. imperialist system of colonial domination established in the South. Recently, a new obstacle was placed in the path of unification, the traitorous ROK-Japan Treaty concluded in 1965 between the puppet regime of South Korea and Japan to draw the Japanese militarists into South Korea. Japanese imperialists, who have infiltrated as a result of the treaty, are now a dangerous obstacle to unification.

All facts show that the ROK puppets are walking the anti-people, traitorous road of dependence on external forces instead of the road of sovereignty and independence and that they are not at all interested in national unity or national unification. They are very much afraid of national unification being solved by the Korean people themselves. They are so anxious to have U.S. armed forces occupy South Korea and want to live under this protection because they are afraid of the people. Otherwise, why do they oppose a free North-South election and why do they obstinately refuse to accept exchanges of personnel and mail?

In spite of the desire of all the Korean people today, more than 20 years after the defeat of Japanese imperialism, our fatherland still remains divided because of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets. Kim Il Sung says:

At present, the traitorous clique of South Korea, faithful henchmen of U.S. imperialism, stubbornly oppose the peaceful unification of the country and recklessly arrest and imprison people, and severely punish them, merely because they have spoken in favor of peaceful unification. The peaceful unification of our country can be attained only after the present puppet "regime" is overthrown and progressive forces seize power in South Korea.⁵

The developments of the past 20-odd years since the Liberation show that the Korean people consistently have sought sovereignty, independence and peaceful unification, whereas U.S. imperialism and the South Korean puppets have sought only enslavement and aggression. The actual situation shows that unification can never be attained by kneeling to the United States and begging for it, but only by winning it through the struggle of the Korean people themselves.

The DPRK's stand on peaceful unification is based on anti-imperialist struggle and has nothing in common with a compromise with the United States or with the theory of "peaceful transition" of the social system. When the South Korean people overthrow U.S. imperialism and its puppets and seize power, unification will be achieved peacefully through the united strength of the forces of socialism in the North and the democratic forces in the South.

If the United States, which is intensifying war maneuvers, should provoke a war against North Korea or unleash a global war, the conflict on the side of the Korean people would be a national liberation war, a war for national unification and for a nationwide victory of the Korean revolution. Kim Il Sung says:

The Korean people do not want war but are never afraid of it. If the enemy forces a new war upon us, all the people will rise as one in a heroic struggle to defend the great socialist gains in the northern half of the Republic, attain the complete liberation and unification of the fatherland and safeguard peace in Asia and the world, and they will deal annihilating blows to the enemy.⁶

The only Korean state is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and only its government can represent the genuine national interests and will of the people, South and North. The DPRK represents the future of a unified Korea and embodies the unanimous aspirations of all the Korean people for complete unification and independence of the fatherland.

2. UNIFICATION AND THE KOREAN REVOLUTION

In order to hasten the day of triumph and glory, the South Korean people should expedite preparation of the revolutionary forces and wage the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle more vigorously on a mass scale. Meanwhile the people in the northern half should further consolidate our revolutionary base politically, economically and militarily, continue to render active support to the South Korean people in their revolutionary struggle and steadily strengthen militant solidarity with the international revolutionary forces.⁷

This strategic line advanced by Premier Kim Il Sung takes into account that the revolutionary forces for national unification and an all-Korean victory are threefold: the forces of the socialist revolution in the northern half, revolutionary forces in South Korea, and international revolutionary forces. However, in the light of their position, role and mission, these three factors do not have the same weight. Of decisive significance among the three are the internal revolutionary forces of the Korean people, because the Korean people themselves are the masters of the Korean revolution. According to Kim Il Sung: "Revolutionary forces should be prepared equally in both South and North Korea, and only when all the Korean people in both North and South pool their strength and deal a blow at U.S. imperialism, can the national liberation revolution successfully be carried out."⁸

The Party established a democratic base of the revolution in the North after the Liberation, and saw this revolutionary base as the fundamental guarantee of the Korean revolution

and unification. This scientific strategic line, reflecting the objective requirements of the Korean revolution, is being realized successfully, the powerful democratic base of the revolution having been created and consolidated in the northern half. This ensures the superiority of the revolutionary forces over the counter-revolutionary forces and guarantees national unification with internal and independent forces. The invincible revolutionary forces, built up politically, economically and militarily in the North, exercise a great revolutionizing and inspirational effect on the South Korean people. Unification will be successful when the revolutionary forces in South and North fully are prepared and united.

Consequently, it is important not only to continue to build the revolutionary base in the North but also to consolidate the forces in the South which constitute the other component part of the internal revolutionary power of the Korean people. Strengthening revolutionary forces in the South will strengthen the internal revolutionary forces as a whole and will isolate decisively the counter-revolutionary forces, hastening the decisive moment of unification. Inasmuch as the South Korean revolutionary forces will engage directly in the South Korean revolution, strengthening them is important in creating conditions favorable for national unification. Needless to say, North Korea will give powerful support to the South Korean revolution, but the people in the North cannot carry out the revolution for the South Korean people. The South Korean revolution can triumph only when the South Korean people themselves rise up.

Kim Il Sung says: "For an all-Korea victory of our revolution, it is necessary not only to strengthen domestic revolutionary forces but also to increase the international revolutionary forces."⁹

The Korean revolution is one front of the world revolution, a front of sharp anti-imperialist struggles directly confronting U.S. imperialism. The development of the revolutionary situa-

tion in Korea is closely related to the weakening of U.S. imperialism. If the revolutionary forces are strengthened on a worldwide scale and if the United States is cornered in all parts of the world, its foothold in South Korea will be weakened and the victory of the Korean revolution will be hastened. But the international revolutionary movement can only extend assistance to our internal forces, however strong it may be and whatever positive assistance it may extend. Moreover, the auxiliary role of the international movement depends to a large extent on how well prepared it is.

In this way, the position concerning the relative importance of the three revolutionary factors is based firmly on the independent role of the government of the Republic and the principle of internationalism.

Concerning the tasks of the Korean people, Kim Il Sung wrote: "Today, there are two revolutionary tasks before the Workers Party of Korea and the Korean people. One is to construct socialism in the northern half of our country and the other is to liberate South Korea from the colonial rule of U.S. imperialism and realize the unification of the fatherland."¹⁰

Korea is one, and our nation is one. Actually, however, the South and the North have been separated and have fundamentally different social systems. Consequently, each is in a different stage of the revolution. Unlike the North, where the socialist system has been established, the South is plagued by contradictions peculiar to itself, being a colonial, semi-feudal society. Therefore, the South Korean people are faced with revolutionary tasks different from those in the North.

Socialist construction in the DPRK and the revolution in South Korea are both components of the Korean revolution and are closely related. But the nature of the South Korean revolution is defined by the contradictions inherent in South Korean society. To carry out this revolution successfully, it is important to strengthen decisively the struggles of the South Koreans. Consequently, the South Korean revolution cannot be equated with socialist construction in the North.

Although the South Korea revolution is closely related to unification, these two questions should be strictly differentiated from each other. In the first place, there is a difference in geographical scope. Unification encompasses the entire area of North and South and its revolutionary task is to complete the Korean revolution on a nationwide scale. The South Korean revolution is concerned primarily with the southern half, and is subordinate to the completion of the all-Korea revolution.

Further, the South Korean revolution and the unification of the fatherland have different contradictions to solve, based on different factors. Unification is based on the objective reality of the division of the country and the split of the nation, and the task is to reunify the severed land and people under the banner of the Republic. In contrast to this, the South Korean revolution is based on national and class contradictions in South Korea, and its task is to solve these contradictions. Because of these differences, different strategy and tactics must be used to carry out the South Korean revolution and for the unification of the fatherland.

For the unification of the fatherland, the revolutionary forces of the North and of the South and the international revolutionary forces — of which the most important are the revolutionary forces of North Korea — are needed. For the South Korean revolution, the necessary forces are the South Korean people, beginning with workers and peasants, whose purpose it is to solve the social and class contradictions of South Korea, to seize power and to overthrow the social system. Here victory cannot be won without violent struggle. However, unification of the fatherland is an internal affair, and should be effected peacefully after the South Korean people drive out the United States, recover sovereignty, and complete the South Korean revolution.

This policy of the Workers Party of Korea for realizing the South Korean revolution and national unification is an embodiment of the *Juche* idea of Kim Il Sung, based on Marxism-

Leninism. Under his leadership the United States finally will be driven out of South Korea, and the day will surely come when the 40 million Korean people will construct a victorious new Korea and will live happily in a unified fatherland.

CHAPTER IV

The Struggle of the South Korean People

Since the Liberation of August 15, 1945 the South Korean people, in defiance of the fascist terrorism of the United States and its agents, have fought heroically, following the strategic and tactical line of the South Korean revolution and national unification indicated by Kim Il Sung. The course of this struggle has never been smooth; it has gone through many ups and downs, upsurges and temporary retreats and then upsurges again. Today the South Korean people are continuing their anti-American, national salvation struggles in various ways, including guerrilla warfare.

1. THE COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE

Since Liberation, the South Korean people have gone through three periods of struggle until today they have reached a higher plane of struggle, including armed guerrilla warfare.

(1) *First period: From the August 15 Liberation to Installation of the Puppet Regime*

Of this, Kim Il Sung says:

Immediately after the August 15 Liberation, labor movements rapidly developed in South Korea and, under their influence, people's struggles on various levels witnessed an upsurge.

Encouraged by the results of the revolution in the northern half, the South Korean people fought unrelentingly against the U.S. imperialist policy to turn South Korea into a colonial dependency, demanding sovereignty and independence for their fatherland and democratic reforms such as were carried out in the northern half.¹

The struggle of the South Korean people immediately after Liberation was characterized by anti-imperialist and anti-feudal activities, clearly reflecting the basic tasks of the South Korean revolution and its rapid development as a mass-based, positive political struggle for power.

The revolutionary forces launched a strong attack on the counter-revolutionary forces of U.S. imperialism and its agents (pro-Japanese and pro-American), and fought against the colonization of South Korea as a U.S. dependency. They fought against the dissolution of people's committees and against the repressive measures taken by the United States against democratic activities, demanding the guarantee of democratic freedoms, establishment of unified people's power, and democratic reforms such as had been carried out in the North. Raising these demands, they developed mass struggles involving people in all walks of life.

The working class played a leading role in these revolutionary struggles and the worker-peasant alliance was consolidated considerably. This is illustrated graphically by the October People's Resistance, an anti-American action involving all strata of people, kicked off by the general strike of Pusan railway workers in October 1946, and also by the general strike of industrial workers.

The general strike and the October People's Resistance clearly indicated the revolutionary character and fighting capacity of the South Korean people, who were determined to win freedom, independence and democracy. These struggles threw U.S. authorities and the military government into utter confusion and their foundation was shaken greatly, with the result that the revolutionary situation in South Korea reached a climax.

The South Koreans who were politically mature and tempered in sharp struggle concentrated on establishing a unified democratic government, while the United States and its stooges intensified their attempts to turn South Korea into a colonial dependency and began openly to carry out their policy of perpetuating the division of Korea. The South Korean people concentrated on frustrating the maneuvers of U.S. imperialism to set up a separate puppet regime.

In spite of terror and bloodshed, the February 7, 1948, national salvation action, in which two million people participated, was organized successfully and, following this, the May 10 struggle against the traitorous separate election was developed. The February 7 action and May 10 demonstration were sharp struggles over power and sovereignty—the basic questions of the revolution. There were 2,863 instances of struggle between March 3 and May 15, 1948, of which 2,251 (78.6 per cent) were violent. The United States succeeded in setting up a separate regime (Syngman Rhee) at bayonet point and by fraud, but the elections were exposed as a fake by the efforts of the people.

In the upsurge in South Korea during this period the political leadership of the Party gave a correct perspective to the struggle of the South Korean people. The political situation in South Korea immediately after Liberation was favorable to the revolution. However, the people were not sure what to do. They had a strong desire to win national sovereignty and independence, but they had, to a certain extent, illusions about the United States. In the early stage they did not understand the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism.

Under these circumstances, the Party encouraged the South Korean people to give full play to their spirit of sovereignty and independence and to their strong desire to have a new system and lead a new life. It made clear the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic nature of the South Korean revolution, while exposing the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism, and it led the struggle of the South Korean people in the correct

direction by raising the goal of a unified, autonomous and independent state. It was because of this dynamic policy and wise leadership of the Party that the South Korean people were able to make full use of the objective revolutionary situation in those days and develop it to a high political level.

Another factor in the rapid upsurge of revolutionary struggles in South Korea immediately after Liberation was that while the counter-revolutionary forces were extremely isolated and weakened, the revolutionary forces rapidly were increasing and becoming stronger, resulting in a major change in the relations of class forces.

The August 15 Liberation put an end to Japanese imperialist colonial rule and, at the same time, a shattering blow was dealt to domestic counter-revolutionary forces which were allied with the Japanese and had followed the road of national betrayal. They were extremely weakened and lost their potency as a political force. In contrast, after the collapse of Japanese domination, the enthusiasm of the working people soared and their forces grew rapidly. The middle classes then came over to the side of the revolution. This change in the relations of class forces was an important factor in the rapid upsurge of the revolutionary struggle.

(2) *Second Period: From Establishment of the Puppet Regime to the April 1960 Popular Uprising*

Kim Il Sung has this to say:

However, the struggle of the South Korean people entered a period of temporary decline after the concoction of a separate puppet regime in South Korea in May 1948, and the subsequent fascization policy of U.S. imperialism and the Li Sung Man [Syngman Rhee] clique. In order to suppress mass movements, U.S. imperialism and the Li Sung Man clique mobilized the U.S. armed forces, equipped with newest weapons, to commit barbarous acts of arresting, imprisoning and murdering patriotic people at random.

Further, U.S. imperialism perpetrated underhand maneuvers to split and disintegrate the revolutionary forces from inside by utilizing factionalist elements and spies who had infiltrated the leadership of the South Korean Workers Party. As a result, party organizations were completely destroyed and the revolutionary forces were split in South Korea.²

Pak Hong Yong and his followers, who were spies serving the United States, captured the leadership of the vanguard party in South Korea and deliberately drove Party members and patriotic people to reckless actions, making them suffer great losses in order to destroy the Party from within and stamp out the revolutionary forces.

By the end of 1949, the Party and mass organizations were completely destroyed and revolutionary movements were forced into a temporary retreat. The retreat was gradual, indicating that even while the movement was declining, the South Korean people fought bravely and desperately against the offensive of enemy reaction. Thus, this period saw demonstrations in South Korea to support and welcome the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic, struggles to hoist the flag of the Republic, a demonstration of South Korean workers in November 1948 to demand the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces, and a revolt of South Korean soldiers in October in Ryosu. These struggles were on a higher level than the previous struggles but were unable to expand and develop into a mass movement involving all parts of South Korea.

However, the Fatherland Liberation War [the Korean War, 1950-53] was a special period of temporary upsurge of the movement. During this period the powerful revolutionary forces of the North were combined with the revolutionary forces of the South. In those days, as a result of the victorious advance of the Korean People's Army, a large part of South Korea was liberated and Party organizations and people's committees were again organized in the liberated areas, vari-

ous democratic reforms were carried out, and revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses ran very high.

Groups of South Korean youth joined the volunteers and fought bravely to annihilate the enemy, and the people in the rear actively supported the fighting ranks on the front. For a short period, the South Korean people directly experienced the policy of the Workers Party of Korea under a people's government and, consequently, actively supported the People's Army even during the difficult time of the temporary, strategic retreat. Even after that, fierce struggles developed in South Korea, including the burning of transport materials in November 1951 by the Pusan dockworkers, the explosion of the First Arsenal of the Defense Department, and various guerrilla actions. However, because of the change in the military situation and betrayal by Pak Hon Yong and his followers, the revolutionary forces were not maintained or strengthened and the Party organizations were destroyed. The struggle of the South Korean people again stagnated. But the revolutionary movement began to recover its former strength gradually during the period from the armistice to the April Popular Uprising of 1960.

(3) *Third Period: From the April Popular Uprising to the Present*

Kim Il Sung says:

After the [Korean] war, the struggle of the South Korean people gradually followed a new course of development. The South Korean people, encouraged by the results of socialist construction in the North, continued to fight tenaciously against U.S. imperialism and its stooges, demanding democratic freedoms and rights.

The Popular Uprising, centered on the students and youth of South Korea in April 1960, finally toppled the Li Sung Man [Syngman Rhee] puppet government which had long served as agents of U.S. imperialism. This was the first victory in the struggle of the South

Korean people and dealt a shattering blow to the colonial domination of U.S. imperialism.³

During this period the South Korean people struggled against the increased war provocations of the United States — against the growing burden of military spending and particularly against the ruthless plunder and fascist repression by the Syngman Rhee clique. The successful results of socialist construction in the North and the correctness of the policies of the Party encouraged struggles against the United States and its puppets. Thus, for seven years after the war, the struggles of the South Korean people followed a steady upward curve; in 1959, the number of actions rose five-fold to 891, compared with 176 in 1954. The South Korean people, in this period, fought for democratic rights, which they combined with struggles for a solution to the immediate problems of livelihood, using anti-fascist and democratic slogans. These struggles finally led to the historic April Popular Uprising, in which pent-up indignation at extreme suppression and vicious plunder by the United States and its stooges flared up. Participating in the mass uprising in April 1960 were more than a million city people — workers, peasants and intellectuals, with patriotic students as the core. Syngman Rhee's fascist dictatorship was overthrown in this, the first victory of the South Korean people in their anti-American national salvation struggle. It was a serious blow to U.S. imperialism's colonial rule.

The collapse of the puppet regime meant the bankruptcy of its anti-people policy and especially of its policy to "unify Korea by marching north." And it reflected a serious crisis in the colonial domination system of U.S. imperialism. In this heroic struggle the people demonstrated their revolutionary mettle and acquired valuable experience. The April Popular Uprising showed that further revolutionary advances of the South Korean people could not be prevented even at bayonet point.

The South Koreans were awakened politically by this struggle and they were convinced that they could storm successfully any imperialist stronghold if they were united and fought tenaciously. Their revolutionary fervor was great after their first victory. Although the Syngman Rhee clique was toppled by the April Popular Uprising, colonial domination by U.S. imperialism continued. The United States imposed Chang Myon as its new placeman, set up a new puppet regime and intensified the suppression and plunder of the people, while promising them a democratic government.

Thus, the people's demands in the April Popular Uprising were completely trampled upon, and economic crisis and political confusion were aggravated further. Consequently, the South Koreans conducted a more positive struggle, especially for national unification and national prosperity. Kim Il Sung made this clear in his 1960 report at the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the August 15 Liberation and at the Eighth Session, Second Supreme People's Assembly, where the program was spelled out, giving a new impetus to the struggle after the April Popular Uprising.

Under the slogan, "Unity is the only way to live," the South Koreans advanced their fight for independent unification and gradually turned the thrust of their struggle against U.S. imperialism, shaking the foundations of colonial domination. Alarmed by this critical situation, the United States instigated fascist elements within the South Korean Army to carry out a military coup in an attempt to establish a military-fascist dictatorship and strangle the people's revolutionary struggle. In less than one week after the coup, 23 progressive parties and 238 social organizations were ordered disbanded, while over 2,300 publishing establishments forcibly were closed down; hundreds of thousands of patriotic people were arrested, many imprisoned and murdered.

However, suppression by the dictatorship did not strengthen the position of the United States in South Korea; rather it

deepened the crisis of the system of colonial domination. The imposition of the dictatorship meant that the United States and its agents could maintain their colonial domination only at bayonet point. No suppression can stamp out the struggle of politically awakened people, and the worse the suppression and poverty, the greater are the will and strength to resist. This was clearly demonstrated after the coup.

There were a series of protests against the ROK-Japan talks and the ROK-Japan Treaty, on March 24 and June 3, 1964, and in August 1965. Hundreds of thousands of people, including youth and students at 53 universities and at 173 middle and high schools, participated in the protests, which continued for more than 70 days from March 24 to June 5, 1964. The demonstrations frequently assumed the character of riots and were the first large-scale mass struggles since the fascist suppression imposed after the coup. As a result, the sixth ROK Japan talks were frustrated and U.S. imperialism and its Pak Chung Hi clique were dealt another blow.

However, the United States and its puppets tried to resume the talks with Japan by declaring a virtual state of emergency, mobilizing the armed forces and resorting to fascist suppression, including the closure not only of universities but also of middle and high schools. After the initialling of the ROK-Japan Treaty at the end of February, more and more struggles took place until, in August, the people engaged in large-scale, mass-based demonstrations against the ratification of the treaty. Anti-treaty protests continued for more than a year in defiance of fascist suppression. More than 200,000 youth and students were the center of the movement. The colonialist policy of the United States and the maneuvers of the Japanese to enter South Korea were exposed.

The dispatch of South Korean puppet troops to South Vietnam aroused even stronger anti-American, anti-government feelings. There is also wide-spread resentment among the puppet troops against dying in South Vietnam as a shield for

the United States. With the defeats of U.S. troops in Vietnam, the setbacks suffered by the troops of other countries, including South Korea, and the sharp increase in the number of war casualties among them, the number of draft evaders increased rapidly, alarming the puppet authorities.

Protests against the incursions by Japanese monopoly capital and the increased robbery by the puppet authorities also spread, especially since the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty. Workers in the coal, power and railway industries, and in the docks, especially employees at U.S. military installations, participated in struggles. More than 200,000 took part in protest actions from late 1965 to early 1966; and in 1966 there were 560,000. The people fought not only for higher wages, better working conditions and other economic demands but also for trade union rights, for the abolition of extraterritorial labor regulations, and against national discrimination. They fought stubbornly in defiance of suppression by U.S. military and puppet police and succeeded in winning several of their demands. Peasants fought against eviction from their land required for military operations and opposed low prices for farm products, demanding guaranteed acceptable prices.

Through these struggles for existence, the South Korean people gradually came to understand better the real cause of their starvation and difficulties, and the need to increase their fighting capacity. At the same time, the demand for sovereignty and independence became more and more widespread during the struggle against sending troops to Vietnam and the economic struggles of the working people. Demands for the expulsion of foreign forces, both American and Japanese, for sovereignty, independence and national unification, were voiced more and more often.

Despite fascist suppression and control of the press, journalists and writers criticized and condemned the false arguments of the Pak Chung Hi clique that Korea would be unified

in the latter half of the 1970's by the UN. They urged that Korea should be unified by the Koreans themselves and that exchanges between North and South should be activated, so that Korea could assert national identity in her relations with the United States.

The anti-American, anti-fascist struggles flared up violently in a political action against the unfair elections of June 8, 1967. Participating between June 6 and July 10 were more than 200,000 students at 145 universities, high schools and middle schools, and a large number of ordinary citizens. They fought courageously in defiance of school suspension orders and arrest warrants, police clubs and tear-gas bombs, shouting "Remember April 19!" "The Unfair Election Is Invalid!" "Arrest the Ringleaders of the Unfair Election!" "Stamp Out Corrupt Government!" "Let us Defend Democracy to the Last!" and "Let Us Defend People's Rights!" As these slogans show, this was not only a protest against the unfair election but also a patriotic struggle to restore democracy and freedom. The struggle spread to many parts of the country in a very short period of time.

The students used various tactics, including condemnation meetings, burning effigies of government leaders, demonstrations and sit-downs, turning their schools into strongholds of struggle, going on a hunger strike, and stoning the police.

Since the end of 1967, the struggle of the South Korean people has developed into a new, active phase on a qualitatively higher plane, including armed guerrilla warfare.

2. THE PRESENT STRUGGLE AND ITS PROSPECTS

In a recent major report, Kim Il Sung said:

The revolutionary struggle of the South Korean people is now expanding and developing into various forms of active anti-U.S., national salvation struggles, including armed struggle. Their struggles are becoming organized gradually and are taking deep root among the workers and peasants, the main forces of the revolution, and are vigorously growing among broad sections of the masses of all strata. While further expanding their revolutionary organizations, the revolutionary and patriotic people of South Korea are waging an unyielding struggle against the enemy in towns and villages, underground and in the mountains, even in prisons and in "courts." The activities of the revolutionary armed groups operating in various parts of South Korea and the revolutionary vanguard of different groups of people, including workers, students, newsmen, educators, and even conscientious national capitalists, have alarmed the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and thrown them into utter confusion.⁴

The most important problem to be solved in carrying out the revolution is that of the political leader. The political leader is the center of unity and cohesion of the masses, and the leader's revolutionary ideas are the ideological basis on which all the people are to be rallied. The South Korean people have great respect for Premier Kim Il Sung, who is the foremost leader of the Korean revolution and is loved by the 40 million Korean people who regard him as the beacon of the revolution, and are determined to entrust their destiny to him. The invincible unity of all the people with this great revolutionary leader is the decisive guarantee for victory. And this is the most characteristic feature of the present stage of the South Korean revolution—the conviction that victory will be won, whatever difficulties and ordeals may ensue, if they follow the teachings of Kim Il Sung.

Many individual instances can be cited of the public expression, despite the fascist repression, of widespread respect for Kim Il Sung among the South Korean workers, peasants, youths and students, and intellectuals. And there is a growing tendency among them to accept his revolutionary ideas and to prepare themselves for struggle, according to the strategic and tactical line of Kim Il Sung on the South Korean revolution and national unification.

Thus, the struggles of the South Korean people are developing among the broad masses, including workers, peasants, youth and students, intellectuals, and urban petty-bourgeoisie; the spearhead of these struggles is gradually being directed at U.S. imperialism.

According to incomplete statistics, actions involving all strata totaled 1,030 between January and October 1968, and the number of people who participated in these struggles was 1.3 times larger than in the comparable period of the previous year.

(1) *Workers' Struggles*

Workers have participated in an increasing wave of actions in defiance of the U.S.-puppet regime. According to incomplete statistics, there were 125 workers' actions in the first half of 1968, participated in by 198,000 workers, a 2.3-fold increase over 1967, including railway workers, coal miners, dock workers and seamen, textile workers, and others.

The regime tightened the low-wage policy in early 1968 and tried to revise the Labor Standards Law to the detriment of the workers, to secure more profits for foreign monopoly capital and comprador capitalists. It also enacted a fascist Labor Dispute Mediation Law to take more repressive measures against the struggles of workers. However, the South Korea workers have been developing their resistance, linking their struggle for better living conditions and democratic freedoms with anti-war actions. A characteristic of the struggle

in 1968, was its increased scale, better organization and the higher political consciousness of the workers.

Early in 1968, more than 30,000 railway workers organized a committee to work for better conditions in Seoul and in different districts under its wing, dealing a sharp blow at new war provocations by conducting the movement under a unified leadership. About 3,000 clothing workers in Pusan organized a labor disputes committee with representatives from more than 30 enterprises and gradually intensified their struggle from a dispute to a strike under a unified leadership. Starting in June 1968, large-scale struggles, each involving more than 10,000 workers, were continuous. Among these were the struggle of 13,000 workers of the ROK Public Coal Corporation who fought for higher wages in June; the struggle of 20,000 postal and telecommunication workers who demanded higher wages and other benefits in August; and the struggle of over 40,000 employes at U.S. military bases and installations in October.

Another important characteristic was that the workers fought more positively and tenaciously, moving more and more toward formation of an anti-American, national salvation united front. The 13,000 workers of the ROK Public Coal Corporation, who had a long dispute demanding a 30 per cent wage increase, called a 48 hour general strike at all mines in 11 districts. When the puppet authorities adamantly refused to accept any of their demands, they called a strike of indefinite duration at the end of August. At Pusan, 8,000 dock workers who conducted a demonstration early in June, launched another action on October 16.

South Korean workers are moving toward joint struggles in related industries, or may join an action launched by workers elsewhere. For instance, early in March 1968, over 30,000 railway workers demanded better living conditions. This was followed by the struggle of 13,000 workers in monopoly enterprises. When the Pak Chung Hi regime attempted to revise

the Labor Relations Law to suppress the struggles of the workers in monopoly enterprises, the South Korean workers arose, on March 5, against it. In an expression of solidarity, railway, telecommunication and government monopoly workers were determined that "one million workers will rise as one, at any risk, if the Pak Chung Hi clique does not give up their fascist plots and maneuvers." In another instance, 56,000 textile workers in many parts of South Korea adopted a resolution in mid-June to support actively the struggle of the workers of Jonnam Paper Manufacturing Co. and spread the struggle throughout South Korea to help the workers win their demands early in July.

A remarkable thing about the struggles of the South Korean workers is that they are being developed into struggles against the United States and the puppet "government." Workers employed at U.S. and Japanese installations conducted 15 protests in the first four months of 1968, the total number of workers involved reaching 74,000. More than half of the struggles waged by workers in the first quarter of 1968 were directed against the Pak Chung Hi clique. About 1,000 dock workers at Inchon completely stopped the transport of military supplies during their struggle for higher wages. At about the same time, some 600 workers employed by the U.S. Army in the same city joined the struggle and succeeded in winning their demands. Recently 2,000 workers employed at the U.S. base in the Osan area carried out a firm anti-American demonstration in protest against repressive measures against South Korean workers. This touched off mass anti-American struggles in Seoul, Inchon, Buchon, Bupyong, Uijongbu, Taegu and other parts of South Korea.

In this way, South Korean workers, inspired by the developing revolutionary armed guerrilla actions, are expanding and strengthening their struggles, led by workers in railway, coal mining, telecommunication, longshore and textile, which are key industries of South Korea. Through their difficult strug-

gles, the workers develop politically, and are linking their battle for higher wages, an eight-hour day, and trade union organization and rights with the struggle against the war policy and fascist suppression, and for democratic freedom.

(2) *Struggles of Peasants*

South Korean peasants, becoming more and more class-conscious and tempered in the course of their struggles, are becoming an integral part of the main revolutionary force, a reliable ally of the working class, and are contributing greatly to the cause of South Korean revolution.

According to incomplete data, there were 146 peasant actions in many parts of South Korea in the first half of 1968, involving a total of 176,000 persons, a 3.7-fold gain over the comparable period of the previous year. The Honam district, particularly hard hit by drought, accounted for more than half the peasant actions in the first quarter of 1968.

Some 2,000 peasants in Imsil county, North Cholla province, staged demonstrations in front of the puppet National Assembly demanding payment for their land, forcibly requisitioned by the puppet authorities, while in the Ulsan area, some 300 peasants squatted on the farmland they cultivated, demanding land. In Chonwon county, South Chungchong province, 500 peasants demonstrated in May 1968, in protest against the plan of the puppets to evict them from their land without adequate compensation, for the purpose of building a military road.

Poor peasants in Taegu, North Kyongsang province, formed an organization to fight against the puppets' plan to evict them from their land to build an airstrip. In Konyang-myon and Sopo-myon, Sachon county, South Kyongsang province, and in Songju county, North Kyongsang province, and in many other areas, peasants formed task committees to demand dissolution of agricultural associations which levy fees and irrigation taxes on the peasants.

The scale of struggle is also increasing. The number of actions in which more than 100 peasants participated comprised 48.9 per cent of all actions in the first three months of 1967. This was increased to 68 per cent in the same period of 1968. The number of actions involving more than 500 peasants totaled 31 in the first half of 1968, a 3.9-fold increase over the comparable period in 1967. These peasant struggles are manifestations of the pent-up indignation over the policy of the U.S.-puppet regime, which is forcing them to the brink of complete ruin, and are a logical result of the contradictions in South Korean society under the occupation of U.S. imperialism.

(3) *Youth and Students*

South Korean youth and students are actively developing struggles to democratize the campuses against fascist efforts of the Pak Chung Hi regime to coordinate the campuses as their private institutions. In April 1968, the 1,500 students of Masan Commercial High School adopted a resolution expressing opposition to the repressive measures taken by the regime and staged protest demonstrations. The 600 students of Dongjung High School in Chunchon city, Kangwon province, called a "strike" in opposition to the fascist measures taken by the school authorities and waged stubborn struggles against the anti-people educational policy, and against high tuition fees and various other impositions.

Their attempts to oppose and boycott mandatory military training are directed at U.S. imperialism. On September 25, 1968, the Pak Chung Hi clique formulated an Education Enforcement Ordinance to send students to war as soon as they graduate from school. Under the ordinance, military training, which had so far been given to students at 11 high schools, was to be given to 400,000 students at 800 high schools throughout South Korea, starting in 1969, for two hours a week—a total of 40 hours (20 weeks) a year. (University stu-

dents were to be given military training as before). The South Korean students fought vigorously against this militarization policy. Particularly noteworthy in this respect was the struggle of the Taegu High School students, who fought stubbornly against the school's plan to convert three hours of physical culture to military training, in addition to the two hours specified for that purpose.

Although the struggles of the youth and students were not as widespread as at the time of the April Popular Uprising or of the June 3 and March 24 actions, their potential was greatly increased. They have learned by experience that they cannot win a decisive victory unless their struggle is linked up with that of workers and peasants, and they are making efforts to strengthen this solidarity.

(4) *Urban Struggles*

The South Korean people in urban areas are also playing a role in isolating U.S. imperialism and its agents and in strengthening the anti-U.S., national salvation united front. Characteristic of the struggles of ordinary city people is their mass base and the fact that they are assuming a violent nature.

At the end of March 1968, inhabitants of Chungong-dong, Sudaemun ward in the city of Seoul, fought against the Pak Chung Hi clique's edict to forcibly clear the area of shacks. They occupied the *dong* office and assaulted several policemen, including an officer, of the Sudaemun police station, who were imprisoned at the *dong* office. There are countless other such instances.

It is also characteristic of the urban struggles that the city people are becoming more and more indignant at the policies of the Pak Chung Hi clique. In January 1968, some 2,000 inhabitants of Ryongtaek-dong and Dodu-dong in Cheju Island held a meeting, adopted a resolution against the expansion of the Cheju airstrip, and submitted the resolution to the puppet

government. The people of Ryosu had demonstrations demanding compensation and an immediate stop to construction of the naval port and military roads on which they were forced to work daily without adequate safety measures.

(5) *Guerrilla Struggles*

The revolutionaries and patriots of South Korea are developing diverse forms of struggle, and even combining them with armed actions.

The form and method of revolutionary struggle are determined by actual subjective and objective conditions, and particularly by the resistance of the reactionary, ruling classes. In conditions where all democratic rights are denied and living conditions depressed, the people have no alternative but to turn to armed struggle to fight counter-revolutionary force. They use as their guide the historical lessons learned in the anti-Japanese armed struggles led by Kim Il Sung under Japanese colonial rule.

The guerrilla struggles, which began in South Korea in the latter half of 1967, have been expanding rapidly since the armed attack on the Presidential Residence in the central part of Seoul on January 21, 1968. Even according to data released by the puppet authorities, there were more than 200 attacks by armed guerrilla units in various parts of South Korea between January and the end of October 1968, wounding, killing and executing more than 2,000 U.S. aggressors, puppet military police and their agents.

Guerrilla units showered hand grenades on the building of the International Telephone and Telegraph office in the central part of Seoul on the night of April 30, 1968, and took actions in Wonjon Wonsong county, Hweng county, Kosong county and other areas of Kangwon province on June 22, 23 and 24. Since November 1968, armed guerrilla units have been activated in Susan, South Chungchong province; Wuljin

and Bonghwa counties, North Kyongsang province; Samchok, Myungju, Jongson, Pyangchang and other areas of Kangwon province. On November 3, a guerrilla unit in the eastern part of South Korea ambushed a small enemy squad on the move, rained hand-grenades and bullets on the enemy and left quickly. The guerrilla forces are increasing their equipment with arms and weapons taken from the U.S. Army and the puppets, with the help of the people.

Armed struggle is also being directed against U.S. forces in frequent raids on military trains. On September 3, 1968 South Korean patriots rained bullets on a military train between Komo Station and Kyongsan Station in North Kyongsang province, and on November 3 they derailed a military train in a tunnel at Sangwol-ri, Sinrim-myon, Wonsong county, Kangwon province.

From early in 1968, as in 1967, armed struggles were developed in various areas of South Korea, particularly in the provinces of Kyonggi, Chungchong, South Kyongsang, and Kangwon. Guerrillas fought fierce battles with the enemy in 66 places in about 10 days after the thrust into Seoul on January 21, killing 104 U.S. soldiers and puppet military police and destroying a number of military vehicles and other war materials.

Guerrillas have the active support of broad sections of the people and rapidly are increasing their ranks. Guerrillas, who moved into Buk-myon, Wuljin county, South Kyongsang province on November 2, 1968, held the village all night and, after executing traitors and puppet military police, appealed to the villagers to "establish genuine people's power." They praised enthusiastically the northern half of the Republic, and the villagers, greatly impressed by their speeches, received them warmly. They volunteered to join the guerrillas, pledging "to fight to the end, risking their lives, in the struggle to win a new government, a new system and a new life."

South Korean revolutionaries and patriots are actively recruiting forces, as was demonstrated by the guerrillas who thrust into Wuljin and Bonghwa counties of North Kyongsang province in early November. While dealing a heavy blow at the enemy in these counties, they organized a revolutionary party and formed a National Salvation Youth League and a Revolutionary Women's Association, mass organizations to cement kinship among the people. In Bonghwa county, a people's committee was organized on the basis of the unity of the revolutionary organizations with broad sections of the people.

These instances indicate that the revolutionary struggles of the South Korean people are beginning to enter a new phase.

3. THE UNITED REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF SOUTH KOREA

With great appreciation of the heroic struggles of South Korean revolutionaries and patriots, Kim Il Sung said:

The priceless achievements of struggle gained by the revolutionaries and patriotic people in South Korea in their dedicated fight for the freedom and liberation of the people, for the unification and independence of the fatherland will shine forever in the proud history of revolution in our country.⁵

An important place in the proud struggles of the South Koreans is held by members of the United Revolutionary Party (URP), including the late Choi Yong Do, chairman of the South Cholla Provincial Committee of the Party, and Kim Jong Tae, chairman of its Seoul City Committee.

The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK conferred the title "Hero of the Republic," the Gold Star medal and the National Flag, First Class, on the late Choi

Yong Do, in recognition of his heroic and devoted struggle. He was arrested and imprisoned in July 1968 in connection with the Imja Island "incident," and was barbarously murdered in prison on January 25, 1969.

The URP is a militant underground organization, based on the ideas of Kim Il Sung regarding the South Korean revolution and all-Korea unification. The Party has developed revolutionary anti-American, national salvation struggles on a large scale.

The basic policy on the South Korean revolution at the present stage [says Kim Il Sung] is to make preparations for an impending great revolutionary event by preserving the revolutionary forces from suppression by the enemy and, at the same time, by constantly strengthening and enlarging them. Most important for this purpose is to build a solid revolutionary party and to build the main contingent of the revolution in South Korea.⁶

After a long period of preparation, in which Choi Yong Do played a leading role, the URP was founded on March 15, 1964. At that time, just before the March 24 struggle against the ROK-Japan Treaty, class and national contradictions were extremely acute in South Korea. The Party necessarily started as an underground organization and remains so to this day in the midst of blatant fascist terrorism. Represented in this organization are progressive people in all walks of life, but workers and peasants are the main force. For example, Choi Yong Do and Kim Jong Tae, both of poor peasant origin, were chairmen of the South Cholla Provincial Committee and the Seoul City Committee, respectively, around which rallied workers, peasants, youths and students, writers, teachers, journalists, doctors, company employees, national capitalists, politicians and even puppet army officers.

The Party's program calls for building up powerful revolutionary forces, driving U.S. imperialism out of South Korea, overthrowing their agents, and completing the national liberation democratic revolution through unification of the

fatherland. The program defines the 14 tasks necessary to achieve success, among which are included: "to prepare to secure hegemony in armed struggle," i.e., to secure decisive superiority over the counter-revolutionary armed power; "to organize academic study groups and train leading cadres of the Party," and "to arm all organizations ideologically so that they may be developed into guerrilla units in the future."

Kim Il Sung says: "The leading core of Party organizations must consist of competent revolutionaries who are capable of judging a situation accurately and of skillfully leading the movement on the basis of the tactical and strategic principles of Marxism-Leninism in any complicated circumstances."⁷ On this principle, revolutionaries, beginning with Choi Yong Do, concentrated on picking outstanding cadres from among the workers, peasants, youth and students, and intellectuals and on training them as competent revolutionaries. The URP now has a core of several hundred leading cadres in South Korea.

While building its own organization, the Party also built democratic mass organizations around itself, in conformity with the teaching of Kim Il Sung, who said:

Mass organizations must include the broad masses; they must be democratic organizations that truly defend class interests, and they must be legal organizations in principle. When the workers and peasants are gathered together and alerted by their organizations and united around the Party, the revolution in South Korea will have a powerful main force.⁸

Under the leadership of the URP, a number of mass organizations were formed, including the following nine democratic groups in Seoul: the New Culture Study Society, Young Literary Writers' Society, Buddhist Youth Society, Donghak Society, Youth Association, Society for the Study of Nationalism, Christian Youth Economic Welfare Association, Kyongyu Society, and the Bachelors of Art Pub.

The New Culture Study Society was formed around the graduates of the Literature and Science College of Seoul University. The society had six subcommittees—on history, politics, social affairs, economics, culture, and law—and its aim was to “relate problems in all these areas to the theories of communism and to acquire communist ideas.”

Im Jung Sam, a literary critic and graduate of Songgungwan University, was the leading figure in The Young Literary Writers' Society; among its members were progressive novelists, critics, poets and journalists from various universities who helped spread its revolutionary influence among the masses.

The Buddhist Youth Society was made up of graduates of Songgungwan and Tongguk universities, with Kim Hi San, of Songgungwan, as its leader. It organized the Sangsan Culture Association to train leading cadres and at the same time worked with ordinary Buddhist believers, organizing and mobilizing them in revolutionary struggles by training them politically and ideologically.

The Ponghak Society was a group of graduates and undergraduates of Seoul University, with Ro In Yong, a graduate of the Literature and Science College, as its leader.

It is also important, in forming the main contingent of the revolution, to build a united front of people of various social strata. Kim Il Sung has this to say:

To win victory for the revolution, it is necessary to mobilize all forces that are interested in the revolution while building up its main force. Only by winning over all forces that can be won over and uniting them into a single political force will it be possible to fully isolate the counter-revolution, secure overwhelming superiority over it for the revolutionary forces, and lead the revolution to victory.

It is one of the most important tasks in strengthening the revolutionary forces and advancing the revolutionary struggle to form a broad anti-U.S. united front for national salvation that embraces the patriotic democratic forces of all circles and strata in South Korea today.⁹

In accord with this policy, the URP built the national liberation front and the fatherland liberation front, uniting people in all walks of life and developing active struggles to form a broad-based anti-U.S., national liberation united front.

Kim Il Sung teaches that it is important to develop the political and ideological consciousness of the masses in order to preserve and increase the revolutionary forces: “The first and foremost task in isolating the counter-revolution and increasing the revolutionary forces is to awaken the masses politically and ideologically.”¹⁰

It is especially important today, when the United States and its puppets are intensifying daily the reactionary ideological offensive in South Korea to lull the class and national consciousness of the masses, to carry out political, ideological and educational activities. It is only in this way that the South Korean people will be convinced of victory in their struggle for freedom and liberation. It is also essential for the South Koreans to be educated in the revolutionary traditions of anti-Japanese armed struggle.

Members of the URP worked to implement the tasks regarding political and ideological education. First, they concentrated on learning Kim Il Sung's revolutionary ideas by studying his writings and his biography. They published *Hyokymong Jongson* (Revolutionary Front) as their party newspaper and *Chong Maek* (Blue Range of Mountains) as the party magazine, and they established study circles.

Hyokmyong Jongson carried revolutionary articles and news items, and *Chong Maek* published stories to encourage and hearten the masses so as to arouse their anti-U.S. imperialist and anti-“government” feelings and to inspire them to fight vigorously for a new government, a new system and a new life. The first issue of the *Chong Maek* was published in August 1964, and 44,000 copies had been published by June 1967. The political and ideological activities of the members of the United Revolutionary Party reached not only the basic masses of South Korea but even into the puppet army.

Kim Il Sung wrote: "Revolutionary forces cannot be prepared automatically, without any struggle. They can grow in strength only through arduous struggles. It is through the ordeals of struggle that leaders and the nucleus of revolution are reared, the masses of people awakened and revolutionary forces increase."¹¹

In conducting mass struggles, the URP searched for methods appropriate to the constantly changing revolutionary situation in relation to the goals, and combined these factors according to the teachings of Kim Il Sung. In this way, it was possible to maintain the strategic and tactical principle of dealing blows at the enemy from all sides. Thus, political and economic struggles, legal and illegal struggles, violent and non-violent struggles were all combined and carried out as part of the preparations for the decisive battle to overthrow the colonial rule of U.S. imperialism and recover sovereignty for the people.

For instance, the URP carefully organized and led large-scale demonstrations against the fake election of June 8, 1967, and against the inauguration of the "President," dealing a smarting blow at the enemy. It also led a demonstration against the visit of the former U.S. Vice-President to South Korea. These struggles continued for more than 20 days in 30 places in South Korea, and involved over 200,000 persons in 145 universities, middle and high schools and 32,000 other citizens. In addition, the Party led other struggles; Choi Yong Do obtained weapons in Imja Island in South Cholla province and organized the training of military leaders in preparation for the South Korean revolution.

"People who make a revolution should not permit their political lives to be sullied even when their physical lives may be ended,"¹² Kim Il Sung said. Bearing this dictum in mind, Choi Yong Do fought to the end and remained a faithful Korean communist even though he was subjected to barbarous torture after he was arrested and imprisoned. He continued

to fight resolutely against the enemy, turning prison and court into a new arena of struggle, the murderous court into a tribunal where the aggressors and the traitors to the nation were put on trial.

Afraid of his revolutionary struggle and his devotion to his cause, the puppet authorities sentenced Choi Yong Do to death on December 27, 1968, under the national security law and the anti-Communist law, and he was murdered in a prison cell on January 25, 1969. He was 47 years of age.

If U.S. imperialism and its agents kill a revolutionary, thousands of other revolutionaries and patriots will replace him in the ranks of the revolution. This is the law of development of revolution. The revolutionaries and patriots of South Korea will surely overthrow the U.S. aggressors and their stooges and win ultimate victory in the South Korean revolution. As Kim Il Sung said:

In spite of fascist suppression and all kinds of fraudulent artifices of the U.S. imperialists and their puppet clique, the South Korean people will be further awakened and steeled through the struggle and will grow into an invincible revolutionary force which will eventually overthrow U.S. imperialist rule. In due course they will surely drive out the U.S. imperialist aggressors and overthrow their lackeys, and thereby emerge victorious from the revolution.¹³

PART THREE

The Korean Revolution and the World Revolution

In his report at the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Republic, Premier Kim Il Sung made it clear that the Korean revolution is a part of the world revolution and that the struggle of the Korean people to drive U.S. imperialist struggles against the leader of world imperialism being developed in close relation to the anti-imperialist, especially anti-American, struggle being waged on a worldwide scale.

South Korea is not only a total colony of the United States but is also its military base for aggression against the whole of Korea and Asia. Our country is a front in the sharp anti-imperialist struggles against the leader of world imperialism. The Koreans are fulfilling their national and international duties by fighting to drive U.S. imperialism out of South Korea and unify the fatherland.

In this report, Kim Il Sung gives clear Marxist-Leninist explanations on the question of strategy and tactics for the anti-imperialist, anti-American struggles. He projects a strategy for the revolutionary peoples of the world, and particularly for the peoples of small revolutionary countries, to destroy U.S. imperialism. It is a positive strategy, directing the spearhead of struggle at the main enemy, U.S. imperialism, and concentrating attacks on it from all sides to drive it completely onto the defensive.

Kim Il Sung on Acceleration of the World Revolution

1. THE FIGHT AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM

Kim Il Sung wrote: "All the events taking place in the international arena prove more and more clearly that U.S. imperialism is the main force of aggression and war, the international gendarme, the bulwark of modern colonialism and the most heinous enemy of the people of the whole world."¹

What is most important today, therefore, is for all the world's anti-imperialist forces to concentrate their attacks on U.S. imperialism. This is the unquestionable course of the historical development of the world revolution and of the objective process of the anti-imperialist struggle. It is the conclusion necessarily derived from a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the development of the international situation at the present stage, the class nature of U.S. imperialism, the position and role of the United States in the system of imperialist aggression and its strategy for world domination.

All the anti-imperialist forces of the world should unite to spearhead their struggle against U.S. imperialism because it is the ringleader of aggression as head of world imperialism. Since the end of World War II, the system of imperialism has been reorganized with the United States at its center, politically and militarily, as well as economically.

The United States was the only imperialist power that was not directly hit by World War II. On the contrary, in the

course of the war, American monopoly capital was able to rake in fabulous wartime superprofits. In contrast, Germany, Italy, Japan and other imperialist powers were defeated and the economic power of the victors, Britain and France, was decisively weakened. Consequently, the United States emerged as the most powerful reactionary force in the capitalist system after the war.

Moreover, U.S. imperialism used the war boom to overcome the effects of the serious economic crisis of the 1930's, and for easing the problems arising from the general crisis of capitalism. However, the general crisis continued to deepen in the postwar period, as U.S. imperialism engaged in military provocations in all parts of the world, strengthened its armaments, and heightened international tension. U.S. monopoly capital temporarily averted a major crisis of overproduction, largely by maintaining military production on a wartime or near-wartime footing. U.S. monopolies were thus able to pour their huge superprofits into the renewal and expansion of fixed assets, continuously increasing the productive forces, and further strengthening their economic power. Supported by huge industrial power, U.S. imperialism by far surpassed other nations in military capability, and boasted of its alleged global military supremacy.

Under these conditions — overwhelmingly superior economic and military power and the relative weakening of other imperialist powers — the United States emerged as the bulwark of world colonialism, whatever the form. It also set up under its control various aggressive military blocs to serve its ambition of world domination, and adopted its so-called "aid" policy for the same purpose.

The network of U.S. military bases extends throughout the capitalist world, threatening the independence and freedom of the host countries and world peace. The United States revived and reactivated West German and Japanese militarism in order to reorganize the world system of imperialist reac-

tion, of which it is the international gendarme. As the ring-leader of aggression and war and the main enemy of peace, democracy, national independence and socialism, the United States has become the prime target of anti-imperialist forces the world over.

The setback suffered by U.S. imperialism in the Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean people (1950-53) marked the beginning of the decline in its relative power. Since then, and especially in recent years, it has lost ground to other imperialist countries and especially to the socialist camp in economic and military strength.

However, U.S. imperialism remains by far the strongest power, especially militarily, in the capitalist world. The very fact of its declining relative position spurs it to lash out more viciously in the vain attempt to achieve its world domination aims. Kim Il Sung says:

U.S. imperialism is working desperately to find a way out of its impending doom by aggravating international tensions, stepping up the arms drive and unleashing a new war of aggression. . . . U.S. imperialism extends its talons of aggression to all parts and all countries of the world — Asia and Europe, Africa and Latin America, and big and small countries.²

During the present period the strategy of U.S. imperialism is to concentrate on attacking smaller and weaker countries, especially newly independent countries and divided countries which are partly socialist. It speculates on hoped-for splits in the socialist camp to prevent adequate aid to these countries in their resistance to U.S. imperialism. At the same time, U.S. imperialism continues to prepare for a possible sudden global nuclear aggression against the USSR, China and all peoples of the world.

Following this strategy, the United States is expanding military preparations, strengthening its foreign bases and military alliances to attack socialist and progressive countries. For instance, in fiscal 1968 direct U.S. military spending

reached \$76,200 million which, together with indirect military expenditures, accounted for more than 50 per cent of the total national budget of the United States. Defense accounts for 20 per cent of the total production of U.S. heavy industry.

As part of its war policy, the United States today maintains more than 2,000 military bases in more than 90 countries of Asia, Oceania, Europe, Latin American and Africa, with 1.5 million members of the U.S. armed forces stationed there. Since the end of World War II, there have been more than 200 large and small wars, all caused directly by U.S. imperialism. It continues to make large-scale preparations for global or nuclear war, and has engaged in barbarous aggressive wars.

The maneuvers of U.S. imperialism at the present stage are designed, in the first place, to intensify aggression and subversive activities especially against the socialist countries. It is stepping up the barbarous war of genocide in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Occupying the Cuban territory of Guantanamo, it continuously perpetrates aggressive and provocative maneuvers against the Republic of Cuba. Its efforts to provoke a new war in Korea have reached a grave stage, with new war preparations in South Korea and more open military provocations against the DPRK as the anti-American, national salvation struggle grows in South Korea.

Pursuing a policy of suppressing national liberation movements of Asian, African and Latin American peoples, it is trying to strangle national independence everywhere. The United States instigated the Israeli expansionists to launch an aggressive war against the Arab peoples and is maliciously attempting to stifle their struggle for national independence and a new life.

In recent years, the United States has been more open in its subversive activities against newly independent national states. It has penetrated countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, with "aid" as a bait, meddles in their internal affairs and, having bribed and gathered reactionaries to oppose

progressive forces, engineers reactionary military coups. In this way it plots to sway these countries to the right and prevent their firm adhesion to the anti-imperialist camp.

As a result of the revival by the United States of Japanese and West German militarism, they have grown into dangerous aggressive forces in Asia and Europe, menacing the peace and security of the world.

There can be no question that U.S. imperialism is the main force of aggression and war, the main enemy of the peoples. The most urgent revolutionary task is to defeat the world strategy of U.S. imperialism. Then, the anti-imperialist struggle will develop by leaps and bounds, and the world revolution will be accelerated decisively.

2. THE SIMULTANEOUS FIGHT AGAINST ALLIES OF U.S. IMPERIALISM

In order to fight against U.S. imperialism and defend world peace [Kim Il Sung says], it is imperative to fight against the lackeys of U.S. imperialism and its allies.

An important factor in U.S. imperialist strategy is to induce all forces of reaction to oppose socialism and the national liberation movement. In executing their policies of aggression and war, the U.S. imperialists count on the reactionary forces in many countries that use U.S. imperialism as a guide for aggression. Typical examples are Japanese and West German militarism.³

While U.S. imperialism is the main target of all the peoples of the world, this does not mean that the struggle against other imperialist powers, particularly against the lackeys and allies of U.S. imperialism, can be underestimated. On the contrary, decisive blows can be dealt only when the principal target and its allies are correctly specified and the struggles against them are linked. The power of socialist countries is increasing, and vigorous national liberation movements are developing in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As a result, the U.S. strategy

of attacking socialist and progressive countries one at a time is being dealt hard blows in all parts of the world. Confronted by an overall collapse of its system of colonial domination, the United States seeks a solution to this crisis in open aggression and war. In these circumstances, it is important for it to induce all forces of reaction to oppose socialism and the national liberation movement, and to carry out its aggressive world strategy.

Today, Japanese and West German militarism are the most loyal allies of the United States and are active agents of its aggressive policy. They have become "shock brigades" of U.S. imperialism and are creating dangerous hotbeds of war. The struggle against them should be strengthened, as an important part of the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

It is of special importance to intensify the struggle against Japanese militarism. Kim Il Sung puts it this way:

Today the U.S. imperialists are directing the spearhead of aggression particularly to Asia, and Japanese militarism is faithfully serving the U.S. as its "shock brigade" in Asian aggression. . . . The Japanese militarists, at the bidding of the U.S., are making active preparations for a new war and Japan is serving the U.S. imperialists as a supply base and military base for aggression against Asian countries. In these circumstances, the struggle against Japanese militarism can by no means be neglected.⁴

Concentrating its military forces in Asia, the United States is integrating Asian anti-communist dependencies into its plan, reorganizing them and utilizing the power of revived Japanese militarism to which is assigned a leading role in the anti-communist military bloc.

The Japanese, with the backing of the United States, are trying to realize their old dream of Asian aggression and are working up war plans against Korea and other socialist countries of Asia. They are also increasing economic and cultural infiltration into Asian, African and Latin American countries under the slogans of "aid," "joint development" and "eco-

omic and technical cooperation." An example of these maneuvers is Japan's reentry into South Korea. Under the aegis of the United States, the Japanese, in collusion with the Pak Chung Hi regime, have again penetrated South Korea, especially since the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty. They have interfered in politics, the economy, military affairs, and culture and all other spheres, with the intention of reducing South Korea again to the status of their own colony.

In military affairs, Japan is reinforcing U.S. domination over South Korea. The plan is to use South Korea as a military base in an anti-communist Pacific military alliance (PATO), with Japan at the center, by linking the Northeast Asian Treaty Organization (NEATO) with the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in a reorganization of these alliances into a "vertical military relationship" with the U.S. at the apex. This is clearly seen in the establishment of a unified system of command and telecommunications—with the U.S. Army at the core—unification of military equipment, and joint military maneuvers of South Korea, the United States and Japan.

Concerning establishment of a unified system of command and telecommunications we cite the Japan-U.S. secret agreement concerning "mutual exchange of directions and information among the Air Force Commands of South Korea, the United States and Japan" which was exposed in March 1967, the BADGE system which went into operation in March 1969, the opening of diffused wave communications between South Korea and Japan, and the construction of a large long-wave transmitter in Pusan.

The standardization of military equipment was started long ago. Recently, since the escalation of the war in Vietnam, procurement of military supplies from Japan has increased sharply.

Japanese militarism is also lightening the burden of U.S. military aid by providing so-called "property claims funds"

and granting credits to South Korea. These funds have been invested in strengthening the military potential of South Korea, e.g., the Taejon Engineering Arsenal and the Pusan Arsenal, and in constructing ports and harbors, military roads, explosives manufacturing factories and communications equipment, as well as investing funds to supply military vehicles and various kinds of weapons to the puppet army of South Korea. The expressway between Seoul and Pusan, on which construction is being expedited with aid from Japan, is designed wide enough to serve as an emergency air strip, and it is specially reinforced to withstand heavy tanks.

Under directions from the United States, the Japanese frequently conduct military maneuvers in anticipation of actual operations in Korea. Japan's Self-Defense Forces are trained in mountainous areas with climatic conditions similar to Korea; they study U.S. Army records of the Korean War and learn the Korean language. The Japanese are concentrating land, sea and air units of the Self-Defense Forces in areas close to Korea and openly conduct large-scale straits-blockade and anti-submarine training maneuvers, with the naval forces of the United States and South Korea, in the East Sea and near the straits of Korea; the Seventh Fleet of the United States is the central force.

As has been widely exposed, Japanese militarism has already worked out a number of operational plans in anticipation of a second Korean War, including Operation Three Arrow, Operation Flying Dragon, and Operation Bull Run.* Puppet Prime Minister Chung Il Kwon of South Korea stated that if a war breaks out in Korea, Japan will aid the ROK as a participant with the UN forces. This statement indicates the main purpose for which the Japanese are accelerating their remilitarization.

Japan's place in the world strategy of the United States is

* See, for example, Wilfred G. Burchett, *Again Korea*, New York, 1968.

not confined to Korea. It plays an active role in the war in Vietnam—as a supply base, as a front line base where weapons and arms are repaired, as a direct operational base for B-52 strategic bombers and the Seventh Fleet, and as a base for the transport of military personnel.

U.S. imperialism utilizes Japan as a nodal point connecting Vietnam to Korea, for military provocations, and for escalation of the war in Vietnam. Both the RB-47 reconnaissance plane, which violated the territorial air space of Korea and was shot down in August 1964, and the spy ship *Pueblo*, which invaded the territorial waters of the Republic and was captured in January 1968, were based on Japan.

The ROK-Japan Treaty is essentially a military alliance and naturally requires political domination and subjugation in support of it. The seven-article treaty gives a legal basis for establishing the Japanese role in the political domination of South Korea, in conjunction with the United States. In other words, it is intended to guarantee and justify the political role of the Japanese as an ally of the United States in Korea.

On the basis of this legal system, a Japanese embassy and consulate have already been established in South Korea, staffed by political, diplomatic, military, police and information officers experienced in the colonial domination of South Korea. Other permanent organizations, such as a ministerial conference of the ROK and Japan, have been established. The joint colonization of South Korea by the United States and Japan is supported, as we have seen, by the export of state capital in the name of "property claims funds" and also of private monopoly capital; through the "yen collateral fund" the Japanese have obtained a voice in the control of the finances of the puppet regime. Economic penetration by Japanese monopoly capital has been stepped up since the conclusion of the ROK-Japan Treaty, reflecting the desire to convert South Korea into an economic appendage and to control its market for the export of capital and commodities.

Elsewhere, the Japanese support the aggressive acts of the Israeli expansionists in the Middle and Near Eastern areas, and oppose the righteous struggles of the Arabs. A revived and remilitarized Japan has become a dangerous aggressive force threatening the peace of Asia and of the world and the struggle against Japanese militarism cannot be neglected.

"We must be aware of the danger of Japanese militarism in Asia along with that of West German militarism in Europe," wrote Kim Il Sung. "As all the socialist countries struggle against West German militarism, along with U.S. imperialism, in Europe, so they should fight against Japanese militarism, along with U.S. militarism, in Asia."⁵

It is erroneous, in terms of the anti-imperialist and anti-American struggle, to emphasize only the danger of West German militarism and ignore the danger of Japanese militarism, which may lead to a policy of unprincipled compromise with Japanese militarism instead of fighting against it.

To underestimate the danger of Japanese militarism and take a negative attitude toward fighting against it, is tantamount to encouraging its aggressive ambitions and strengthening the position of the United States in Asia. To be sure, there are certain contradictions in the relations between the United States and Japan, but since these imperialisms have a common interest in aggression against Asia, they are closely linked politically, economically and militarily. To underestimate the alliance of the Japanese with the United States, to overestimate contradictions between them, is to deviate from the class principle that must be upheld in strengthening anti-imperialist, anti-American struggles.

At the same time, of course, the contradictions between Japanese and American imperialism are growing, and if properly utilized, can aid the struggle for national liberation.

CHAPTER II

Revolutionary Strategy of Anti-Imperialist, Anti-U.S. Struggle

The peoples of all countries making revolution should tear the limbs from the U.S. beast and behead it all over the world [Kim Il Sung said]. The U.S. imperialists appear to be strong, but when the peoples of many countries attack them from all sides and join to mutilate them in that way, they will become impotent and bite the dust in the end.¹

Regarding the basic strategy of the United States and the present stage of the anti-imperialist, anti-American struggle, Kim Il Sung says:

For the successful defeat of U.S. imperialism, it is necessary to understand its world strategy thoroughly.

The basic strategy of U.S. imperialism for world aggression at the present stage is to destroy by armed force the small and divided revolutionary socialist countries and newly independent countries one by one, while refraining from worsening its relations with big powers and avoiding confrontation with them as far as possible, and to intensify the ideological and political offensive against, and subvert from within, those countries which are weak ideologically and unwilling to make a revolution, spreading illusions about imperialism among the people clamoring only for unprincipled coexistence with imperialism, and a desire to live on good terms with imperialism.²

On the basis of its world strategy, the United States, while making large-scale preparations for global or nuclear war, has been committed to the policy of waging "local wars" and

“special wars” in different areas in the world, including Vietnam. While bribing unstable elements that are afraid of revolution, e.g., among labor leaders, and utilizing them as their agents, the U.S. imperialists actively pursue a cold war of a new type, promoting sham “liberalization” and “democratic developments” in certain countries. Under this cover, they engage in subversive activities, trying to detach newly independent countries one by one from the anti-imperialist front. They offer “aid” as a bait and meddle in internal affairs, seeking to foment counter-revolution by uniting rightist reactionaries in opposition to the progressive forces. However, as Kim Il Sung says, “Like any other imperialism on the globe, U.S. imperialism, too, is declining steadily and becoming moribund. The intensified aggressive maneuvers of U.S. imperialists are not signs of strength but, on the contrary, prove their vulnerability.”³

Setbacks in the aggressive war in Vietnam and the bankruptcy of its war policies show that the United States is no longer a symbol of strength but, on the contrary, a symbol of weakness; its crisis is deepening in the face of the upsurge of worldwide anti-imperialist, anti-American revolutionary struggles. The more the United States holds to its policy of aggression and war, the stronger will be the counter-attacks it evokes; the contradictions inherent in its world position will intensify and precipitate its downfall. It is in its aggressive Asian policy that the weakness of U.S. imperialism and its structural crisis are revealed most clearly, especially in Korea and Vietnam where it most blatantly conducts aggressive war and war provocation.

While the United States has been conducting the undeclared war in Vietnam, it has sharpened its antagonisms with the socialist camp, newly independent countries and other peace-loving forces of the world. At the same time, it is now isolated more and more from capitalist countries in Europe, which are afraid that the escalation of the Vietnam war will

have unfavorable political and economic repercussions on them, and even from its Southeast Asian satellites which are opposed to the expansion of the war. The isolation of U.S. imperialism is clear to all—the Pak Chung Hi regime of South Korea and a handful of colonial dependencies in Asia are the only countries that support actively the aggression in Vietnam.

Moreover, the war in Vietnam is deeply dividing the United States itself. Distrust of government leaders, especially of the President, is spreading rapidly among the American people over the Vietnam policy. As a result, contradictions between ruling circles and the people of the United States are growing. The escalation of the Vietnam war by reactionary ruling circles, the military-industrial complex, and the jingoistic military is making class and social contradictions more and more acute. The Negro liberation movement, in which the opposition to the Vietnam war and the struggle for civil rights are linked, is becoming sharper; economic difficulties and moral degradation, with a great increase in criminal offenses, are causing deepening social unrest and disaffection.

Practically the entire student body of the country is engaged in mounting struggle against U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia and against the militarization of the country. The youth are in revolt against the military, with large numbers of those called for service failing to report, or refusing to accept induction when they do report. Tens of thousands have deserted and gone into exile.

The working class is struggling increasingly against the reduction in its living standards due to soaring wartime prices and taxes, and against the growing repressive activities of the government. Millions of workers are going on strike against the monopolies, and undermining the positions of the pro-imperialist right-wing union leaders.

The weakness of the United States is also seen in the crisis of the dollar and of the international monetary system, essential elements in U.S. imperialism’s aggressive global

strategy. Enormous sums are spent for U.S. overseas military bases and support of its puppet armies and wars of aggression. Huge sums of capital are exported to create the basis for billions of dollars of superprofits in areas where it has military domination.

Before War II gold was the world currency for international transactions; regardless of the strength of the United States, it would have been impossible to obtain enough gold to sustain world expansion on the scale now required. It was the Breton Woods agreement, the International Monetary Fund, that provided the monetary framework for its worldwide operations after World War II.

Utilizing the IMF, the United States has been able to mobilize the necessary funds for its world strategy by making the dollar an international currency to take the place of gold. This international monetary system of the capitalist world, based on the dollar, was supported by the economic and military superiority of the United States, and particularly by the huge gold reserves which amounted to more than \$24 billion. (In 1948 the United States held about 70 per cent of the total amount of gold in the capitalist world.)

But today, more than 20 years after the end of World War II, the gold reserves of the United States have been reduced to about \$12 billion, which is less than one-third of the \$40 billion overseas liabilities of the United States. This indicates the real state of the dollar crisis and threatens a virtual downfall of the IMF, established on the basis of the dollar.

The seriousness of the crisis is shown further by the U.S. balance of trade, which had been favorable and made up for the deficit in the international balance of payments, but which has now deteriorated to the point that, on a month by month basis, it is now in the red for about half the year. The deficit in the U.S. trade balance has now come to assume a structural character.

A further weakening of the imperialist monetary system

was the forced introduction of the two-tier price system for gold, major currency devaluations and revaluations, and the virtual ending of the convertibility of the dollar into gold in international transactions. Thus, the dollar crisis has sharpened further the conflicts among the capitalist powers: the sharp demand of France that the price of gold be raised, clashes between France and West Germany over revising parity values at the time of the crisis of the franc in November 1968, Japan's demand for a more rational redistribution of monetary gold, and the failure of the United States to exercise its influence in the settlement of the crisis of international currencies.

The direct cause of the dollar crisis was the outflow of gold from the United States and a consequent sharp decline in the amount of its gold holdings, kicked off by the growing deficit in the U.S. international balance of payments. Mainly responsible was the large deficit in capital transactions, due particularly to overseas military spending and military and economic "aid," and export of private monopoly capital. In other words, the dollar crisis is caused basically by U.S. imperialism's policy of war and plunder which, in turn, accelerates inflation in the U.S. economy and is indirectly responsible for the decline in its competitive position and its trade balance.

When did the dollar crisis emerge and what made it break into the open? This is an important question, relating to the turning point in world history when the disintegration of U.S. imperialism was indicated clearly.

The dollar crisis began during the Korean War. This was the first step of U.S. imperialism on the road to its downfall, not only politically and militarily but also economically. It was in 1950, the year of the outbreak of the Korean War, that the international balance of payments of the United States changed from surplus to deficit and its gold reserves began to decline. The gold reserves had continued to rise, even after World War II; but at the end of 1950, they sank from \$24.6

billion to \$22.8 billion, a decrease of \$1.8 billion that year. With some fluctuations, this decline continued, falling to a low of \$10.4 billion in May 1968. Thus, the struggle of the Korean people in the Fatherland Liberation War shook the imperialists and started them on their downward course.

Although the United States developed its world strategy, relying on the dollar, the very development of this strategy led to the disintegration of the dollar and accelerated the bankruptcy of the world strategy itself. Furthermore, if we analyze relations among the capitalist powers, we find that the dollar crisis has led to the relatively strengthened position of West Germany, France, Italy and Japan. It also has revealed the sharpening antagonisms among the imperialist powers, in connection with the crisis of the dollar, the pound, the franc and the gold crisis that raged throughout Europe. But, as Kim Il Sung warns:

We must neither underestimate nor overestimate the strength of the United States. U.S. imperialism can still commit many more crimes.

But U.S. imperialism is on the decline. Today when the U.S. is acting most outrageously, its weakness is revealed more clearly than ever before. The Korean people are aware what U.S. imperialism is. Our people have had experience fighting the U.S. and have defended their motherland from its aggression. The Korean War revealed that U.S. imperialism is by no means invulnerable, but can be beaten in fighting. The triumph of the Cuban revolution proved this truth again under circumstances different from ours. The Vietnamese people's resistance war of national salvation, too, clearly confirms this truth. U.S. imperialism is doomed to complete destruction.⁴

For all the peoples of the world to develop a powerful struggle against the world strategy of U.S. imperialism, it is necessary for all anti-imperialist forces to unite for maximum strength. However, the actual situation falls short of this goal. There are right opportunist forces attempting to obtain "favours" by making concessions to U.S. imperialism. And there

are extreme leftist adventurists who actually abandon the struggle, while paying lip service to anti-imperialism.

It is important to overcome these obstacles, and especially to establish principled unity in the world communist movement. However, peoples oppressed by U.S. imperialism cannot wait for all problems to be solved before combatting their enemy. Moreover, small countries pitted against U.S. imperialism can achieve much by rendering mutual assistance and combining their forces in joint struggle.

This can create favorable conditions for overcoming differences in the international communist movement and for accelerating development of an anti-U.S. imperialist united front of the peoples of the world. Even if there are differences among fraternal parties, no party is in a position to evade joint action in the struggle to defeat U.S. imperialism because of such differences.

The world anti-imperialist forces are extremely diverse and include political parties and organizations in different social and political systems and individuals with diverse political and religious beliefs. Nevertheless, regardless of composition, the anti-imperialist forces share the common objective of destroying American and world imperialism.

The revolutionary struggles of the peoples of European and other highly industrialized capitalist countries are closely connected with those of the newly independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The national liberation movements are particularly active in this period. Kim Il Sung says:

The invariable policy pursued by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in international relations is to cement the unity and cohesion of the socialist camp, develop friendly and cooperative relations with newly independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and render active support and encouragement to the peoples of these areas in their liberation struggles against imperialism and to the peoples of all countries in their revolutionary struggle. We regard it as an internationalist duty to do so and to spare no efforts to that end.⁵

The Workers Party of Korea and the government of the Republic have tried consistently to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the socialist camp, to support and encourage, and increase solidarity with, the revolutionary peoples of the world. This correct policy contributes greatly to the acceleration of the Korean revolution.

The Party and the DPRK government are making every effort to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the socialist camp and consolidate internationalist friendship and unity with the peoples of the socialist countries. They support especially the just, heroic struggles of the Vietnamese people against aggression by the United States, and the heroic struggle of the Cuban people.

At the same time, they develop cooperative relations with newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and render active support to their struggles against imperialism and colonialism, for national independence and prosperity. They support fully the Laotian and Cambodian peoples in their fight to preserve their independence against U.S. intervention.

The revolutionary struggles of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America are interrelated. When Latin America suffers under the yoke of imperialism, the peoples of Asia and Africa cannot possibly live in peace, and if the United States is defeated decisively in Asia and Africa, a favorable phase will be opened for the national liberation movement of the Latin America peoples.

The Party and the government of the Republic will make efforts in the future, too, to strengthen and develop militant solidarity with the revolutionary peoples of the world. The consistent policy of support for peoples making revolutions and of cementing solidarity with them is based on a strong sense of responsibility to the world revolution and on the firm determination to advance revolutionary struggles until imperialism is completely wiped off the earth.

Indeed, the 40-year history of the revolutionary struggles of Kim Il Sung is a history of struggle against Japanese and U.S. imperialism. It is a history in which he has led the Korean people to victory with his principled stand of Marxism-Leninism and his outstanding leadership.

The Party and the government in the future, too, will strongly support the revolutionary struggles of the working class and working people in capitalist countries against exploitation and oppression, and endeavor to strengthen solidarity with them, holding high the banner of proletarian internationalism.

The just struggle of the Korean people, led by Premier Kim Il Sung, for peace and democracy, for national independence, socialism and communism, will surely triumph, and the downfall of imperialism is inevitable.

Kim Il Sung on Ultimate Victory of World Revolution

The International Conference on the Tasks of Journalists of the Whole World in Their Fight against the Aggression of U.S. Imperialism was held in Pyongyang, the capital of the DPRK, from September 18 to 24, 1969. The conference was attended by 114 delegates from 90 countries, and representatives of 13 international democratic organizations, 221 in all. This was the first international press conference held under the banner of opposing the aggression of U.S. imperialism.

The meeting of representatives of the world's progressive press to discuss their common struggle against the United States and its intensified aggression was a great event in the annals of the anti-imperialist struggle of the journalists.

In his speech at the conference, Kim Il Sung clarified the tasks facing all the peoples of the world. He analyzed contemporary imperialism, particularly that of the United States, and the historical position of contemporary imperialism in the phase of decline.

Kim Il Sung made clear the position and role of the national liberation movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the revolutionary movements of the world, and the need to strengthen the militant unity and solidarity of all the revolutionary peoples, the need mutually to support and assist each other. Further, he outlined the position and role of the socialist countries in strengthening and developing the world revolution and anti-U.S. imperialist struggles, and the need to strengthen unity and solidarity among themselves.

1. HISTORICAL POSITION OF CONTEMPORARY IMPERIALISM

The assessment of the present era, the latter half of the 20th century, is basic in defining the line and policy of the world revolution in general, including the strategy in the struggle against imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism; and the question of developing the international communist movement is the starting point in defining the line and policy of the world revolution.

Kim Il Sung made a Marxist-Leninist assessment of our era, fully analyzing the contradictions, the balance of forces in the world, the basic trends, the decisive factors in the development of the history of mankind, and various other factors. Regarding the characteristic features of the present time, Premier Kim Il Sung says: "Today we are living in a glorious age of revolutionary change when the colonial system of imperialism is crumbling beyond recovery, in a grand historic age when the national liberation revolution of the oppressed peoples is gaining great victories."

In our era irresistible tides of world revolution are rising, oppressed peoples and nations are struggling for liberation, and imperialism and colonialism will be swept from the surface of the earth. In the international arena, sharp struggles are developing between socialism and capitalism and between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces, in which the revolutionary forces are scoring great victories.

Indeed, the ultimate victory of the world revolution is on the agenda. Herein lies the basic characteristics of the latter half of the 20th century.

The ultimate victory of world revolution and the downfall of modern imperialism is a realistic prospect for our era, as shown by the development of the forces of socialism, of the labor

and democratic movements, and particularly by the rapid development of national liberation struggles. In defining the characteristics of the present age Kim Il Sung attaches importance to the collapse of colonialism and the great upsurge of national liberation struggles:

In the world arena, along with the revolutionary struggles of the people in socialist countries, the liberation struggles of the people in colonial and dependent countries are forging ahead vigorously. Today, in vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, mighty flood-tides of national liberation revolutionary movements are surging with an irresistible force, and great revolutionary storms are sweeping across the continents, wiping out imperialism and colonialism. Hundreds of millions of people in these areas, oppressed and plundered by imperialism for centuries, have thrown off the cursed yoke of colonialism and have risen proudly to emerge in the new arena of history as heroes; they are achieving brilliant victories in tearing down the old system of imperialism and colonialism and carving out a new life. The peoples of the countries still groaning under the colonial yoke of imperialism heroically are taking up arms against the aggressive forces of foreign imperialism. Under the powerful impact of the national liberation movement, the chains of colonial slavery are falling apart everywhere, and the colonial system of imperialism, which has spelled so much misery and suffering for humanity, is crumbling to dust. There no longer exists any "safe rear" or "quiet backyard" for the imperialists, and imperialism is breathing its last.²

The struggles of Asian, African and Latin American peoples against imperialism and colonialism together with the struggles of the international working class for socialism, are the two main revolutionary forces of our era. Such tremendous forces have never before been mobilized against imperialism, nor has the struggle ever been as strong as it is now.

At the same time, the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in capitalist countries against oppression and exploitation and for good living conditions and democratic freedoms are also being developed vigorously. Political and economic

crises in the capitalist world are deepening and contradictions among the imperialist powers over markets and spheres of influence become more acute. Thus, contemporary imperialism is buffeted from within and from without and is slipping into an abyss from which it cannot extricate itself. Kim Il Sung formulates the historical position of capitalism as follows:

Imperialism is a moribund force whose days are numbered, whereas the liberation struggle of the people is a new force which advances the progress of mankind. There may be innumerable difficulties and obstacles, various turns and twists, in the path of the liberation struggle, but it is an inevitable law of the development of history that imperialism is doomed and the people's liberation struggle is sure to be crowned with victory. Though the imperialists, led by the United States, are running amuck in an attempt to check the surging liberation struggles, it is only the death-bed rattle of those who are condemned to destruction. The more frantically the U.S. imperialists act, the more difficult their position becomes. U.S. imperialism is going downhill and is confronted with the fate of a setting sun.³

Yet, however difficult the position of imperialism, it will never retire from the arena of history voluntarily. Regarding this question, Kim Il Sung states: "The imperialists, led by the U.S., will never quit the arena of history of their own accord. Dreaming of its old positions, imperialism is making desperate efforts to recover its lost foothold and is trying to find a way out in aggression and war to save itself from doom."⁴

The basic imperialist policy of aggression and war leads to counter-revolution to strangle the revolutionary peoples' movements, including socialist forces, national liberation struggles of colonial peoples, and democratic movements in capitalist countries.

The United States is intensifying aggressive and subversive activities against the socialist countries. It is committed to attacking small and divided countries such as Vietnam, Korea, Cuba and the German Democratic Republic, one by one. As part of this strategy, it creates dangerous hotbeds of war in Asia and Europe by remilitarizing Japan and West Germany.

While paying lipservice to the "independence" and "freedom" of peoples, the imperialists are actually set on maintaining their colonial rule by cunning and nefarious means, and are trying to bind the peoples of newly independent nations with the fetters of neo-colonialism.

We should pay particular attention to the nature and concrete aspects of neo-colonialism, a form of dependency employed especially by the United States to deceive the people and to maintain and expand its domination, under conditions where peoples of colonial and dependent countries are awakened and join in the great upsurge of struggle for national liberation. In such circumstances, the old forms of colonialism based on direct political rule can no longer be maintained.

The imperialists bribe the reactionary oligarchy, and top military or tribal chieftains, bringing together right-wing groups to maintain the essence of colonial enslavement. Whenever the puppets they install become even slightly uncooperative in fulfilling the colonial policy, they hatch a reactionary military coup and establish a military fascist dictatorship, sometimes carrying out open military interventions. These machinations are intended to swerve the newly independent countries to the right and make it impossible for them to emerge from their colonial or semi-colonial status.

The policy of dominating economically the newly developing countries is one of the most important features of neo-colonialism. The U.S. imperialists, utilizing "foreign aid" as an important instrument for overseas expansion, pave the way for greater investments of monopoly capital. The imperialists control the economic arteries of not a few countries of the world by exporting large sums of capital and by obtaining vested colonial-type interests. Through "economic aid," they not only place obstacles in the way of the development of independent national economies but also meddle in the internal affairs of developing countries, rendering their political independence ineffective and nominal. Side by side with

military missions, training and supply of arms, ideological and cultural infiltration are also important means of neo-colonialism. With an olive branch in one hand and a gun in the other, the United States uses the combined tactics of nuclear blackmail and peaceful infiltration, oppression and appeasement, political subversion and ideological-cultural infiltration.

Obviously, the road to the ultimate victory of the world revolution is by no means a smooth peaceful transition. It will be achieved only by the strengthening of world revolutionary forces and by decisive struggle against the citadel of world reaction.

2. THEORY OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST, ANTI-U.S. UNITED FRONT

Kim Il Sung told the journalists at the world conference in Pyongyang:

The present situation demands that the revolutionary peoples of the five continents fight more resolutely against imperialism, against new and old colonialism, and concentrate their attack on U.S. imperialism in particular. Without struggle against U.S. imperialism, neither peace and national independence, nor the victory of democracy and socialism are conceivable today.

The revolutionary peoples of the whole world should put strong pressure on the imperialists, led by the United States, from all sides and tie them hand and foot so that they cannot cut up rough.⁵

An important aspect of the struggle is to establish clearly the array of opposing forces. Imperialism, its puppet regimes and subservient countries constitute the counter-revolutionary forces, whereas the socialist countries and the national liberation, labor and democratic movements constitute the forces for world revolution in our era.

The forces for world revolution have an identity of interests in the struggle against imperialism, and they assist one

another in the struggle. However, the various revolutionary forces do not have an identical role in the development of the world revolution. Regarding the role and tasks to be fulfilled by the socialist camp in organizing forces for world revolution, Kim Il Sung states:

In this the peoples of the socialist countries, before anyone else, should play a leading role. The peoples of the socialist countries should not only expedite the building of socialism and communism vigorously in their own countries, exercising vigilance to smash the subversive activities and sabotage of the imperialists and the remnants of the deposed exploiting classes, but also should regard it as their internationalist duty to render active support to the national liberation movement, proceeding from the Marxist-Leninist sense of revolutionary ethics. The socialist countries, as bases of the world revolution, should resolutely oppose the war policy and colonial predatory policy of the imperialists, and energetically assist the oppressed nations in all their revolutionary struggles. This will strengthen the allied forces of the socialist countries and the international working class, and is the way to hasten the victory in the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle.⁶

The socialist camp is the most powerful base and the most important and decisive of all the anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. forces promoting world revolution. The forces of the socialist camp comprise the total political, economic, military and other potentials of the countries within it, and represent a class alliance of the states of proletarian dictatorship; it is decisive in determining the historical development of mankind, in accelerating the world revolution. The existence and the strength of the socialist camp, encourage the revolutionary struggles of the people of the world — inspiring the peoples of colonial and dependent countries in their liberation struggles, and creating favorable conditions for and influencing the struggles of the working class in capitalist countries. Consequently, the socialist camp is the most powerful of all forces for world revolution.

Concerning the struggles of the working class in capitalist countries, Kim Il Sung says: "Together with the peoples of the socialist countries, the working class in the capitalist countries should also fight more vigorously against imperialism and thereby give strong support and encouragement to the liberation movement of the oppressed nations."⁷

In the capitalist countries, the working class opposes exploitation and oppression through the trade unions, and seeks to achieve its class emancipation. Today, labor movements in most countries tend toward communism. Militant labor movements can weaken imperialism and thereby deal a blow to world aggression and also create conditions favorable to the national liberation movements. The working class of sovereign capitalist states and oppressed nations have common interests in fighting monopoly capital. Therefore the imperialists make every effort to estrange the working class of the developed capitalist countries from the colonial and dependent peoples in order to increase their plunder and exploitation. They foster racism and national chauvinism and subvert the militant ranks of the working class by bribing the labor aristocracy with a portion of the superprofits they gain in the colonies.

Regarding the position and role of the national liberation movement and its militant tasks, Kim Il Sung says:

Colonies are the lifeline of the imperialists, their last stronghold. The imperialists will not give up their colonies of their own accord, nor will they give them independence. The peoples of colonial countries must unite their strength and wage a resolute and do-or-die struggle to drive out the imperialists and win complete freedom and independence.⁸

The anti-imperialist national liberation movement, together with the struggle of the international working class for socialism and communism, constitute the two great revolutionary forces of our era. The national liberation movement in

its revolutionary struggle to cut the lifeline of the imperialists can contribute to the development of an overall world revolution by rapidly weakening the imperialist forces, accelerating their downfall and safeguarding world peace.

Asia, Africa and Latin America account for 71 per cent of the earth's total land area and more than two-thirds of the total population. These continents have tremendous resources. Imperialism has fattened on the sweat and blood of their peoples and plundered their resources. Even today, imperialism rakes in profits amounting to billions of dollars annually from these areas. If colonialism, old and new, is wiped out in Asia, Africa and Latin America, a vital basis of imperialism will be destroyed.

Kim Il Sung says: "The newly independent countries that have thrown off the yoke of imperialism are confronted with the weighty task of safeguarding their national independence, carrying forward the revolution and assisting the liberation struggle of the peoples of the countries still in imperialist fetters."⁹ He points out that peoples who have won independence are faced with the task of abrogating all shackling treaties, agreements and military alliances concluded with the imperialists, liquidating the political and economic footholds which they and their domestic reactionary accomplices rely on for subversion, and rallying forces to effect a revolutionary society.

On the role of the democratic movement in the mustering of forces for world revolution, Kim Il Sung states:

Today, the international democratic movement and the peace movement hold a very important place in the common anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. front. These movements unite hundreds of millions of working people and progressives in the world. All peace-loving people of the whole world must fight more stubbornly for a lasting peace and a bright future for mankind and for checking and frustrating the imperialist policy of aggression and war.¹⁰

The democratic movement is not directed specifically toward socialism, but it is one of the forces of anti-imperialist

struggle. It fights to win democratic freedoms and rights, to oppose fascist oppression. Today, all international democratic movements have a common interest in the struggle against imperialism, and U.S. imperialism in particular. As Kim Il Sung says: "When all of the world's revolutionary forces vigorously wage an anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle on every front they hold, imperialism will be wiped out for good and the peoples of all countries will come to achieve genuine national independence and social progress."¹¹ It is to prevent this that the imperialists are engaged in maneuvers to split these forces.

Today, differences within the international communist movement are obstructing internal unity. An anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. united front formed as quickly as possible, can foil maneuvers to split the ranks of the international communist movement, overcome "left" and right opportunism, and achieve unity of the international communist movement, thus accelerating the world revolution.

Joint action is necessary not only to accelerate the world revolution, but also to develop revolutions in individual countries. A victory on one front against the United States will weaken the strength of U.S. imperialism and will create favorable conditions for victory on other fronts. Today, an anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. united front on an international scale is realistic because the United States is reaching out its tentacles to all countries, large and small, which consequently have a common interest in opposing U.S. intervention. On the revolutionary principle and concrete method for realizing an anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. united front, Kim Il Sung says:

It is necessary for us to bring together all the forces opposed to imperialism and to develop anti-imperialist struggles with their united strength. It is a basic principle for the strategy and tactics of the Communists today to bring together as many allies as possible, even if they are not adequately strong forces, and expand the anti-imperialist front to isolate U.S. imperialism as much as possible, and to attack it jointly.¹²

A revolution is carried out by broad sections of the masses. Consequently, the greater the forces, the more successful the revolution will be. People with many different ideas are opposed to imperialism—those who fight actively against imperialism, and others who are forced to join the struggles under mass pressure in their own countries and from the peoples of the world. Whatever their motivations, all forces, even weak ones, should be united, as long as they are not agents of imperialism. Kim Il Sung explains: "In realizing joint action, the Communists must stick to the principle of achieving unity through struggle and conducting struggles through unity."¹³

It is impermissible to make unprincipled compromise with any forces for the sake of unity to effect joint action or a united front. In launching a joint struggle, wavering and inactive elements should be criticized to help them overcome negative tendencies and to support and develop their anti-imperialist leanings. It is also necessary to approach those who avoid or take a negative attitude toward anti-imperialist struggle and convince them. Today, it is most important to strengthen assistance to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression. Only through practical actions can inactive forces be awakened and led gradually into more positive involvement.

Kim Il Sung says: "Even small countries can defeat a big enemy, once they establish *Juche*, unite the masses of the people and valiantly rise in battle despite sacrifice."¹⁴

To establish *Juche* is a fundamental requirement of a revolutionary struggle. No one can write prescriptions for revolutions in other countries, nor can he carry out a revolution for other countries. The Party and the people of each country are responsible for their revolution. Needless to say, however, revolutionary struggles in each country are a component part of the world revolution and are closely related to those in other countries. Consequently, international unity and mili-

tant solidarity among all revolutionary forces are important for victory, and for defending and consolidating revolutionary gains. But victory depends primarily on militant preparation and revolutionary struggles in each country.

In the struggle against foreign imperialism, external aid is important, but secondary. Consequently, the Party and the people of each country are required to establish *Juche* and exert self-reliance in their revolutionary struggles, as well as in fighting against foreign aggressors.

Kim Il Sung says further:

There must not be even the slightest illusion about the United States. History clearly shows that spreading illusions about the United States and advocating unprincipled compromise with it will only lead to dulling the revolutionary vigilance of the people, making the U.S. imperialists more arrogant and insolent, high-handed and outrageous, and will encourage their maneuvers of aggression and war.¹⁵

The apologists for imperialism are trying to whitewash it by inventing such sophistries as "imperialism has changed in nature" and "imperialism has adapted to new historical conditions." Particularly, they are trying to impart some kind of popular nature to state monopoly capitalism, which is the economic basis of contemporary imperialism.

However, state monopoly capitalism is a system of domination by monopoly capital, which cannot exist without increasing the exploitation, plunder and oppression of working people the world over. The expanded domination and arrogance of monopoly capital necessarily intensify all the contradictions of imperialism and deepen its crisis, forcing it to seek a way out in militarization of the economy, the arms race, aggressive overseas expansion and wars, and in the attempt to establish fascism.

If the United States were to change its nature, it would no longer be imperialism. To say that it has changed its nature is like saying that a wolf in a sheep's skin is not a wolf. In order

to fight U.S. imperialism it is necessary to take a firm class stand, to cast off all illusions, and to fight. To fight, it is necessary not to overestimate the strength of U.S. imperialism and not to be afraid to oppose it. As Kim Il Sung says, we should neither overestimate nor underestimate the United States. Like other imperialisms, it is already going downhill.

Today, the United States is carrying on aggression and war in all parts of the world. This is not an indication of strength but of the fact that it is in a more difficult position. If one loses sight of this, it can lead to yielding to U.S. imperialism.

The historical mission of the working class is to eliminate exploitation on a worldwide scale and to construct socialism and communism, the highest ideal of mankind. The world revolution is the struggle of the international working class to realize its historical mission.

Since subjective and objective conditions for the revolution do not ripen simultaneously in different countries, the ultimate victory of the world revolution is achieved through socialist triumphs in individual countries and through the gradual expansion and strengthening of the socialist camp. Kim Il Sung formulates the law of development of the world's revolutionary movement as follows:

As the forces of capital are international, so the liberation struggle of the peoples is an international movement. The revolutionary movements in individual countries are national movements, and constitute a part of the world revolution at the same time. The revolutionary struggles of peoples in all countries support and complement each other, and unite in one stream of world revolution. Victorious revolutionary forces should assist the revolutions of those countries which are not yet triumphant, using their experiences and examples. They should give active support to the liberation struggle of the world's peoples, with their political, economic and military power. At the same time, people in the countries which have not yet won the revolution should struggle more actively to defend the victorious revolutions of other countries against the imperialist policy of strangulation and hasten victory for their own revolutions.

This is the law of development and the excellent tradition already formed in the course of the people's liberation struggle.¹⁶

If the situation is ripe and the forces fully are prepared, the proletariat in each country should carry out its revolution without waiting for other countries to carry out their revolutions, and should thereby establish the power of the working class. The working class that has seized power must consolidate its revolutionary gains, develop them and promote actively the revolution and construction in its own country. To be faithful to its revolution is in complete accord with the law of development of the world revolutionary movement and also is to be faithful to proletarian internationalism.

The ultimate victory of the revolution in individual countries is impossible apart from the victory of the world revolution, and the more the world revolution is developed, the more favorable will be the revolutionary situation in individual countries.

In order to accelerate the victory of the world revolution, the working class of the countries which have achieved revolution and the working class of the countries that have not yet achieved it must assist each other and join in one great current of world revolution.

Today, imperialism is going downhill, toward final collapse on a worldwide scale. On the agenda of world revolution is the question of liquidating imperialism for good and all. Premier Kim Il Sung says:

For their common position in the past and for their fighting goals, the Korean people have always stood firmly by the oppressed peoples and supported their struggle for freedom and liberation in every way. The militant friendship and solidarity of our people with the revolutionary peoples of the world are further strengthened today. We regard this as an important guarantee of victory in our revolution and will continue, in the future, too, to strive tirelessly for firm militant solidarity with the peoples of all countries on the front of anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle.¹⁷

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